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1Abstract
The last two decades have witnessed the development of theories deal-
ing with discourse. Contributions from Linguistics, Philosophy, and Logics
have helped to expand the knowledge of the eld. But, independently of the
researchers' viewpoint, all theories make the same basic claim, namely: dis-
course is a complex structured abstract entity. If a theory is to succeed it must
take into account such structure. Therefore, questions such as \What struc-
tures do discourses have?", \How many structure sorts can be assigned to
discourses?", \Can discourse structure sorts be unied?", and the like, must
be be asked (and answered). This thesis proposes a formal semantical model
as an answer to the rst question.
This is not a work in Linguistics; it, however, is based on a series of well
established results from Linguistics research. For instance, it presupposes
that discourses can be hierarchically organized having discourse segments,
or discourse blocks, as their basic components. Also, it presupposes that
coordination and subordination are the basic relations among discourse blocks.
However, dierently from the literature where the hierarchical organization
corresponds to the well known tree structure, leading in one way or another
to stack oriented processing, this work proposes a \list" oriented processing.
The stack oriented processing has been vindicated in the literature as a
tool for processing discourses. Among many other things, the stack-block
structure allow us to explain how anaphoric relations are possible even across
segment borders. This would be ne for continuous discourses. But, it clearly
fails to account for interruptions.
Sometimes, a discourse can be interrupted and resumed later on. A simple
example of this phenomenon occurs when someone introduces a person to a
group and discovers that that person is not so well-known as (s)he thought.
Trying to recover the situation, a parenthetical background explanation would
be given; after that the discourse might be resumed naturally. But, if the
resumption is almost always taken in a backward direction (and therefore the
stack model will work ne), there might be the case that a \forward" move
2into the parenthesis is needed. As a consequence the stack model ought to be
relaxed (the stack is not a stack, after all) or hardened (stacks of stacks, and
the stack-like have been prescribed for these stack-rascal cases.) Therefore,
a stack oriented processing does not seems to be the \natural" model, at
least not as natural as a list (or tuple) might be. A nice property is that all
\relevant properties" modelled by a stack-theory are preserved under the list
model such as, for example, the search for possible referents of denite noun
phrases and pronouns.
This is a work in Semantics; this thesis proposes a semantical system for
handling nested discourses with interruptions. Since these issues remind us of
programming languages concepts; dynamic logic which has been extensively
used to model programming languages forms our basic building block. This
thesis can be seen as a generalization of Groenendijk and Stokhof's (1991)
system, since it takes Groenendijk and Stokhof's (1991) Dynamic Predicate
Logic (dpl) as the dynamic theory to be further developed. Groenendijk
and Stokhof's (1991) system deals with anaphoric pronouns occurring in a
\plain" discourse, i.e., in a linear sequence of sentences. The cornerstone of
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) is the insight that a sentence is a function
between information states. Since the present work presupposes hierarchically
structured discourses, a multidimensional function should be used instead. As
a consequence of the better structuring \attached" to discourse structure, the
present work allow us to keep track not only of anaphoric relationships but
also of denite noun phrases which could be rendered under the uniqueness
restriction (which I take as a relative concept.)
This thesis not only generalizes previous work, but also opens the way for
a new series of semantical systems. Going even further in the programming
languages paradigm, we might say that the present system has only dealt with
a few parameters. For example, we assume that all \dimensions" share the
same domain of individuals. Also, we don't take into account any rhetorical
relations (these might be seen as a kind of parameter communicating dierent
things amongst dierent dimensions). But this is left as future work.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Context
This research work deals with natural language semantics and is the result of a cross-
fertilization between two compelling research elds, which we might roughly call
\logic semantic theories for natural languages" and \linguistically based discourse
theories."
Characteristic of linguistic theories is the attempt to explain not only the reg-
ularities among sentence structure components (and therefore to come up with a
compositional semantics of natural language sentences), but also (in a \general per-
spective") the regularities among groups of sentences. Central to the discourse
discussion are questions such as (to cite only a few): Are discourses a hierarchically
structured entity? If so, which structures are there? Are these structures related to
what makes a discourse coherent? What is the relationship between these structures
and anaphoric reference? Also characteristic of these approaches is the cognitive,
psycho-linguistic settings into which their development is made.
Characteristic of logic semantic theories is the computational paradigm adopted.
In it, the analogy drawn makes a sentence a computational process with the potential
of modifying the information one might have before the sentence has been conveyed.
So, sentences are modelled as \update functions" between information states. This
model has achieved impressive results. For example, under the compositionality
2criteria (basic to almost all logic theories since Frege), anaphoric intra-sentential
(as well as inter-sentential) reference has been solved. As a consequence of the
sentential barrier breakdown, these logical theories \stepped forward" to a more
general setting: the discourse context.
Although some approaches have adopted the word \discourse" into their names
or \advertising slogan," we must be aware that they all, indeed, deal with discourses
as plain as possible (discourses are equated to a linear sequence of sentences. No
hierarchical structure is even taken into consideration.) This certainly does not
invalidate the computational paradigm. On the contrary, it shows that there is a
problem still to be solved.
Put in a simple way, the problem is to develop a logical semantic system capable
of dealing with a more complex range of structured discourses (and a more complex
range of linguistic phenomenon occurring inside and among the discourse structures,
such as, for example, pronominal anaphoric reference, long distance reference, in-
terruptions, the use of denite noun phrases, etc.) under the rule of computational
paradigm. And that is what this thesis is all about.
1.2 Goals of this Research
The main goal of this research is to show that:
1. it is possible to bring \linguistically based discourse theories" into \logic se-
mantic theories,"
2. the previous move improves our comprehension of some linguistic phenomena,
3. the improved comprehension might be used to give feedback to \linguistically
based discourse theories,"
4. the model developed here could be used as the starting point for new generation
of dynamic logics.
Items 1, 2, and 3, above, characterize the cross-fertilization already mentioned.
The move from \linguistics" to \logics" seems to provide an improved model for
3understanding a logical analysis of some natural language phenomena, since it helped
us to expand the ontology taken into account by traditional dynamic semantics.
The new ontology ought to include new entities corresponding to discourse and
its constituents (namely, discourse blocks). The traditional dynamic settings are,
still, rather conservative; for them, the top most entity (namely, sentence) is only
a formula and therefore a discourse (which they take as a sequence of formulas) is
only a formula, since a conjunction of formulas is still a formula.
It is clear that these new entities ought to introduce a new scope dimension
into the information states model. The dimension I am referring to here is related
to the physical limits of discourse blocks. This dimension, which is missing from
traditional dynamic settings, would be used to model some linguistic phenomenon.
For example:
anaphoric pronouns on noun phrases It is a well known fact that anaphoric
pronouns might be used inside (but not outside) the discourse block where
their antecedent noun phrases are rst introduced. As a consequence, anaphoric
relationships should be kept local to discourse blocks.
long distance reference Long distance reference occurs when the antecedent of
an anaphoric pronoun (or anaphoric noun phrase) is located far away from
its anaphor. But this distance depends only on the metric adopted. So, long
distance reference might be seen as a short distance one if the lengthy interme-
diate material behaves like a digression, which in this case, should constitute
a sub-block (i.e., a sub-discourse).
1
Once more, the referential relationship is
kept local to the discourse block.
To cope with such new ontological entities and their implications, a new information
states model ought to be developed. This new model ought to keep track of the
1
An analogy to the programming language Lisp would help here. Let (a1 a2 (b1 b2 . . . b100) a3
. . . a10) be a list. How far is a3 from a2? For a Lisp programmer the answer is easy: two units of
distance. For a non programmer the answer is easy as well: one hundred and one units of distance.
The Lisp programmer sees (b1 b2 ... b100) as a single object for which the internal elements are
not relevant for answering the question made. The same metric could be used for explaining the
long distance anaphoric puzzle.
4local nature of scope. The analogy to Lisp would help us once more. Lists (a
mathematician would read tuple instead of list) are recursive structures composed
of atoms or lists. And discourses are no dierent: they are recursive structures
composed of sentences or discourses. To keep some phenomenon local to the index
position they occur, a tuple is the semantic tool we are after. The information state
model conforming to the data presented can be constructed upon the \traditional"
information state model in the format of a tuple of traditional information states.
In other words, the new information state is multi-dimensional.
The move from \logics" to \linguistics" seems to provide an improved model
for understanding some linguistic phenomena, since substituting the list processing
for the stack processing model (used by all linguistics theories I have seen) should
provide us with better solutions for problems posed by, for example, discourse in-
terruption and discourse resuming. However, I am not a linguist and so will not
attempt to a full linguistic evaluation.
The multi-dimensional dynamic logic proposed looks like the top of an iceberg.
The present formulation is kept as simple as possible, but open to further generaliza-
tions as well. Some generalizations would be of methodological nature (and in some
sense conservative, since we should expect the preserving of basic results). Others,
not so much.
For example, we assume that for each discourse block the universe of discourse is
the same (a not very realistic assumption) and equals the whole universe. If we drop
this assumption, new possibilities will appear. For example, I might have dened the
universe as the union of the tuple of local discourse block universes. We also used
total assignment functions (an inheritance from traditional Tarskian semantics). I
might have adopted partial valuation functions instead. But these proposals seem
to t into the methodological category.
A set of possibilities are available and could be attached to every dimensional
component. But the one I like most is to imagine that every component of the mul-
tidimensional information state is composed by a set of assignment functions and
5a set of rhetorical functions. These rhetorical functions would allow us to transfer
specic phenomena (or entities) from one dimension (discourse block) to another.
This would impose an even greater dynamic character on an already dynamic frame-
work. This certainly ts into a new radically distinct category. We have to wait for
the right time to come.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into two halves. In the rst half we provide the background
for the thesis' second half, where a new logical framework is presented and dis-
cussed. An incremental construal of the argument that discourses are highly
structured abstract entities (where anaphora, uniqueness of denite descrip-
tions, among many other phenomenon) might be better analysed is adopted
for the rst part. The length of this part reects the many roots we searched for
support.
The main part proposes a new logical framework, which is suitable for processing
some types of complex discourses, and develops a new semantic system in tune with
it. The proposed framework, which deviates from classical Tarskian semantics set-
tings, adheres to the new information states semantic paradigm.
2
But, if we accept
that discourses are hierarchically structured objects, our ontology should reect
this; as a consequence, sentences can not any longer be taken as uni-dimensional
update functions on uni-dimensional information states. To overcome these prob-
lems, this thesis proposes a multi-dimensional information state model. More
than a simple extension, this model (of multi-dimensional update functions) paves
the way for a great number of new extensions, capable of dealing with broader range
of linguistic phenomenon, which we can already envisage a quite interesting ones for
future work. After all, we are not seals on the top of an iceberg engaged in a dis-
cussion about the whole iceberg size. We are aware of the iceberg we have just
2
The terms computational paradigm, information states semantic paradigm, and dynamic se-
mantics will be used hitherto interchangeably in this work.
6\discovered". So:
Chapter one introduces the problem we are going to deal with, and establishes
the research context.
Chapter two covers anaphora in more detail. It presents a good number of ex-
amples of anaphora as well as a syntactic tool, the Government Binding Theory
(GB), due to Chomsky, for dealing with it. GB's strengths and weakness are also
discussed. Moreover, the material presented makes clear the need for world know-
ledge, word meaning, inference and default referents since the referent for an anaphor
can be almost anything { be it explicit, implicit or absent from discourse. The next
two chapters deal with these topics from dierent viewpoints.
Chapter three draws a contrast between unstructured and structured approaches
for discourse representation from a linguistic point of view. The linguistic data and
linguistic theories presented argue for a hierarchical structure for discourse pro-
cessing. A stack oriented processing is advocated by these theories as an adequate
tool for explaining how (and when) anaphoric relations are allowed (or not) across
discourse segments' borders. The structural restrictions inherited from the stack
model allow us to explain linguistic phenomenon such as, for example, which refer-
ents are actually available, and the use of a full noun phrase instead of a pronoun.
But, instead of accepting a stack model we argue for a list model; after all, we
can simulate a stack on a list. Above all, lists are general enough to allow one to
represent multi-dimensional entities. Most importantly, this chapter motivates the
development of a logically based theory taking not sentences but discourse segments
as the basic information unit.
Chapter four discusses theories dealing with unstructured discourses. All logic-
ally based theories for discourse found in the literature are of this modality; discourse
is always presented as a linear sequence of sentences. However, these approaches,
in one way or another, are able to cope with problems such as (1) the relationship
between indenites and pronouns occurring inside conditional clauses (the so-called
donkey sentences), and (2) the relationship between noun phrases and pronouns
7anaphoric on them occurring in it or in some previous sentence. Also, the natural
language dynamic interpretation framework, referred to as dynamic semantics is
presented and discussed. Dierently from traditional logic approaches, where mean-
ing is equated to truth conditions, dynamic approaches are based on a completely
dierent basic notion. It is the information change potential of a sentence that is
taken as constituting its meaning.
Chapter ve, at last, presents the problem and proposes a methodology to solve
it. The problem is related to structured discourses where interruptions might occur
with posterior resuming of it. So to speak, this kind of discourse is rooted in chapter
three. However, the stack methodology does not t as a natural model for this
discourse class. The solution, on the other hand, is rooted in chapter four. The
cross-fertilization of both \views" lead to the proposed solution.
Chapter six is where the development of the formal system is done and its prop-
erties are presented.
Chapter seven is a collection of examples showing how the formal system copes
with it.
Finally, chapter eight summarizes the overall research and points out its limita-
tions and contributions, as well as recommendations for future work.
8Chapter 2
Syntactically Focused Approaches
This chapter deals with the problematic character of anaphora and its associated
doppelganger partner, reference, in connection with Natural Language Processing
(NLP).
As is well known, reference plays a central role in language; theories developed
to model natural language should take a close view of reference-anaphora pair into
account. Philosophers, linguists, and, more recently, AI workers have studied such
phenomena from dierent viewpoints. Roughly speaking, we might classify these
viewpoints into three basic categories which might be labelled as \syntactic," \se-
mantic," and \pragmatic." Each category has witnessed the development of theories
spread through the time-line.
For the \syntactic" category, two fundamental approaches are represented in the
literature by Russell's (1905) Theory of Descriptions
1
and Chomsky's works on syn-
tactic and binding theory (as known as GB) which inspired most of the NLP research
up to the mid 70's; here the time gap is around half a century. For the \semantic"
category, fundamental approaches are given by Kamp's (1981) Discourse Repres-
entation Theory (DRT), Heim's (1982) File Changing Semantics, and Groenendijk
and Stokhof's (1991) Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL); they all have in common the
fact that they revive Frege's dichotomy between sense and reference. Finally, for
1
I am assuming the reader is acquainted to this work; comments on it will appear in the scope
of this thesis; no other mention to Russell's work will appear in this chapter.
9the \pragmatic" category, fundamental approaches are exemplied by Strawson's
(1950) criticism of Russell's (1905) work and Grosz and Sidner's (1986) proposal.
Although \syntactic" approaches fail to take into account most of relevant as-
pects of NLP they provide introductory background concepts. According to the
trichotomy given above, this chapter should be seen as the syntactic one while
Chapter 3 should be seen as the pragmatic one and Chapter 4 the semantic one.
2.1 A Brief Introduction to Anaphora
Being one of the most fundamental natural language phenomenon, anaphora is also
one of the most puzzling and pervasive problems; its problematic character shows
up in every theory dealing with natural language independently of the viewpoint
adopted. It is present in logically, linguistically, philosophically, and pragmatically
oriented theories corresponding to the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic tricho-
tomy already explained.
2
Moreover, due to its immanent dynamics, complexities,
and subtleties, no theory has successfully covered the issue of explaining how words
are able to denote concepts and \refer back"
3
to objects, concepts and entities in
general.
Anaphora will be used here in the general sense to refer to the relationship in
natural language wherein a proform is interpreted by reference to another term,
usually a name, or noun phrase (NP), in a sentence or discourse. We can say
also that anaphora is the device of making in discourse a short reference to some
\object(s)", real or abstract,
4
in the expectation that the discourse participants be
able to \recover" the full reference and therefore determining the identity of the
2
We are not going to take into account psycho-linguistic, and therefore, cognitive theories
for anaphora acquisition. However, such theories help to strength the pervasiveness character of
anaphora; psycholinguistic research has pointed out that children's mastering of anaphora occurs
at a fairly uniform age, being quite independent of the child's level of general syntactic
development. The last argument seems to strength the idea that anaphora could not be fully
accounted by purely (traditional) syntactic approaches. To get better acquainted to such issues,
see Chomsky (1969), and Lust (1986).
3
The term anaphor derives from the Greek meaning pointing back. However, what is being
pointed back might occur in a forward as well as backward direction which are termed cataphor
and anaphor resp. And for deictic cases, \outside" of discourse.
4
Asher (1993) deals with abstract objects, and reference to them, in English.
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entity referred to. The reference is called an anaphor and the entity referred back
to is usually called the referent or antecedent. A reference and its referent are said
to be coreferential.
5
Although the terms referent, antecedent, and coreference are not
problem free we will adopt the general usage.
Daryel carried a pewteer centipede and a box to put it in.
antecedent/anaphor relation
reference induced coreference
Figure 2.1: Coreference as a induced relation.
Usually the anaphoric reference is lexically, or phonetically, shorter than the
referent, as for instance in (1.a), and (1.b).
(1) a { Daryel carried a pewter centipede and a box to put it in.
b { Ross took Nadia and Sue  Daryel.
Paraphrases, however, provide counter-examples for shorter reference case, as in
(2).
6
(2) Most of the city's federal buildings were dark, but chandeliers shone brightly
from the National Portrait Gallery. Inside the building in which Walt Whitman
once read his poetry to wounded Union troops and Abe Lincoln held his second
Inaugural Ball, a black-tie assemblage of guests stood chatting.
5
Strictly speaking, the traditional semantic view of reference is one in which the relationship of
reference is taken to hold between expressions in a text and entities in the real world, and that of
coreference between expressions in dierent parts of a text. However, Brown and Yule (1983, page
192) states that
co-referential forms are forms which \instead of being interpreted semantically in
their own right . . .make reference to something else for their interpretation (Haliday
and Hasan (1976, page 31))." These forms direct the hearer/reader to look elsewhere
for their interpretation.
Figure 2.1 summarizes these points and explains why the term coreference is employed as I stated.
6
Example taken from Hirst (1981, p. 26).
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A possible alternative \denition" for shorter reference is accepting that the ana-
phoric reference provides less information, or is less specic, than the referent. This
is not true, either, since example (3) refutes such assumption; the reference is clearly
more informative than the referent.
(3) Maaike went to a sunny country last year. She wanted to go to Spain, but
eventually went to Portugal.
Anaphor is a complex issue that cannot be approached from a single point of
view. Pragmatically and semantically related issues will be discussed in Chapter 3
and Chapter 4 respectively. It is worth noting that the literature on anaphora deals
mostly with the intrasentential kind. This is specially true for syntactic and semantic
approaches, although, more recent semantic theories have been designed to take
care of intersentential kind which traditionally has been addressed by pragmatically
discourse related approaches.
The next few sections will be dedicated to present a basic taxonomy for anaphora,
based on Hirst's (1981) work, and discuss anaphora from a syntactic point of view,
where General Binding Theory concepts play a fundamental role.
2.2 A Basic Taxonomy
A \grammar" for anaphora ought to take into account the distributional dierences
among anaphor types and their interpretation in terms of the specics of their
domain, whether syntactic, semantic or pragmatic (in the sense introduced in the
beginning of this chapter). Adhering to this viewpoint, Hirst (1981) presents a
ne-grained anaphora taxonomy, which is summarized in Table 2.1.
Pronominal anaphora is the most common kind of anaphoric relationship in the
literature; for them, Hirst distinguishes three main categories. Although he didn't
rene his pronoun pronominal variety, the \literature" goes further splitting that
category into three other subcategories corresponding to deictic, e-type and bound
types, to be presented in section 2.3. For the remaining types, a short characteriza-
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Type of anaphor Lexical realization
pronominal
 pronouns : : : : : : : : : : : : \he", \she", \it", \one", . . .
 epithets : : : : : : : : : : : : : \the idiot", \that stinking lump of
camel excrement", . . .
 surface count : : : : : : : : : \the former", \the latter", \same", low
ordinals, . . .
prosentential \it", \so", . . .
pro-verbial \do"
proactional \do so", \do it"
proadjectival j prorelative \such", \so", . . .
temporal \then", temporal relations
locative \there", locative relations
ellipsis 
Table 2.1: Hirst's (1981) anaphora classication.
tion, achieved by the use of prototypical examples, will be provided in the next few
paragraphs. However, before this, it is worth pointing out that Hirst claims that all
types of anaphora in Table 2.1 plus paraphrase are indeed special instances of den-
ite reference, for which he presents a proposal dealing with semantical ISA hierarchy
augmented/amended by pragmatic factors such as focus of attention, consciousness,
and activatedness, to cite but a few. This reects the state of the art at the time.
Interestingly, the distinctions made were similar to the Fregean dichotomy between
sense and reference, which started to become part of many logical-semantical theor-
ies thereafter. Such distinctions try to solve, for instance, problems exemplied in
(4) where it refers to the same entity which the gherkin sandwich refers to. For the
paycheck example it does not refer to the same entity referred to by the antecedent;
instead, they pick up their referents from the very same sortal class.
(4) a { Mr Bean made a gherkin sandwich but didn't eat it.
b { The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man who
gave it to his mistress.
In an indirect way, we will present the denite reference anaphora case making
use of the partition presented in table 2.1. As tiles of a puzzle t together to produce
a complete picture, so the tools below will integrate to provide an improved model
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of anaphoric reference. Each \subcase" will indicate the need of tools from syntax,
semantics and pragmatics elds.
2.2.1 Denite Reference: case by case
Epithets When used anaphorically, epithets cannot take pronouns as antecedents
(cf. Lako (1976)). This seems to direct us to \syntactic" theories; traditional
ones, such as gb, for intrasentential cases as (5.a) or discourse grammar ones,
such as Prust, Scha and van der Berg (1994) and Polanyi (1988), for cases as
(5.b).
(5) a { `What's that?' asked Terrier, bending down over . . .
`The bastard of that woman from the rue aux Fers who killed her
babies!'
7
b { Mary used Ross' credit card so much, the poor guy had to declare
bankruptcy.
Surface Count Reference Noun phrases like the former and the latter can be
used anaphorically as in (6). The reference is directly guided by syntactic
surface structure.
(6) If I have to choose between a car or an elephant, I will go for the former.
Although ordinal numbers could be used in this sense, it seems unnatural to
pick up an inner element from a list, as in (7):
(7) John went to a car boot sale and bought a penguin pet, nails, a pair of
spectacles, a bunch of dried owers, a broken mainframe console, a pair of
ex-NASA thecno-trousers, and a money maker machine. He declared that
he preferred the sixth.
Prosentential Reference This category includes pronouns and words such as
such, and so used to refer, not to previous NPs, but to situation(s) evoked
by, as exemplied in (8) (from Anderson (1976)).
7
The epithet refers to Jean-Baptiste Grenouille, the main character of Patrick Suskind's book
Perfume.
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(8) Your wife was under the impression that you would be away tonight, and
as you can see, I thought so too.
Strained Reference This category includes cases where the referent is not \expli-
citly" present in any previous NP; the referent, however, is risen to attention
by a lexically similar term, as exemplied in (9) (cited in Hirst (1981)). The
pronoun it refers to the guitar which is only indirectly brought to discourse by
the NP a guitarist.
(9) John became a guitarist because he thought that it was a beautiful instru-
ment.
Pro-verbial Reference This is the case for verbal phrase anaphora, as in (10).
Notice that to do is the unique English pro-verbial verb (cf. Hirst (1981)).
(10) a { Maaike likes belly-dancing.
b { She hates waltzing.
c { Saskia does too.
Proactional Reference This is the case when an anaphor refers to the action(s)
taking place in a previous event, as in (11). This kind is built with do in
conjunction with so, it and demonstratives.
(11) Nadia removed a herring from her pocket and began to llet it. Ross did
so too.
However, as Hirst (1981) observes, there is no clear border separating proactions
and pro-verbs; sometimes replacing does it or does so for does do not change
the originally intended meaning.
Pro-adjectival Reference Words like such might be used to refer to adjectival
forms, such as in (12).
(12) I was looking for a purple wombat, but I couldn't nd such a wombat.
Temporal Reference This is the case when an anaphoric reference is made to a
time or an event as in (13).
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(13) a { In the mid-sixties, free love was rampant across campus. It was then
that Sue turned to Scientology.
b { In the mid-sixties, free love was rampant across campus. At that time,
however, bisexuality had not come into vogue.
Locative Reference This is the case when an anaphoric reference is made to a
place as in (14).
(14) The Church of Scientology met in a secret room behind the local Colonel
Sanders' chicken stand. Sue had her rst dianetic experience there.
Ellipsis This is the case when the anaphor is completely null.
(15) Nadia brought the food for the picnic, and Daryel  the wine.
The examples given above do not exhaust each item of the basic classications. For
instance, example (10), the pro-verbial case, shows the intricacies for coordinative
verbal phrase anaphora since (10.c) might refer to (10) as a whole or only to (10.b).
8
2.3 Pronominal Anaphora
As already mentioned, pronouns have been classied into three categories, namely,
deictic, bound, and the e-type, accordingly to their characteristic behaviour patterns
and intended analyses.
The interpretation of deictic pronouns are determined in relation to specic fea-
tures of the speech-act; in a two person conversation, the speaker and addressee's
identity together with the time and place depends on the speech event. Because
of that, deictic pronouns have been traditionally analysed as free variables of a
predicate calculus.
The bound approach to pronominal anaphora can be analysed in a purely syn-
tactic tradition, as in the Government Binding Theory, and in a semantic line, as
done in the dynamic logic settings. Dynamic settings follow the motto that pro-
8
For more detailed coverage on VP anaphora, see Prust et al. (1994).
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nouns should be seen as syntactically free variables that are, somehow, semantically
bound.
The e-type analysis are similar to the bound analysis in that both assume that
pronouns are, somehow, semantically bound variables. The dierence between them
is basically that in the bound analyses pronouns are identied to variables while the
e-type analyses pronouns are interpreted as \going proxy" to denite descriptions.
E-type accounts realize these ideas by taking e-type pronouns as quantiers. Again,
a logical semantic setting is present.
To be in accordance with this chapter's name and goals, and the previous ex-
position, it seems that the proper place to give more details of pronominal analysis
should be postponed until chapter 4, the one dealing with logical approaches, has
been reached.
2.4 Government Binding Theory
Binding Theory, Chomsky (1981), is a theory developed to syntactically mirror
the principles governing anaphoric behaviour of noun phrases (NPs). In order to
achieve this, the notion of command is introduced and NPs are classied in three
categories, namely, ana for reexives and reciprocals, pro for pronouns, and np
for non-pronominal full NPs. Each category is governed by a principle restricting
anaphoric possibilities. The principles are usually referred to as:
Principle A: If an anaphor is of type ana, it must be locally bound to an ante-
cedent.
Principle B: If an anaphor is of type pro, it must be locally free.
Principle C: If an anaphor is of type np, it must be free.
Auxiliary notions of locally boundness/freedom are dened as:
 An NP is locally bound if it is coindexed with a locally commanding NP.
 An NP is locally free if it is not coindexed with a locally commanding NP.
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 An NP is free if it is not coindexed with a commanding NP.
The notion of command remains unexplained; in the traditional Binding Theory
(gb) this notion, called c-command, is dened congurationally based on the surface
syntactic tree representation. In gb c-command is dened as:
 A c-commands B i the rst branching node dominating A dominates B.
 A locally c-commands B i A c-commands B, and A and B are contained in
the same minimal S or NP.
Figure 2.2 shows that the NP the boys locally c-commands the anaphor themselves.
S
NP VP
V NP
themselves
The boys
like 
Figure 2.2: A locally c-commanding conguration.
That all full NPs behave the same as far as binding relations are concerned is not
problem free. Proper nouns, non-pronominal denite NPs, indenite and quantied
NPs are all subject to Principle C, and therefore equally treated. However, data
displayed in (16){(19) refutes gb criteria since all these sentences respect Principle
C | the full NPs are free and coindexed with some NP but not with a commanding
NP. Moreover, (a) sentences are better than the (b) ones.
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(16) a { When he
i
arrived home, John
i
kissed his wife.
b { When he
i
arrived home, every man
i
kissed his wife.
(17) a { John
i
is a fool but John
i
doesn't mean any harm.
b { A man
i
is a fool but a man
i
doesn't mean any harm.
(18) a { John
i
's mother loves John
i
's father.
b { A boy
i
's mother loves a boy
i
's father.
9
These examples are from Dorrepaal (1994)
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(19) a { His
i
friends say John
i
is very intelligent
b { His
i
friends say [every boy in my class]
i
is very intelligent
Solutions have been proposed, but they were not adopted by the standard version
of the Binding Theory. Postal (1971), for instance, claims that when a denite
pronoun is to the left of an NP, this NP must be denite for it to serve as antecedent.
Wasow (1972) suggests that the relevant distinction is between referring expressions,
which he calls determinate, and other NPs. The former class includes specic NPs
and generic NPs. For him, non-specic non-generic NPs are indeterminate. These
constraints, if adopted, would be added to Principle C.
Another type of solution is shift to the semantic representation dierences as
exemplied in (19) a and b. Although defensible that properties like determinate
or denite belong to semantics rather than syntax, that shift does not solve the
problem. Reinhart (1983) and Dorrepaal (1994) argue that the unavailability of
anaphora for cross-over cases, like (19.b), should be ascribed to properties of surface
constituent order rather than scope.
Dorrepaal (1994) proposes an alternative to gb preserving as much as possible of
gb's original goals; the basic dierence to standard gb is a mechanism of controlled
coindexing aecting Principle C.
In most linguistic theories, the anaphora problem is approached from only one
viewpoint. Syntactic theories are mostly concerned with syntactic intrasentential
constraints; they also require that antecedents be more specic, i.e. have more
descriptive content, than the anaphors. But, the specicity constraint is the Achilles'
heel for most of syntactic approaches since it is better accounted for at the discourse
level.
2.5 Summary
The aim of this chapter was to present a basic taxonomy for anaphora as general
as possible in order to show how dicult the development of an automatic ana-
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phora solver would be. From a methodological point of view such an automatic
solver presupposes the existence of a general framework (in some kind of general
logical language) capable of representing anaphoric phenomena. However, due to
the number of anaphoric sorts, we have shown that the common practice is to take
into account a small number of cases. This typically includes noun phrases such as
pronouns and denite descriptions, when used anaphorically.
The material presented makes clear the need for world knowledge, word meaning,
inference and default referents since the referent for an anaphor can be almost any-
thing { being it explicit, implicit or absent from discourse. The next two chapters
deal with these topics.
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Chapter 3
Discourse Focused Approaches
3.1 Initial Remark
The aim of this chapter is to draw a contrast between unstructured and struc-
tured approaches for discourse representation. A non-structured discourse might
be understood as a linear sequence of sentences/utterances. As a consequence, the
discourse does not play a role except for delimiting the extension for scope relations.
However linguistic data has been prescribing/pointing to a tree structured hierarchy
as the best model for representing the relationships among discourse segments. So a
stack oriented processing has been prescribed as the tool for processing discourses.
Moreover the block structure explains how anaphoric relations are allowed (or not)
across discourse segments' borders. This is even more astonishing when we take into
account that these theories are older than the unstructured ones which, by the way,
have taken programming languages as a paradigm.
By now, we might realize that structured approaches convey more information
since, for instance, the stack imposes restrictions over which referents are actually
available, the use of a full noun phrase instead of a pronoun, etc. Plain theories lack
all this richness. This chapter motivates the development of a logically based theory
taking not sentences but discourse segments as the basic information unit.
Since all \linguistic" theories for discourse segmentation are, in some sense, based
on three approaches, I will focus on them.
21
3.2 Semantics and Pragmatics of Natural Lan-
guage
Pragmatics, as the study of language in context, is often dicult to distinguish
from semantics, as the study of the connection between the language sign system
and the world it represents. Although the phenomena covered by both viewpoints
are almost the same, a dierence of perspective is still present. \Semanticists"
advocate that meaning is a property of a text, dialogue or discourse. For the less
strict semanticists, meaning can not be seen detached of context. To determine the
meaning, large amount of contextual knowledge are needed and used. Contextual
knowledge is used under dierent disguises and names such as ontologies (complete
with default reasoning),
1
and lexical/semantic preference approaches, which help
us to interpret metonymies, metaphor, and other non-literal language and facts
about discourse structure and other language regularities to determine the overall
plan and purpose of the discourse.
2
However, the parts of context used tend to
be compartmentalized and represented as universal static knowledge sources (cf.
Farwell and Helmreich (1995, p. 4)). On the other hand, \pragmaticists" advocate
meaning as a property of people since only people can engage in intentional thought
and action. Pragmaticists generally agree that human language is used not just for
reecting the world, but for the purpose of describing complex mental models of how
things are not as well as how things are. The last point of view is literally expressed in
Farwell and Helmreich's (1995) article intitled \Contextualizing Natural Language
Processing".
From the viewpoint expressed above, the approaches we are going to discuss
might be labeled as semantic theories.
1
Lascarides and Asher (1991) might be included in this group. As we will see in subsection 3.3.1
they use defeasible reasoning to infer discourse relations providing a way to deliver dierent in-
terpretations for similar syntactic structures in a temporal import. Defeasible rules represent
causal laws and Gricean-style pragmatic maxims that codify world knowledge as well as linguistic
knowledge.
2
Grosz and Sidner (1986) should be included into this group.
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3.3 Three linguistically oriented well-known ap-
proaches
A discourse is usually understood as a sequence of utterances/sentences; each utter-
ance/sentence may be assumed to contribute something to the meaning of that dis-
course as a whole (Prust et al. (1994)). However, the meaning of a discourse cannot
be regarded as the simple conjunction of the meanings of the utterances/sentences
that constitute it. Sentences, and discourse segments in general, are usually in-
volved in complex semantic dependencies. Parallelism is a good source for simple
and clarifying examples of these dependencies. The two sentences
(1) a. John likes visiting relatives
b. (and) Peter likes visiting friends.
can independently have an \active" reading or a \passive" one (i.e., John likes to
visit relatives for the active reading and John likes relatives who visit for the passive
reading). The parallel coordination does not allow for a mixed
3
reading; this case
shows how discourse compartmentalizes ambiguity. If we replace (1b) for Peter likes
visiting marketplaces then the active reading for it superimposes onto the ambiguous
(1a) sentence. So, a discourse is more than a sequence of connected sentences.
But, discourse seems to be a pervasive concept. Its meaning is usually taken from
the common ground; therefore, it is unlikely to be directly approached. Hopefully,
there exist indirect ways to determine the nature of discourses, the essence of its
building blocks, and the relationships between these building blocks. Questions are
the tools for this research endeavour. Questions such as what makes a coherent
discourse?
4
And this is what the literature in discourse is all about.
Hobbs (1979), Hobbs (1985), Reichman (1978), Grosz and Sidner (1986), Mann
and Thompson (1987b), Polanyi (1988) and Scha and Polanyi (1988) proposed the
most signicant theories dealing with the questions above. At rst glance, these
3
Not allowed: (1.a) active and (1.b) passive and vice-versa.
4
Notice that this question is indeed a twofold one, namely: (i) What are the basic building
blocks for making a discourse? (ii) What kinds of relationships do hold between the building
blocks?
23
theories do not have any common point but the hierarchical structure claim. Inde-
pendently of the cited authors' distinctive points of view and background, the ana-
lysis of discourse data allowed them to attribute hierarchical structure to discourse,
and relations of \dierent sorts" between the discourse segments. The theories vary
in the ne grain structure of their analysis of discourse structure. The extremes are
best exemplied by Grosz and Sidner's (1986) approach, which makes use of three
levels of description for discourse, and Rhetorical Structure Theories, which propose
an open-ended set of relations between discourse segments; Mann and Thompson
(1987b), for example, introduces a set of twenty three relations such as Evidence,
Cause, Contrast and Elaboration. Although there is no direct mapping from one
theory to another some rules of thumb hold: for example, Elaboration is a type of
subordination (cf. Inder and Oberlander (1994, p. 4)).
Not surprisingly, the hierarchical structure proposed is modeled through tree
structures. Tree structures display all relevant characteristics since nodes at same
level might be used to represent coordination. Nodes at dierent levels, display-
ing the ancestor-descendent relationship, might be used for subordination. Tree
structures are suitable for representing not only plain coordination/subordination
relations but also information about the segments, such as its extension (i.e. where
the segments start and end; every subtree of a given node conveys such information)
and the relationship among them, such as, for example, Explanation and Narration.
Figure 3.1 is an abstraction exemplifying narration as the coordinative force and ex-
planation as the subordinative one. Moreover, all theories advocate the right frontier
as the locus of all possible points for attachment of incoming sentences/utterances.
5
The default attachment point is the bottom right-hand node of the tree; however,
various discourse cues can cause attachment to occur further up on the right frontier.
Coordination and subordination play an important role not only for natural lan-
guages but also for articial ones. Let us take the Algol programming language
as a preliminary example. As is well known, Algol is a nested block oriented lan-
5
Gardent (1994) argues that in cases where one discourse segment is semantically related to
two or more discourse segments, a graph, instead of a tree, provides a better solution.
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Narration
Explanation
Narration
Explanation
Figure 3.1: An Abstract/Hypothetical Discourse Tree
guage. The concept of nesting represents, essentially, the idea of (co/sub)ordination
since blocks at the same level represent process coordination while embedded blocks
represent process subordination.
Programming languages as a paradigm for natural language processing is not a
new claim. As a paradigm, it has been used some times disguisedly, some times
explicitly. We can enroll Grosz and Sidner (1986) and Polanyi (1988) in the rst
group and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) in the second one. Grosz and Sidner
(1986) propose a stack as the way to compute the focus of attention, one of the three
components of their theory. Polanyi (1988) uses a tree as the natural model for her
theory, the Linguistic Discourse Model (ldm). These two theories share the idea
that discourses are made of possibly embedded segments standing in a coordination
or subordination relationship. Dynamic Predicate Logic (dpl), Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1991), was the rst logical theory to take it explicitly.
6
The block structure provide us with a rough answer for the original questions
above. In some sense, we have produced some evidence for a kind of grammar
for discourse dealing with the possible syntactic attachment points for incoming
sentences. But to discuss the semantic counterpart that makes all cited theories
distinctive we should take them individually.
6
But only in a shallow form since a discourse is taken as a linear sequence of sentences. As a
programming language it reminds me of Basic. However, dpl and other logics are the target for
chapter 4.
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3.3.1 Rhetorical Structure Theories
Rhetorical Structure Theory (rst) addresses the development of a comprehensive
theory of text organization. The theories developed, such as Mann and Thompson
(1987a), Mann and Thompson (1988), Dahlgren (1988), Hovy (1991), Moore and
Paris (1991), follow a very basic pattern, since they all provide a set of rhetorical
schemata rules for a wide variety of purposes trying to capture what it means for a
text to be coherent.
To achieve such goals, the following questions should be answered:
 what are the smallest building blocks, or atomic parts, of a organized text?
 how can these parts be arranged?
 how can the parts be connected together to form a whole text?
In this way, the theory could be used as part of a text analysis system, applied to
generation and/or interpretation process. And, indeed, most of \rival" alternative
approaches, in the interpretation set up, take rst as a useful and important part of
their own internal structure. Polanyi (1988) and Prust et al. (1994), for instance,
fall into this category.
Rhetorical approaches, such as the ones already named, characterize text struc-
ture in terms of functional relations holding between parts of the text. These theories
also take texts as hierarchally structured objects making explicit the resources avail-
able for use in interpretation or generation. But, instead of using coordination and
subordination terminology, we nd an equivalence on the use of terms like nucleus
(N) and satellite (S), Dale (1993), as already pointed out on page 23.
In Dale (1993, topic 3, transp 53 and 55) we nd the following example and also
the denition for the Elaboration relation as displayed in gure 3.2.
(1) I love to collect classic automobiles.
My favourite car is my 1899 Duryea.
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N S
love-to-collect favourite-car
Elaboration

relation name: Elaboration
constraints on N: none
constraints on S: none
constraints on the N + S combination:
S presents additional detail about the situation or some element of
subject matter which is presented in N or inferentially accessible in N
in one or more of the ways listed below. In the list, if N presents the
rst member of any pair, then S concludes the second:
1. set : member
2. abstract : instance
3. whole : part
4. process : step
5. object : attribute
6. generalization : specic
the eect: Reader recognizes the situation presented in S as providing additional
details for N. Reader identies the element of subject matter for which
detail is provided.
the locus of the eect: N and S.
Figure 3.2: Denition for the Elaboration relation (cf. Dale (1993))
Although Rhetorical Theories propose an open-ended set of relations between
parts of a text, they also suggest the existence of grammars dealing with discourse.
Polanyi (1988), Scha and Polanyi (1988), Lascarides and Asher (1991), Lascarides,
Asher and Oberlander (1992), and Prust et al. (1994) present us with sophisticated
grammars; in Lascarides and Asher (1991), Lascarides et al. (1992), Lascarides
and partners work on Discourse Relations, Discourse Representation Theory and
Defeasible Reasoning. Using defeasible reasoning to infer discourse relations, they
provide a way to deliver dierent interpretations for similar syntactic structures,
in a temporal import. In their framework, defeasible rules represent causal laws
and Gricean-style pragmatic maxims codify world knowledge as well as linguistic
knowledge. Prust et al. (1994) present us with an extension for Scha and Polanyi
(1988) in a context of typed multi-sorted logic.
The main criticism of Rhetorical Theories (rt) is based on the fact that if rts
provide an account to discover/model relationships holding between discourse seg-
ments, they all fail to explain, or provide an account to model, three kinds of se-
mantic phenomena. They fail to provide explanation for the way discourse structures
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change the propositional content of the constituents being related in the discourse.
They also fail to explain anaphora resolution where the antecedents refer to ab-
stract entities (Asher (1993)). Finally, they do not account for temporal reasoning
in discourse (Lascarides and Asher (1991)).
Let us make again a parallel to computing. Imagine that discourse segments are
subprograms taking a discourse from an input state s
i
to an output state s
i+1
, as
exemplied below:
s
i
 s
i+1
 s
i+2
The dynamics of \rst-order" subprograms.
Dierently from \rst-order" subprograms, where the input state and the subpro-
gram determine the output state, \higher-order" rhetorical subprograms have to
take into account an extra parameter, a rhetorical relation, as displayed below:
s
i

Rh
s
i+1
 s
i+2
The dynamics of \higher-order" subprograms.
The output state s
i+2
is dependent on the input state s
i+1
as well as on the nature
of the rhetorical relation Rh. But rhetorical relations modify the computational
behaviour of subprograms they are input. They themselves behave like subprograms.
So to speak, the computation done inside each discourse block is mediate by another
(kind) of subprogram { the rhetorical subprogram { which is given as input to it.
From a functional viewpoint, each discourse segment might be seen as a comput-
able (partial) function taking two dierent sorted inputs, a state and a rhetorical
relation. To model incoherence we have two choices. On one hand, we might adopt
partial functions as models.
7
On the other hand, we might adopt a trap strategy
assigning a particular trap value as output for those undened input values. If the
rhetorical relation makes the discourse incoherent, relative to the input state, then
the output from  must reect this fact.
7
Recall that partial functions are not dened for all input values. When applied to values that
do not belong to their domain, partial functions diverge, i.e., do not produce or assign an output
value.
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Although incoherence aects the whole discourse, it is localized to the open
part of discourse, namely, the right frontier of the discourse parse tree (for more
details on discourse parse, see Lascarides and Asher (1991) and Polanyi (1988)).
Recovering from incoherence would be a matter of backtracking, trying to recover a
correct rhetorical relation, as in cases of misunderstanding.
8
The worst case occurs
when no recovering is possible. If no rhetorical relation could be recovered for it,
the block might have been linked to the wrong point. And, if no place could be
found to attach the block, then something went wrong. But if the last case occurs,
it is likely to happen only on a single participant discourse situation such as the
reading of book (or thesis) where the author's intention could not be accessed. For
dialogues, however, it is possible to extend recovering via segment deletion, since
the other(s) participant(s) could help to overcome the troublesome situation. In any
case, this does not change the point made here since deletion should be done on the
most right element of the discourse parse tree.
Since rhetorical theories do not invalidate the programming language analogy
we proceed to the analysis of Grosz and Sidner's theory, which advocates the use of
a small set of intentional relations instead of rhetorical ones, and to the tree based
theories, which incorporate rhetorical relations into their own account.
3.3.2 Grosz & Sidner's theory
Grosz and Sidner (1986) present us with a theory based on linguistic and non lin-
guistic notions intending to stress the role of purpose and processing in discourse.
They model the discourse structure as a composite of three separate but inter-
related components: linguistic structure, intentional structure and the attentional
state. They conceive the last two structures as the non linguistic ones.
As they themselves state on page 175, \the linguistic structure deals with the
structure of the sequence of sentences. It consists of segments of the discourse into
8
In these cases, the discourse segment has not to be changed; what has to be recovered is
the correct rhetorical relation attached to the discourse block. See Dahlgren (1988), particularly
chapter 8, for more details on this point.
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which the sentences naturally aggregate. The intentional structure captures the
discourse relevant purposes, expressed in each of the linguistic segments as well
as relationships among them. The attentional state is an abstraction of the focus
of attention of the participants as the discourse unfolds. The attentional state,
being dynamic, records the objects, properties, and relations that are salient at
each point of the discourse. The distinction among these components is essential
to provide an adequate explanation of such discourse phenomena as cue phrases,
referring expressions, and interruptions."
3.3.2.1 Linguistic Structure
To explain the linguistic structure, the authors make an analogy to sentence de-
velopment. At the sentential level, following particular patterns, words aggregate
to make sentences. At the discourse level, a similar process occurs. According to
particular roles and intentions, sentences aggregate into blocks, discourse segments,
contributing not only for the particular discourse segment but also to the overall
discourse.
A close reading of the authors' viewpoints should be enough to realize that
they have implicitly accepted the existence of an automata dealing with discourse.
Dierently to syntacticians,
9
who developed formal grammars for discourse, Grosz
and Sidner informally describe some characteristics of discourse segmentation, such
as, for example, the \neighbourhood relation" between two consecutive sentences.
For any two consecutive sentences, there are cases when they belong to the same
segment and cases when they do not. And, there are cases when non-consecutive
sentences belong to the same discourse segment. Figure 3.3 exemplies these cases.
Once more, the resemblance to a programming language becomes evident. First-
ly, a typical Algol-like block structure is described in the last sentences as shown in
gure 3.3. For this gure, sentences (a), (d) and (h) are not consecutive although
belonging to the same segment/block. On the other hand, sentences (a) and (b) are
9
See section 3.3.3, page 34.
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(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) . . .
(d) . . .
(e) . . .
(f
1
) . . .
(f
2
) . . .
(g) . . .
(h) . . .
(i) . . .
(j) . . .
Figure 3.3: A hypothetical Algol-like block structure
in dierent block/segments. Secondly, the concept of subprogramming underlying
the block structure is triggered by the contribution it could make to the overall
discourse.
The other two components of the theory, namely, the intentional structure and
the attentional state, allow us to go further into the analogy with an Algol-like
programming language.
3.3.2.2 Intentional structure
Intentions play a primary role in explaining discourse structure, dening discourse
coherence, and providing a coherent conceptualization of the term discourse itself.
In their paper, Grosz and Sidner have integrated two previous research work lines,
dealing with focusing in discourse and intention recognition, providing basic mater-
ial to generalize these notions to a broader range of discourses.
10
The model they
propose for intentional structure is very simple when compared to alternative rhet-
orical based theories. They make, indeed, a strong criticism of rhetorical theories
claiming that a xed set of rhetorical patterns, such as the ones in Hobbs (1979),
Mann and Thompson (1983), Reichman (1981), are unlikely to cover the so diverse
intentions underlying discourse.
Every discourse has a foundational purpose, which the authors refer to as Dis-
course Purpose (DP), reecting the intention that underlies engaging in a particular
10
The previous works were in the \context" of task oriented discourse.
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discourse. Since a discourse is built on discourse segments, each segment has asso-
ciated a proper Discourse Segment Purpose (DSP) which contributes to the overall
DP. Based on relevant structural relationships among intentions, modeled by DPs
and DSPs, the authors avoided the adoption of rhetorical relations into their theory.
The authors have identied two structural relations: dominance and satisfaction{
precedence. A DSP
1
dominates DSP
2
, or conversely DSP
2
contributes to DSP
1
,
when the rst is intended to provide part of the satisfaction for the second. A DSP
1
satisfaction{precedes DSP
2
whenever DSP
1
must be satised before DSP
2
.
Notice, however, that the two structural relations correspond to subordination
and coordination, respectively. As a consequence, the authors can transpose DPs
and DSPs to the Attentional State part of their theory.
3.3.2.3 Attentional State
The third component of the theory, the attentional state, is the one to which the
analogy to programming languages becomes more salient. The authors think of it
as a computational device modeling the focus of attention as the discourse unfolds.
Being inherently dynamic, the attentional state is responsible for recording the ob-
jects, properties, and relations that are salient at each point in the discourse. It is
modeled by a set of focus spaces and a set of transition rules. These rules specify
the conditions for adding or deleting spaces according to changes in the attentional
state. The authors call the process of manipulating spaces focusing.
Each discourse has associated with it a focus space containing the entities that
are salient { either because they have been mentioned explicitly in the segment or
because they became salient in the process of producing or comprehending the utter-
ances in the segment. Moreover, the focus space includes the DSP reecting the fact
that the context participants are focused not only on what they are talking about,
but also on why they are talking about it. The focus space structure enables certain
processing decisions to be made locally. Particularly, it limits the information that
must be considered in recognizing the DSP as well as that considered in identifying
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the referents of certain classes of referring expressions.
The authors claim that a stack is the best model for dealing with focusing struc-
ture characteristics. However, such stacks should not be taken in a strict sense.
11
The space in the stack's top is the most salient one, but information in lower spaces
might be accessed from higher ones (but less so than the information in the higher
spaces). The stacking of focus spaces displays the relative salience of the entities in
each space during the corresponding segments portion of the discourse.
Via the focusing structure, the attentional state constrains the search for refer-
ents of denite noun phrases, pronouns and the like. For example, there are dier-
ent constraints on the use of pronouns and reduced denite noun phrases within a
segment than across segment boundaries, as gure 3.5 shows. This concept is sup-
ported by authors' statement, on page 178, where they say: \The segmentation of
discourse constrains the use of referring expressions by delineating certain points at
which there is a signicant change in what entities (objects, properties, or relations)
are being discussed. While discourse segmentation is obviously not the only factor
governing the use of referring expressions, it is an important one."
It is amazing the similarity here compared to Algol-like languages. Firstly, seg-
ments might introduce local entities which should be available for pronominal or
denite reference only into the segment. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 exemplify such be-
haviour; for the tent example, the denite reference on sentence 14 refers back to
the indenite noun phrase on sentence two since both sentences belong to the very
same segment. For the movie essay, however, sentences one and four, belonging to
distinct segments, make impossible the use of denite or pronominal reference. In
some intuitive sense, this compares to local declarations for programming languages.
A local variable, for instance, has as scope the block or subprogram where it has
been declared (except when not being locally declared it has been declared in one
of the block's ancestors).
12
Secondly, the stack model proposed corresponds to the
11
In the sense that only the top element is accessible.
12
Being subordinated, a pronoun/variable might refer back to the entity dened on the main
clause.
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DS0
DS1
1. A I'm going to camping next weekend. Do you have
a two-person tent I could borrow?
2. B Sure. I have a two-person backpacking tent.
3. A The last trip I was on there was a huge storm.
4. It poured for two hours.
5. I had a tent, but I got soaked anyway.
6. B What kind of tent was it?
7. A A tube tent.
8. B Tube tents don't stand up well in a real storm.
9. A True.
10. B Where are you going on this trip?
11. A Up in the Minarets.
12. B Do you need any other equipament?
13. A No.
14. B Okay. I'll bring the tent in tomorrow.
Figure 3.4: The tent example
execution time abstract machine related to block-structure programming languages.
Suppose now that to accomplish the intended task, embedded blocks are needed for
some block. So, during the execution of the dominant block, which is on the top
of the stack, embedded blocks will be processed. At that point, a push operation
will occur on the stack putting a new embedded block in there. The unnished
block is now less salient than the top one. However, the unnished block might con-
tain denitions for entities referred, but not dened, into the top one. Lastly, since
the lexical scope is the same for both approaches, the search for referents follows
the same discipline, i.e., looking for them through the activation records (or focus
spaces) until a denition is found.
An important remark should be made here. Since I have been talking about
Algol-like language, I would like to make explicit the one to one mapping between
the discourse segmentation block and the Algol block structure. As such, the Algol
concept is best understood as an anonymous subprogram whose invocation point
corresponds to its denition point. This diers radically from named subprograms
which can be invoked from dierent points into the program (obeying the lexical
convention.) This allows for dierentiating the lexical link from the dynamic link.
The dynamic link records the base address of the calling subprogram while the lexical
link points to the stack address where the non-local entities should be found. As
a consequence, if a program does not use named subprograms the execution stack
corresponds to the lexical denition. The converse, however, is not true.
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DS0
DS1
DS2
DS3
DS4
DS5
DS6
DS7
16.
overindulgence in the taste for the \movie".
Parents and teachers will do well to guard the young against
15. How can our young people drink in through their eyes a continuous spectacle
of intense and strained activity and feeling without harmful eects?
14. The more reasonable and quiet aspects of life are necessarily neglected.
13. but only strong emotion, or buoonery can be represented through
facial expression and gesture.
12. Without spoken words, facial expression and gesture must carry the meaning:
11. Even the best plays, moreover, are bound to be exciting and over-emotional.
10. One has only to read the ever-present \movie" bilboard to see how
cheap, melodramatic and vulgar most of the photoplays are.
9. In the rst place the character of the plays is seldom of the best.
8. Can it be other than harmful?
7. But the important fact to be determined is the total result of continuous
and indiscriminate attendance on shows of this kind.
6. because of their astonishing vividness.
5. No one can deny, of course, that great educational and ethical gains may
be made through the movies
4. Ought any parent to permit his children to attend a moving picture show
often or without being quite certain of the show he permits them to see?
3. that it is time to take careful thought about their eect on mind and morals
2. especially to young people,
1. The \movies" are so attractive to the great American public,
Figure 3.5: The movies essay
Although events anaphora could be a case for the general full Algol-like case, I
am going to stick to the former case, i.e., to the anonymous block structure.
3.3.3 Syntactic Approaches
Scha and Polanyi's (1988) framework is considered a paradigm of the tree based,
syntax semantics isomorphism approach
13
to discourse theories (cf. Gardent (1994,
p. 2)).
Proponents of the syntax semantics isomorphism support the idea that discourse
can be described by means of a discourse grammar which, essentially, consists of a
typed unication based sentence grammar augmented with a set of discourse gram-
mar rules. The introduction of a discourse grammar provides the tools for predicting
the tree structure of discourse as well as an isomorphism between discourse syntax
13
This explains this section's name.
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and discourse semantics. The tree structure comes up as a consequence of rewrite
rules, since the discourse grammar proposed is basically a context-free one. The
grammar consists of rules which describe how to build up various kinds of structur-
ally dierent Discourse Constituent Units (DCU).
As we have already pointed out, coordination and subordination play an import-
ant role and Scha and Polanyi (1988, page 574) distinguish the following kinds of
DCUs:
Subordinations. Subordination is a binary structure in which the rst element
remains accessible. They are units in which all or most of the structurally
relevant features are inherited from the left constituent.
14
In semantic subor-
dinations, such as rhetorical subordinations and topic-dominant chains, there
is a semantic relationship between the components. Interruptions, however,
are semantically very dierent, although structurally analogous. In this case,
there is no semantic connection whatsoever between the two constituents.
Binary Coordinations Binary coordinations are structures in which the second
element has equal status to the rst. As a consequence, the rst element
becomes inaccessible to the other one. Under this category, the authors, include
rhetorical coordination (the counterparts of the rhetorical subordinations), and
adjacency pairs which are concerned with the interactional dimension of the
discourse.
N-ary Coordinations These are at structures containing arbitrarily many ele-
ments, of which, at any time, only the most recent one is accessible. Lists,
monotonic lists, and narratives fall into this category. This case could be seen
as an extension to the binary coordination when one assigns a right recursive
structure to the context-free grammar rules.
Scha and Polanyi (1988) give an extensive grammar for discourse parsing while
Polanyi (1988) gives an informal description of the parsing process.
14
Unlike the sentential subordination, in discourse subordination, the subordinating element is
always located to the left of the subordinated one.
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Parsing follows a step by step strategy, attaching every incoming sentence to the
right edge of an existing discourse parse tree (see gures 3.6 and 3.7). An important
assumption of the parsing process is that at any point it only uses information on
the right edge of the existing discourse tree. This means that interlocutors just
need to be aware of the stack of information which corresponds to the
labels on the right edge of the tree, rather than the complete details of
the discourse so far (see Scha and Polanyi (1988, p. 576)).
(a) John is a very good athlete.
(b) He can run a four-minute mile.
(c) He throws a mean hardball, too.
(d) And John is very smart.
(e) Won all the prizes at his graduation.
(f
1
) Even I was surprised
(f
2
) that he won the Spanish prize.
(g) He didn't even like Spanish.
(h) Anyway, he's a disaster at parties.
(i) He's too shy.
(j) Last week, he went to a party at Bill's house : : :
Figure 3.6: An example from Polanyi (1988, p. 620)
f2                 g
f1                 S
e                  S
d                  S
S                          S
a                  C
b                  c
C                                           S
h                  S
i                    j
C
Story
Figure 3.7: Discourse Parse Tree for example in gure 3.6
Prust et al. (1994) present us with a very sophisticated extension of the ideas
sketched above. Using a many-sorted typed logic, the authors dene the Most
Specic Common Denominator (MSCD), a kind of unication procedure, aiming to
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solve Verb Phrase Anaphora.
15
The unication procedure, or more correctly, the
underlying logic, takes DCUs as logically complex terms.
The general format of DCUs, as well as the rhetorical coordination rule, are
depicted below:
cat [
1
: 
1
; : : : ; 
n
: 
n
]
where \cat" is the start symbol of the context-free grammar, s are the attributes,
and s are expressions standing for the value-sets of the attributes.
dcu[
1
: mscd(
1
; 
1
); : : : ; 
n
: mscd(
n
; 
n
); sem : a & b & R(a; b)]
) dcu
1
[
1
: 
1
; : : : ; 
n
: 
n
; sem : a]
dcu
2
[
1
: 
1
; : : : ; 
n
: 
n
; sem : x : R(x; b)]
This rule parses semantic coordinations involving an explicitly indicated binary co-
ordinating rhetorical relation R, such as \therefore", \accordingly," for instance.
Notice that the meaning of the relation is incorporated in the semantics of the
clause in which it occurs; it denotes a predicate on propositions. The function
\mscd" computes the most specic common denominator of its arguments in the
hierarchy of value-expressions of relevant attribute.
Back to the programming languages analogy, we nd here explicit references to
concepts such as stack and parse tree. The stack, corresponding to the leaves on the
right edge of the tree, models what Grosz and Sidner (1986) call focusing. Also, the
discourse grammar rules presented provide a unique possibility for attachment of new
incoming sentences, viz. the right edge. Inheritance, when allowed, \propagates"
entities, such as discourse referents, for example, from the left parent (not necessarily
the immediate previous sentence) to the right daughter. As a consequence, a block
structure comes up naturally.
15
The missing verb phrase is recovered by computing the MSCD between parallel sentences.
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3.4 Conclusions
This chapter is one of the cornerstones of this research work which claims that it
is possible to deal logically with discourses from a dynamic point of view. The
keyword here is discourse, which I will take as general as possible, i.e., discourses
as hierarchically complex structures. To give support for the forthcoming logical
development, and provide insightful comments on the subject of discourse structure,
a summary of the most important linguistic theories on discourse structure was
presented.
The methodology to be approached in chapter 6 (namely, the dynamic semantics)
grows upon an analogy to programming languages. The analogy made by logically
based discourse theories is related to the concept of state of program execution.
This analogy seems to be sucient when one takes discourses as no more than a
simple linear sequence of sentences. However, it is possible to go deeper into the
programming analogy borrowing not only the state execution concept but also data
structure concepts. And, as presented in this chapter, the data structure model
is the one present (sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly) in all of the leading
linguistic theories accounting for discourse modelling.
The typical data structure used by linguistic theories (dealing with discourse) is
known as stack. The stack model is used to provide us with explanation (and impose
constraints on) linguistic phenomena such as anaphoric reference, interruptions and
the use of denite (and indenite) noun phrases. However, the kind of stack used is
not really very stack-like and I have argued that a list would be a better structure.
To sum up, this chapter presents a summary of the leading linguistics approaches
to discourse modelling. It also provides the background setting for the (linguistic)
claim that discourses are very complex entities and, how some data structures can
explain the constraints ruling some linguistic phenomena.
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Chapter 4
Logic Focused Approaches
4.1 Initial Remarks
The aim of this chapter is to present, discuss and compare dierent logical ap-
proaches dealing with discourse structure. By its very nature, discourses are dy-
namic and anaphoric relations are the most striking examples. However, we must
realize the nave use for terms such as dynamic and discourse. Most theories make
discourses a \plain" rst step generalization for scope binding operations. This en-
tails, for example, that existentially introduced objects are available for reference
through the whole discourse. Such an eect is achieved by the careful use of indexes
or variables throughout discourse. Questions related to variable renaming and scope
for existentials are in the kernel of such theories. drt, dpl and their ospring are
the leading examples for this framework.
1
This chapter paves the way for the need
for more structured Discourse Theories.
4.2 Introduction
This chapter provide us with a brief overview on theories addressing the issue of dis-
course structure from a logical point of view. Discourse seems to be a rather vague
1
As it was said in this thesis' abstract, the present research work takes dpl as its basis, and
therefore, this thesis should also be included in the end as one of dpl's ospring.
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word used to bridge a gap between natural language semantics and pragmatics. Be-
ing a typically pragmatic notion, discourse had been left aside from traditional logical
approaches. However, the more recently linguistically based approaches have taken
this notion into account (see Kamp (1981), Kamp and Reyle (1993), Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1991), to cite but a few) and brought it to the \semantic battle eld".
For this kind of semanticism, meaning is taken as a property of texts, dialogues or
discourses. This does not imply that meaning could be completely determinable
apart from context as happens in ordinary Predicate Calculus (pc). Actually, large
amounts of all sorts of knowledge are used to determine the meaning of a discourse.
Research on issues such as ontologies, lexical/semantic preferences, metaphor,
and discourse structure has been shedding light onto discourse meaning theories.
Integrating several of these trends, we can cite Lascarides and Asher (1991), Grosz
and Sidner (1986), Polanyi (1988), and Prust et al. (1994). Lascarides and Asher
(1991), for example, use a set of rhetorical relations and defeasible reasoning to
modeling temporal relations in discourse; Grosz and Sidner (1986), and Polanyi
(1988), present us with a research on discourse structure and discourse regularities
to determine the overall plan and purpose of the discourse. And Prust et al. (1994)
present a theory dealing with verb phrase anaphora in which a discourse grammar,
taking into account rhetorical and discourse constraints, establish the parallelism
between the syntactic and semantic components. Such grammar is latter modelled
by a multi-sorted typed logic which is the formal device to recover the antecedent
of the anaphorical verb phrase.
Spelling out rhetorical relations and other pragmatic issues, a question one should
ask is which factors might a purely semantic \discourse" theory take into account.
This question has been acknowledged as a very hard one. To begin with, let us
assume a discourse as \simple" as possible (in the sense that it could be formalized
in pc). The rst generalization step toward a \real" discourse should take into
account a more general quantication theory in which natural language quantiers
such as most, a few, and others could be accounted for. Generalized Quantication
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Theory (gqt) was developed to shed light onto this topic and will be presented
in section 4.3. Bearing in mind the role played by quantication, it would not be
surprising to see (some kind of) gqt underlying all further discourse generalizations.
gqt and pc share the same inadequacy to deal with intersentential relationships
as exemplied by pronominal anaphora as in (1) below.
(1) A man walks in the park. He whistles.
It is easily seen that the pronoun he, in the second sentence, is beyond the scope
of its referent, the NP a man, introduced in the rst sentence. Therefore, the next
generalization step would be related to scope-binding issues, if we want to deal with
intersentential anaphoric relationships.
Most theories tackling the last issue adopt a dynamic approach; the static-
dynamic contrast is meant to emphasize the static character of scope (which was
traditionally tied up to syntactic structures as presented in gb)
2
and the dynamic
semantic character of binding (therefore, providing us with ways to bring syntactic-
ally free variables to the scope of quanticational static structures). This has been
achieved in dierent ways, such as, for instance, the use of unselective quantication,
sometimes associated to reversing binding direction, and the weakening of existen-
tials associated to unselective discourse quantiers. This topic will be presented in
section 4.5.
In one way or another, all dynamic approaches assume that an upcoming sentence
changes the informational state someone would have built upon previous discourse.
Theories addressing this issue will be presented in section 4.5.1.
Although we have pointed out only a very few generalization steps towards a se-
mantically based discourse theory, the interaction among them covers the literature
on the topic.
2
See section 2.4, page 16
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4.3 Logical form and quantication
In English and other natural languages, quantifying expressions like all, no, every,
some are always accompanied by nominal expressions that seem intuitively to re-
strict the universe of discourse to individuals to which the nominal applies. Al-
though quantication in pc
3
bears a connection with quantication in English, such
a connection is not straightforward. Nominals like man in (2) below are usually
represented by a predicate in pc.
(2) a { Every man snores.
b { 8x[man(x)! snore(x)]
c { Some man snores.
d { 9x[man(x) ^ snore(x)]
However, such representations do not emphasize the intuition that nominals like
man do play, indeed, quite a dierent role from predicates like snore. Moreover,
pc's formulas change not only the quantier but also the connective in a complex
formula over which the quantier has scope. In contrast, the English sentences dier
only in the quantifying expression used. (3) shows the way to make the dependence
of the quantier on the nominal explicit with the further advantage of making clear
the need for no connectives when considering simple sentences as those in (2).
(3) a { [8x : man(x)] snore(x)
b { [9x : man(x)] snore(x)
Logics using this kind of quantication impose that the range of quantiers
be restricted to those individuals satisfying the formula immediately following the
quantifying expression. The quantiers are then interpreted as usual requiring that
3
pc is based on Frege's insight of analyzing quantied statements as having two components
where one component is a singular sentence with a place-holder element like a pronoun and the
other component is such that it states how many of the possible values assigned to the place-
holder are such that the singular sentence is true relative to that value of the place-holder. Truth
conditions for quantied statements are dened for the singular sentence relative to some value
for the place-holder. In the second stage, truth conditions are dened in terms of generalizations
about values assigned to the singular sentence.
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[[every ]] = fX  U j [[]]  Xg
[[some ]] = fX  U j [[]] \X 6= ;g
[[no ]] = fX  U j [[]] \X = ;g
[[most ]] = fX  U j X \ [[]] is bigger than

X \ [[]]g
[[the ]] = fX  U j for some u 2 U; [[]] = fug and u 2 Xg
[[two ]] = fX  U j X \ [[]] contains two or more elements g or
fX  U j X \ [[]] contains exactly two elements g
Table 4.1: Generalized Quantiers Interpretation
all (3.a) or some (3.b) of the assignments of values to x satisfying the restricting
formula must also satisfy what follows.
Both approaches work equally well for \traditional" quantiers as those in (2).
However, quantiers like most, which can not be represented in pc, are easily ac-
counted for in the restricted quantication approach. Example (4.c) is true i more
than half the assignments from the restricted domain of men are also assignments for
which snore(x) is true. (4.b) is a dead-end since there are no combinations between
most assignments and connectives !, ^ capable to express (4.a) in pc.
(4) a { Most men snore.
b { most x[man(x) ? snore(x)]
c { [most x : man(x)] snore(x)
(4) shows that most is not rst-order denable since the semantics for it will have
to resort to what essentially amounts to quantication over higher-order entities like
sets (cf. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990, chap3, note 2, page 444)).
Ideas employed in (4) can be applied to other quanticational structures as long
as we take (i) full NPs (Det + nominal) as logical quantiers and (ii) sets of sets as
the semantic objects interpreting NPs. Table (4.1) shows the semantic interpretation
for some cases. It is not dicult, now, to see that for any NP  and predicate ,
 is true i [[]] 2 [[]].
Assuming compositionality as a methodological criteria to follow, the next
step deals with the question of assigning a semantic interpretation for determiners;
however, the previous exposition has already provided us with the answer. Recall
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For every Y  U ,
[[every]](Y ) = fX  U j Y  Xg
[[some]](Y ) = fX  U j X \ Y 6= ;g
[[no]](Y ) = fX  U j X \ Y = ;g
[[most]](Y ) = fX  U j X \ Y is bigger than

X \ Y g
[[the]](Y ) = fX  U j for some u 2 U; Y = fug and u 2 Xg
[[two]](Y ) = fX  U j X \ Y contains two or more elements g or
fX  U j X \ Y contains exactly two elements g
Table 4.2: Determiners Interpretation
that determiners combine with nominals, which are taken as properties (i.e., sets),
to yield NPs, which are taken as sets of sets. Therefore, a function from sets of
individuals to sets of sets is the natural candidate for the semantic interpretation of
determiners. Table (4.2) displays the semantic interpretation for the determiners in
table (4.1). It is now clear that we can analyse the meaning ofmost men, for instance,
as specied in terms of the meanings ofmost and men as [[most]]([[men]]) which yields
the generalized quantier fX  U j X \ [[men]] is bigger than

X \ [[men]]g.
The previous discussion made a point towards moving from determiners as quan-
tiers, as it occurs in pc, to full NPs as quantiers; this identity is best known as
generalized quantiers.
Complex NPs constructions involving possibly several determiners are smoothly
accounted for in the generalized quantier framework. Complex determiners such
as some man and some woman, for instance, are interpreted as
fX  U j [[man]] \X 6= ;g \ fX  U j [[woman]] \X 6= ;g
and therefore equivalent to
fX  U j [[man]] \X 6= ; and [[woman]] \X 6= ;g
For negation, as in not every woman, set-theoretic complementation will do the task
since
P(U)  fX  U j [[woman]]  Xg = fX  U j [[woman]] 6 Xg
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It is not hard to see that embedding generalized quantiers into an intentional
logic would give us a way to represent natural language sentences. With this in
mind, we can analyse (5) as showed in (6) and (7) (where we have assumed that and
and but are truth-conditionally identical and also an intentional framework along
(the Montagovian) Dowty, Wall and Peters (1981) line.) Also, when possible, we
present a pc truth-conditionally equivalent formula.
(5) a { Most but not all men snore.
b { Not all but some men snore.
(6) a { Most but not all men snore.
b { [most
0
^ [:every
0
]](man
0
)(snore
0
)
c { [most
0
(man
0
) ^ [:every
0
](man
0
)](snore
0
)
d { [[snore
0
]] 2 fX  U j card(X \ [[man
0
]]) > card(

X \ [[man
0
]])g \
fX  U j [[man
0
]] 6 Xg
e { [[snore
0
]] 2 fX  U j card(X \ [[man
0
]]) > card(

X \ [[man
0
]])g
and [[snore
0
]] 2 fX  U j [[man
0
]] 6 Xg
f { pc formula: ????
(7) a { Not all but some men snore.
b { [[:every
0
] ^ some
0
](man
0
)(snore
0
)
c { [[:every
0
(man
0
)] ^ some
0
(man
0
)](snore
0
)
d { [[snore
0
]] 2 fX  U j [[man
0
]] 6 Xg \ fX  U j [[man
0
]] \X 6= ;g
e { [[snore
0
]] 2 fX  U j [[man
0
]] 6 Xg
and [[snore
0
]] 2 fX  U j [[man
0
]] \X 6= ;g
f { [[man
0
]] 6 [[snore
0
]] and [[man
0
]] \ [[snore
0
]] 6 ;
g { pc formula: :8x[man
0
(x)! snore
0
(x)] ^ 9x[man
0
(x) ^ snore
0
(x)]
Concluding this section, we point out that the generalized quantiers approach
allow us to study a wide variety of empirical properties of natural language. Ques-
tions related to polarity, conservativity, and monotonicity, for example, have been
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analysed with it; for instance, determiners such as every, some, and no are conser-
vative (assuming conservativity dened in such a way that ()() $ ()( ^ )
equivalence holds) since sentences like Det man snores are truth-equivalent to Det
man is a man who snores, where Det 2 fevery, some, nog. Assume now that
a denition for right upward monotonicity has been given allowing the inference
pattern ()( ^ )! ()(). As illustrated in (8), determiners like some, many,
and every have this property while others such as no, and few lack it. Since the
discussion of this issue would unnecessarily extend the present section we refer the
interested reader to Gardenfors (1987) and the references therein.
(8) a { Some student is Italian and blond ! some student is blond.
b { No students are Italian and blond 6! no students are blond.
Although a nice framework for the study of quantication, generalized quantiers
approach (gqt), in the format presented here, does not solve all problems related to
quantication. The most notorious problems are posed by pronouns. Traditionally,
pronouns are identied with variables which ought to be bound to some quantica-
tional structure; deictic pronouns, on the other hand, are analysed as free variables.
Anaphoric pronouns, however, are \odd" since: (i) they refer to some previously
introduced entity and therefore suggesting that they might have been bound into
the scope of some quantier; (ii) they occur outside the scope of any quantier. In
other words, anaphoric pronouns are syntactically free variables that ought to be
bound.
The \equation" involving quantiers and pronouns has been tackled from dif-
ferent viewpoints. Firstly, there are the dynamic theories. Secondly, there are the
theories originated along the lines of Heim (1982), and Kamp (1981) (such as Dis-
course Representation Theory (drt)), and File Change Semantics, Heim (1983).
Independently of the viewpoint adopted, pronouns are still approached from one of
two perspectives, namely, E-type and bound. The next sections are devoted to a
short but concise explanation of these matters.
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4.4 Discourse Representation Theory
drt is nowadays a theory of semantic content of natural language sentences, dis-
courses and texts, as well as, more recently, of the content and structure of thought.
As a theory of the content of sentences and texts, drt is designed to identify and en-
code the semantic connections between the successive sentences of a text (cf. Reyle
and Gabbay (1994, p. 343)).
drt was the rst of a group of theories to approach a dynamic notion on mean-
ing. However, motivation for the development of a dynamic semantics was already
pointed out in Stalnaker (1974) and Stalnaker (1976).
drt analyzes meaning in two steps. The rst one, a semantic representation
for a discourse is built up through the Discourse Representation Structure (drs)
construction algorithm. The construction algorithm is a set of rules for constructing
the box representation generated and related to noun phrases.
4
This representation
is built up sentence by sentence. If j sentences have been processed to yield the drs
K
j
, then the processing of S
j+1
will yield a drs that combines with K
j
to form an
extended drs K
j+1
. The second step is related to drt interpretation proper. It is
accomplished by the correctness denition, which provides instructions for homo-
morphically embedding a drs in a model so as to yield correct truth conditions
for a discourse. In other words, the interpretation of a discourse in drt takes two
steps: rstly, the construction of a drs, then the proper embedding of the drs into
a model. The dynamic interpretation eect is accomplished by the combination of
the correctness denition with the construction algorithm. The dynamic meaning
of S
j+1
is that function which takes us from the truth conditions of K
j
to the truth
conditions of K
j+1
.
In the literature, two aspects of drt are questioned. Firstly, there is the compos-
itional aspect. It is said that the construction algorithm is not fully compositional
(Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990), to cite one). Secondly, it is questioned if the rep-
4
The determiner heading the NP is, usually, the responsible for the particular box representation
used.
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resentational level is really necessary to achieve the dynamics of anaphoric relations.
For the rst problem, fully compositional extensions have been developed by some
researchers while others have been arguing for the need of such intermediate level.
5
The original drt framework presented in Kamp (1981) contained common nouns,
verbs, the determiners a and every, and the English conditional expression if . . . then.
Also, the construction procedure followed a top down analysis (contrasting to Asher
(1993) who adopted a bottom up analysis). To get acquainted with the way drt
works, let us start by presenting the drs for (9) below (ignoring the semantic con-
tributions of tense):
(9) A boy kicked Fred.
(K1) x, y
boy(x)
Fred(y)
kick(x,y)
(K1) describes graphically an abstract, information structure, a drs, with two
parts. One part is called the universe of the drs, the other its condition set. So,
a drs can be formally stated as an ordered pair consisting of its universe and con-
dition set, written as hU
K
;Con
K
i. The drs (K1) has as its universe two \discourse
individuals," x and y, and as its condition set a collection of property ascriptions to
x and y. The conditions in Con
K1
are formed from unary and binary drs predicates
and discourse referents as arguments. For the fragment considered here, drs predic-
ates are generated from nouns or verbs. The condition set of (K1) says that x is a
boy, y is Fred and x kicks y. To give the truth conditions for (9), we need to dene a
proper embedding for (K1). A proper embedding for (K1) in an (extensional) model
M = hD; [[]]i, consisting of a domain D of individuals and an interpretation function
[[]]. [[]] is a function g that maps x and y onto elements of the domain of M such that
g(x) is a boy in M, g(y) is Fred in M, and g(x) kicks g(y) in M. If we dene (9) to
be true in M just in case (K1) has a proper embedding in M, we get the right truth
conditions.
5
See Asher (1993) for a defense for indirect interpretation, via an intermediate level, especially
for pronoun and anaphora resolution.
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Having shown a drs and the truth conditions it determines for a simple sentence,
we are ready to move towards the treatment of a multisentential discourse. Adding
the sentence Fred cried to (9) we get the discourse:
(10) A boy kicked Fred. Fred cried.
We already know that (K1) is the structure the rst sentence yields. To get a
drs for all of (10), the drs created from the rst sentence serves as a context for pro-
cessing the second sentence. In processing the second sentence, the conditions and
discourse referents introduced by the second sentence are entered into the condition
list and universe already created in processing the rst sentence; such processing
produces (K2) below.
(K2) x, y, z
boy(x)
Fred(y)
kick(x,y)
cry(z)
Fred(z)
The advantage of using the drs built up from previous discourse as a context for
the interpretation of the next sentence arises in the process of anaphora resolution.
Anaphoric pronouns introduce a peculiar sort of condition. Many conditions come
with a determinate, context free-content, but others do not. In particular those that
are introduced by anaphoric pronouns introduce a discourse referent that must be
linked with some other discourse referent in order to give the condition a complete
meaning. Such conditions are called incomplete conditions and are of the form z =
?. All other conditions are complete conditions.
The distinction between incomplete conditions and complete conditions carries
over to drss. Complete drss are those containing only complete conditions; incom-
plete drss contain at least one incomplete condition. The condition contributed by
the pronoun he in (11), z = ?, is responsible for the drs (K3) being incomplete.
(11) A boy kicked Fred. He cried.
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(K3) x, y, z
boy(x)
Fred(y)
kick(x,y)
cry(z)
z = ?
In order to complete the drs, the question mark in this condition needs to be re-
placed by a discourse referent. The task of anaphora resolution is to nd an appro-
priate discourse referent other than z and to turn z = ? into an identity assertion.
For (11), y is an appropriate discourse referent
6
introduced by the processing of the
rst sentence. After identifying y with z,
7
we have the following completed drs for
(11):
(K
0
3) x, y, z
boy(x)
Fred(y)
kick(x,y)
cry(z)
z = y
(K
0
3) has a proper embedding in a model M just in case M contains Fred and a boy
such that the boy kicked Fred and Fred cried.
There are more complex drss that themselves contain drss. Any condition
containing one or more drss as a constituent is called a complex condition. (12)
gives rise to one:
(12) Every girl kicked Fred.
(K4)
x
girl(x )
)
y
Fred(y)
kicked(x,y)
The drs for (12) has two drss that are constituents of a complex condition. Such
constituents are called subdrss. Let us call them (K4.1), the one on the left, and
(K4.2), the one on the right. Naturally, the notion of a proper embedding for such
6
A discourse referent, from drt perspective, is an element of the drs that serves as a context
for the processing of discourse subsequent sentences.
7
Tony Cohn pointed to me that the reading x = z is available as well, because he, the boy,
might have regretted his action.
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a drs must take these subdrss into account. It does so in the following way: f is
a proper embedding for (K4) in a model M i every extension (superset) of f that
properly embeds (K4.1) in M can be extended to a proper embedding of (K4.2) in
M. Not only do many determiners like every introduce such complex DR-theoretic
structures, but also conditionals, ), and other operators, such as negation, :, do
as well. Thus, a sentence like (13) yields the drs below it:
(13) John does not like Fred.
(K5)
:
x,y
John(x)
Fred(y)
like(x,y)
(K5) has a proper embedding just in case there are no objects x and y such that x
is John, y, Fred, and x likes y.
I hope that the reader not acquainted to drt has now grasped the basics of the
theory. We might naturally extend this fragment by adding a stock of operators
corresponding to determiners. And, we might also present the basics of the drt
construction algorithm. However, such a course of action is not relevant for the
purposes of this chapter. For the denitive and complete exposition of the theory,
see Kamp and Reyle (1993).
To sum up, drt characteristics, as might be inferred from the previous \crash
course,"
8
could be stated as:
 it handles indenite noun phrases as non-referential, non-quanticational, re-
stricted free variables,
 it uses operators to bind indenite noun phrases which are much richer than
those of predicate logic,
 it treats anaphoric pronouns as plain bound variables,
 it uses polyadic connectives and quantiers which may bind multiple variables
8
All examples in this section are from Asher (1993).
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simultaneously.
Although drt has achieved a respectable position, it is not problem free, as already
stated. One of the rst criticisms of it was related to the compositionality principle.
It is frequently said that drt does not respect it. However, there are versions which
respect it, as for example, the system proposed by Pinkal (1991). With respect to
(polyadic) quantication, Partee (1984) calls attention to the proportion problem
which results from the view of quantiers as binary relations between relations of
indenite arity. The truth conditions for (14.a) are given by (14.b) and are correct
when Q is all, some, no, or not all. But they do not hold formost. For this quantier,
(14.b) would be incorrect if there are two men, one of which owns two cars that he
washes on Sundays while the other owns just one car which he washes on Saturdays.
(14) a { Q men who own a car wash it on Sunday.
b { [Qxy : M(x)^ C(y)^ O(x; y)] W(x; y)
Within drt the proportion problem is discussed by Kadmon (1990) where she pro-
poses, for the determiner most, an analysis in which material from the restriction is
copied to the scope.
9
This strategy leads to the weak reading for most men who own
a car wash it on Sunday : the cars owners need not wash all of their cars in order to
make it true. In the literature, the strong reading, where all cars have to be washed,
is also suggested. The problem of weak and strong readings is discussed in Rooth
(1987), Chierchia (1992), and Dekker (1993), among many others, and studied in
depth by Kanazawa (1993). Notice, however, that Kadmon's suggestion still leaves
the problem whether there is a uniform way in which it can be made to work for all
quantiers. For dpl, such a method exists (cf. Does (1993, p. 7)).
4.5 Dynamic theories I { the bound perspective
Dynamic theories depart from traditional ones since the information change potential
of a sentence is regarded as constituting its meaning. Put in other way, the basic idea
9
This analysis closely resemble the E-type one.
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is that the meaning of a sentence does not uniquely depend on its truth conditions,
but rather \in the way it changes (the representation of) the information of the
interpreter" (Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991)).
The key notion in the above characterization is that of information. Depending
on the ontology, information may concern the values of variables, or even possible
worlds, or even world-time intervals, or whatever parameters we decide to take into
account. As Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990) already pointed out, \information is
about indices".
To get right to the point, assume that I is a set of indices; assume also any
subset of I as characterizing an information state. The power set of I, (P(I)), is
the set of all information states; it is naturally the least informative state since all
possibilities are present in it. On the other hand, singletons are the most informative
states while the empty set corresponds to the absurd state. It is not hard to see
that information updating is conveyed through functions from information states to
information states.
Theories of dynamic meaning could be grouped together according to the prop-
erties displayed in Table (4.3). Each property aims to model some peculiar aspect
of the dynamics of discourse. So, for example, Veltman's (1990) Update Semantics,
(us), and Veltman's (1996) Defaults in Update Semantics, which are dynamic se-
mantic theories for the language of epistemic propositional logic and default reason-
ing, resp., involve update of information about the world according to the \elimin-
ative" model. This means that updating an information state s with a sentence will
take us to an information state which contains at least as specic information about
the world as s. On the other hand, Groenendijk and Stokhof's Dynamic Predicate
Logic, (dpl), which is a dynamic semantic interpretation of the language of rst
order predicate logic (keeping stock of the possible values of variables introduced
while a discourse unfolds), is a \pointwise" distributive system. In other words,
interpretation in dpl may involve the introduction of new possibilities as we will
soon show. And nally, Dekker (1993), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990), and Does
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  is eliminative i for every state s, (s)  s
  is distributive i for every state s, (s) =
S
i2s
(fig)
Table 4.3: Update varieties
(1993) present us with a unied account of dpl in a update semantics format.
4.5.1 An Update System for Epistemic Propositional Logic
Veltman's (1990) us is a propositional logic with an extra epistemic operator 
(might). us deals with information about the world; the meaning of a us formula
is characterized through update of information about the world. All us formulas in
which  does not occur express factual information about the world. On the other
hand, formulas  express that one's information about the world is compatible with
, something along the line \as far as my information is concerned, it might, but
need not, be the case that ".
Update of information about the world consists in eliminating possibilities. For
instance, the interpretation of an atomic sentence p in a state s involves the update
of s brought about by eliminating the worlds from s which are inconsistent with p.
The resulting state only contains possible worlds in which p is true.
us interpretation is dened as an update function [[ ]] on the domain of informa-
tion states. It is dened with respect to a model M = hW;F i consisting of a set of
worlds W and a interpretation function F that assigns sets of worlds to proposition
letters. In what follows, s[[]]
M
indicates the result of updating an information state
s with  with respect to a model M, that is, the result of applying the function
[[]]
M
to s. As usual, reference to M is omitted whenever this does not lead to
confusion. Interpretation is dened as follows:
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Denition 1: Update Semantics
s[[p]] = fi 2 s j i 2 F (p)g
s[[:]] = s  s[[]]
s[[ ^  ]] = s[[]][[ ]]
s[[  ]] =
8
>
<
>
:
s if s[[]] 6= ;
; if s[[]] = ;

Denition 1, which is a functional characterization for Update Semantics stated in
a postx notation, says that proposition letters are assigned an information content
that intersects with the input information state. Negation is associated with state
subtraction (or set dierence) and sentence conjunction with sequencing, i.e., func-
tion composition. To interpret a conjunction of two formulas  and  in a state s,
we rst interpret  in the state resulting from the update of s with . Interestingly,
the operator  acts as a test: in an information state s,  tests whether s can be
consistently updated with . If  is acceptable in s, then  is true in that state and
the interpretation of  in s returns s. However, if we already know that  is false,
then  is rejected and its interpretation returns the absurd state, i.e., the empty
set.
A remarkable point about  is its \instability" exemplied in (15).
(15) a { A dog is barking at the moon. . . . It might be Fido. . . . It is Rex.
b { A dog is barking at the moon. . . . It is Rex. . . . It might be Fido.
The instability is due to the fact that at some stage  may be true (if  is not
excluded at that stage), whereas at a later stage it is false (if the possibility that
 has been excluded in the meantime). As a natural consequence from instability,
conjunction can not be commutative, as easily seen from (15.a) and (15.b). Also,
distributivity does not hold; a formula  tests a global property of a state s, namely,
its consistency with , which does not hold of all subsets of s. Let us assume, for
example, that  is a predicate, s = fi; jg, fig[[]] = fig and fjg[[]] = ;. Therefore,
s[[]] 6= ; and s[[  ]] = s since s[[]] = fi 2 s j i 2 F ()g = fig 6= ;. However,
fig[[  ]] = fig and fjg[[  ]] = ; and therefore
S
i2s
fig[[  ]] = fig.
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To understand the contrast seen in (15.a) and (15.b) we provide the reader with
the following denitions:
Denition 2:  is consistent i for some state s, s[[]] 6= ; 
Bearing in mind that s[[ ^  ]] = s[[]][[ ]] we can see that p ^ :p is consistent
whereas :p ^ p is not.
Another basic notion of us is that of acceptance:
Denition 3:  is accepted in s, s j= , i s  s[[]] 
And, in terms of acceptance, the following notion of entailment is dened
Denition 4: 
1
; : : : ; 
n
j=  i
for all models M and states s, s[[
1
]]
M
: : : [[
n
]]
M
j=  
This denition says that a conclusion follows from a sequence of premises 
1
; : : : ; 
n
if whenever an information state s is updated with 
1
; : : : ; 
n
, in that order, the
result is an information state which accepts  .
For more details and alternative notions of entailment available in the original
us formulation, see van Benthem (1991), and Veltman (1990).
As a further development into the framework of us, Veltman (1996) presents
the reader with systems of update semantics covering sentences in which modal
qualications such as presumably, probably, must, may, as well as might, occur.
Next section presents a summary of Veltman's (1996) work.
4.5.2 Veltman's (1996) Update Semantics Framework
Veltman (1996) is a rened and self-contained work on the update semantics subject
aiming: (i) to introduce the framework of update semantics as well as to point out
the kind of semantic phenomena which may successfully be analysed in it; (ii) to
give a detailed account of one such phenomenon, namely default reasoning.
To better understand Veltman's 96 (us based) analysis for default reasoning, we
should point out the dierences between his approach and \traditional theories."
Firstly, us analysis diers from traditional theories in virtue of its denition of lo-
gical validity. The standard \static" denition states that an argument is valid if
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its premises cannot be true without its conclusion being true as well. As a con-
sequence, the heart of these theories consists in a specication of truth conditions.
The denition of us states that one knows the meaning of a sentence if one knows
the change it brings about in the information state of anyone who accepts the news
conveyed by it. In this sense, meaning becomes a dynamic concept since the meaning
of a sentence is modelled as an update function on information states. Secondly,
for traditional theories, default reasoning is considered a special kind of reasoning
handling ordinary sentences. Veltman's framework, on the other hand, equates de-
fault reasoning to ordinary reasoning handling special kind of sentences (sentences
including special operators such as might, presumably, normally, and necessarily).
To dene an update semantics for a language L, Veltman (1996) species a set
 of relevant information states, and a function [ ] that assigns to each sentence 
an operation [] on . The resulting triple hL;; [ ]i is called an update system; if
 is a state and  a sentence, `[]' denotes the result of updating  with . Since
[] is a function and  the argument, it would have been more in line with common
practice to write `[]()', but the postx notation is more convenient for dealing
with texts. Now we can write `[ 
1
] : : : [ 
n
]' for the result of updating  with the
sequence of sentences  
1
: : :  
n
(cf. Veltman (1996, page 221)).
The nave characterization given above might lead us to problems. This might
happen if we identify the process of updating an information state with the addi-
tion of informational content of a sentence  to the information we already have.
However, this kind of updating is true only for additive update systems.
Denition An update system hL;; [ ]i is additive i there exists a state 0, the
minimal state, in  and a binary operation + on  such that
(i) the operation + has all the properties of a join operation:
0+  = 
 +  = 
 +  =  + 
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(+ ) +  = + ( + )
(ii) for every sentence  and state , [] =  + 0[] 
Whenever (i) holds  is called an information lattice. Cases such that  +  = 
are denoted by    (in Veltman's words,  is at least as strong as ).
Veltman (1996, pages 222, 223) denes some principles, namely, the principles
of idempotence, persistence, strengthening and monotony, which bear a close re-
lationship to additive update systems as stated in proposition 1.2, page 223. For
convenience, we will repeat these principles, proposition 1.2, as well as the charac-
terization of the notion of acceptance below.
Acceptance in us Let  be any state and  be any sentence.  is accepted in ,
[]  , i [] = .
The Principle of Idempotence: For every state  and sentence , []  .
The Principle of Persistence: If    and    , then   .
The Principle of Strengthening:   [].
The Principle of Monotony: If    , then []   [].
Proposition 1.2 An update system hL;; [ ]i is additive i (i)  is an update lattice
on which [ ] is total, and (ii) the principles of Idempotence, Persistence, Monotony
and Strengthening hold.
To say a few words on some of these principles, notice that persistence, for
example, naturally explains the processing of the following sequence of sentences
Somebody is knocking at the door. . . . Maybe it's John. . . . It's Mary.
This sequence shows that expectations can be overruled by facts. On the other hand,
it is not natural to accept that someone still expects something else after knowing
the facts, as exemplied by the following sequence of sentences
Somebody is knocking at the door. . . . Maybe it's John. . . . It's Mary. . . .
Maybe it's John.
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Idempotence, for instance, oers a natural explanation for paradoxical sentences
such as \This sentence is false" since, it is impossible to change the information
state we are in such a way that we come to accept the sentence. As shown in
Groeneveld (1994), the paradoxicality of this sentence resides in the fact that every
time we try to accommodate the information it conveys, we have to change our mind
(cf. Veltman (1996, p. 223)).
Being a dynamic theory, us should present us with dierent characterization
for notions such as validity. Indeed, in Veltman (1996), we can see three dierent
denitions which we repeat below for convenience.
Validity 1: An argument is valid
1
i updating the minimal state 0 with the premises
 
1
; : : : ;  
n
in that order, yields an information state in which the conclusion  is
accepted. Formally:
 
1
; : : : ;  
n

1
 i 0[ 
1
] : : : [ 
n
]  
Validity 2: An argument is valid
2
i updating any information state  with the
premises  
1
; : : : ;  
n
in that order, yields an information state in which the conclusion
 is accepted. Formally:
 
1
; : : : ;  
n

2
 i for every ; [ 
1
] : : : [ 
n
]  
Validity 3: An argument is valid
3
i one cannot accept all its premises without
having to accept the conclusion as well. Formally:
 
1
; : : : ;  
n

3
 i    
n
for every  such that    
1
; : : : ;    
n
Interestingly, these three notions turn out to be equivalent for any additive up-
date system (cf. Veltman (1996, proposition 1.3, page 224)). However, this fact
is not always true. Notice, for example, that validity
3
is monotonic, validity
2
is at
least left monotonic while validity
1
is neither right nor left monotonic.
10
As it has been pointed out, the three validity notions are equivalent for additive
update systems; therefore, one can develop an update system based on any one of
10
Adding \new" premises, in any order, do not change the validity
3
argumentation. On the other
hand, order is fundamental for validity
2
argumentation. Finally, validity
1
conforms to the principle
of Sequential Monotony, which can be characterized by the following property: if  
1
; : : : ;  
n

1

and  
1
; : : : ;  
n
; 
1
; : : : ; 
k

1
, then  
1
; : : : ;  
n
; ; 
1
; : : : ; 
k

1
. Also, validity
1
complies with
the following version of the principle of Cut Elimination, which Veltman calls Sequential Cut : If
 
1
; : : : ;  
n

1
 and  
1
; : : : ;  
n
; ; 
1
; : : : ; 
k

1
, then  
1
; : : : ;  
n
; 
1
; : : : ; 
k

1
.
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these notions. Interestingly, this is not the case for nonadditive systems. For the
systems developed in Veltman (1996), validity
1
is the right choice to adopt since the
schematic argumentation below is not valid
2
or valid
3
.
premiss 1: P 's normally are R
premiss 2: x is P
conclusion: Presumably, x is R
Notice that this argument remains valid
1
even when one learns more about the
object x, provided there is no evidence that the new information is relevant to the
conclusion, as exemplied by
premiss 1: P 's normally are R
premiss 2: x is P
premiss 3: x is Q
conclusion: Presumably, x is R
However, if on top of the premises 1, 2 and 3 the rule `Q's normally are not R' is
adopted, the argument is not valid
1
any more. If all one knows is
premiss 1: Q's normally are not R
premiss 2: P 's normally are R
premiss 3: x is P
premiss 4: x is Q
then it remains open whether one can presume that x is R. It seems obvious that
the object x must be an exception to one of the rules. However, there is no reason
to expect it to be an exception to one rule rather than to the other. Adding further
default rules may make the balance tip. If, for instance, we add `Q's normally are
P . as a premise, we get the following valid
1
argument:
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premiss 1: Q's normally are P
premiss 2: Q's normally are not R
premiss 3: P 's normally are R
premiss 4: x is P
premiss 5: x is Q
conclusion: Presumably, x is not R
In the presence of the principle `Q's normally are P ', the principle Q's normally are
not R takes precedence over the principle P 's normally are R. A concrete example
given by Veltman (1996) is shown in the following reading: `x is P becomes `x is an
adult', `x is Q' becomes `x is a student' and `x is R becomes `x is employed'.
As remarked before, none of these arguments is valid
2
or valid
3
. This is so because
in their denitions a quantication over the set of states is at stake. This means
that in checking the validity
2
or validity
3
of an argument, one must reckon with the
possibility that more is known than is stated in the premises. Conclusions drawn
from default rules, however, are typically drawn `in the absence of any information
to the contrary'; they may have to be withdrawn in the light of new information.
Therefore, in evaluating a default argument it is important to know exactly which
information is available. That is why Veltman (1996) concentrates on the notion of
validity
1
.
After presenting the basic ideas just summarized, Veltman (1996) proceeds to
the presentation of formal systems dealing with the epistemic possibility operator
might and default reasoning. Since the epistemic system is basically the same as
the one summarized in section 4.5.1 and default reasoning is not relevant to the
present work we proceed to the next section which deals with a distributive update
system for predicate logic. The distributive system to be presented is the basis of
the present research work.
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4.5.3 Dynamic Predicate Logic Proper
4.5.3.1 Prolegomena
Groenendijk and Stokhof's dpl is an insightful landmark on the compositional lo-
gically based analysis of natural language discourse structure. It was the rst theory
to take into account the intersentential, as well as intrasentential, anaphoric relation
among pronouns and existential noun phrases taken as their referents. As might be
correctly inferred, the theory was developed to conform to the compositional criteria
sorting out the anaphoric relationship between pronoun and existential noun phrase.
To achieve the goal, Groenendijk and Stokhof made very simple assumptions
based on the idea that anaphoric pronouns are somehow bound variables falling
outside the syntactic scope of existential noun phrases they are related to. As a
consequence of this assumption, the binding process ought to be modelled at the
semantic level, and therefore, they could stick to the traditional predicate logic
syntax since they didn't take into account generalized quantiers.
Also, discourse is taken as simple as possible: discourse is a linear sequence of
sentences. So, the natural language sequence operator \." could be mapped to the
traditional conjunction operator \^." It is clear that any semantic theory dealing
with the dynamic binding power emanating from an existential quantier should
also make provision for the conjunction ability of passing on that binding power.
In a nutshell, the syntactic part of dpl could be made identical to the standard
predicate logic; however, the semantic part of dpl could not be made identical to
the standard semantics of predicate logic.
Dierently from pc, dpl is not a truth conditional semantic theory. dpl assumes
that an upcoming sentence changes the informational state someone would have
built upon previous discourse. So, it is the information change potential of a sentence
that is regarded as constituting its meaning. It is clear that the nature of any
characterization of information state would depend on the ontology. For dpl, the
ontology is concerned with the values of variables.
11
Having pointed out all this
11
Recall that pronouns are taken as free variables dynamically bound to existentials.
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aspects, it is not dicult to imagine what Groenendijk and Stokhof have taken for
dening an information state: an information state is nothing but a set of assignment
functions from the set of dpl variables to the domain of individuals. Therefore, the
interpretation of any dpl formula would take into account the information state
someone is at. However, instead of following the functional approach just explained
in section 4.5.1, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) present the notion of information
state in a disguised fashion. In the relational format presented in Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1991), information states are merged into pairs of input-output assignment
functions. The equivalence between the relational format and the functional format
developed in Groenendijk and Stokhof's later works
12
is granted by the following
denition, taken from Vermeulen (1993).
Denition: Let G be the set of assignment functions. Let  2 P(G) be an in-
formation state. Let [[]]
gs
2 G  G be the interpretation of  as a relation on
assignments. Then (())
gs
, the interpretation of  as an update function, is dened
by the following property:
(())
gs
= fg 2 G j 9f 2  : f [[]]
gs
gg 
Having presented the basics of Groenendijk and Stokhof's dpl, we proceed to
present a short summary of their theory in its original relational formulation.
13
4.5.3.2 DPL
The syntax of dpl is the same as the one of ordinary predicate logic. So, the
non-logical vocabulary of dpl consists of: n-place predicates symbols, individual
constants, and variables. Logical constants are negation :, conjunction ^, disjunc-
tion _, implication!, the existential and universal quantiers 9 and 8, and identity
=.
Denition 1 (Syntax)
12
See, for instance, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990).
13
For the full article, we refer the reader to Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991).
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1. If t
1
; : : : ; t
n
are individual constants or variables, R is an n-place predicate
letter, then Rt
1
: : : t
n
is a formula.
2. If t
1
and t
2
are individual constants or variables, then t
1
= t
2
is a formula.
3. If  is a formula, then : is a formula.
4. If  and  are formulas, then ( ^  ) is a formula.
5. If  and  are formulas, then ( _  ) is a formula.
6. If  and  are formulas, then (!  ) is a formula.
7. If  is a formula, and x is a variable, then 9x is a formula.
8. If  is a formula, and x is a variable, then 8x is a formula.
9. Nothing is a formula except on the basis of 1{8. 
Denition 1 plays the role of showing us that the set of dpl formulas is the same
as the pc one. And since dpl is a semantic theory we proceed to give the formal
characterization of interpretation.
A model M is a pair hD;F i, where D is a non-empty set of individuals, F an
interpretation function having as its domain the individuals constants and predic-
ates. If  is an individual constant, then F () 2 D; if  is an n-place predicate,
then F ()  D
n
. An assignment g is a function assigning an individual to each
variable: g(x) 2 D. G is the set of all assignment functions. Next, Groenendijk
and Stokhof dene the interpretation of a term t: [[t]]
g
= g(t) if t is a variable, and
[[t]]
g
= F (t) if t is an individual constant. Finally, Groenendijk and Stokhof dene
the interpretation function [[]]
DPL
M
as follows.
14
Denition 2 (Semantics)
1. [[Rt
1
: : : t
n
]] = fhg; hi j h = g & h[[t
1
]]
h
: : : [[t
n
]]
h
i 2 F (R)g
2. [[t
1
= t
2
]] = fhg; hi j h = g & [[t
1
]]
h
= [[t
2
]]
h
g
3. [[:]] = fhg; hi j h = g & :9k : hh; ki 2 [[]]g
4. [[ ^  ]] = fhg; hi j 9k : hg; ki 2 [[]] & hk; hi 2 [[ ]]g
14
As usual, Groenendijk and Stokhof suppress subscripts and superscripts whenever this does
not lead to confusion.
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5. [[ _  ]] = fhg; hi j h = g & 9k : hh; ki 2 [[]] _ hh; ki 2 [[ ]]g
6. [[!  ]] = fhg; hi j h = g & 8k : hh; ki 2 [[]]) 9j : hk; ji 2 [[ ]]g
7. [[9x]] = fhg; hi j 9k : k[x]g & hk; hi 2 [[]]g
8. [[8x]] = fhg; hi j h = g & 8k : k[x]h) 9j : hk; ji 2 [[]]g 
In standard semantics of rst order predicate logic, the interpretation of a formula
is a set of assignment functions { those functions which verify the formula. In the
dynamic framework of dpl, the semantic object expressed by a formula is a set
of ordered pairs of assignments. A closer look at denition 2 shows that except
for conjunction and existential quantication both views, for all practical purposes,
conate due to the clause g = h. Such formulas are called tests because they function
as a kind of test on incoming assignments: if the test succeed, the input assignment
is passed on as an output assignment.
What happens when an existentially quantied formula is interpreted dynamic-
ally? The answer is that a pair hg; hi is in the interpretation of such an existential
formula if and only if when such a formula is evaluated with respect to g, h is a
possible outcome of the evaluation process. Since g and h are assignments of ele-
ments from the domain to variables, the dierence between an input assignment g
and an output assignment h can only be that a dierent object is assigned to one
or more variables. This is precisely the point where the dynamic binding power of
dpl comes from.
If existentials act like dynamic binding generators, conjunctions act like trans-
ducers pushing forward to the second conjunct the dynamic binding that might have
been generated on the rst conjunct. This analogy would be more clearly under-
stood through the inspection of the analysis of an example such as [[9xPx ^Qx]].
15
Notice that in this example, the second occurrence of x is outside the scope of 9x
in the rst conjunct. However, it gets bound by the existential quantier as showed
15
This formula might be seen as formalizing the natural language discourse composed by the
following two sentences: A man walks in the park. He whistles.
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by the calculation below.
[[9xPx ^Qx]] = fhg; hi j 9k : hg; ki 2 [[9xPx]] & hk; hi 2 [[Qx]]g
= fhg; hi j 9k : k[x]g & k(x) 2 F (P ) & h = k & h(x) 2 F (Q)g
= fhg; hi j h[x]g & h(x) 2 F (P ) & h(x) 2 F (Q)g
As displayed in the last line, the second occurrence of x gets bound with the same
strength as the rst occurrence of x in the rst conjunct. This entails that for dpl
there is no dierence in meaning between the formula [[9xPx ^Qx]] and [[9x(Px ^
Qx)]].
16
This result, which is not valid in pc, might be generalized for any formulas
 and  without further problems.
Another remarkable kind of discourse is exemplied by the so called donkey
sentences whose prototypical format is given by dpl's formula (9x) !  . It
happens that, in dpl, the last formula is equivalent in meaning to 8x( !  ).
These dpl equivalences are referred to, in the dynamic literature, as the Scope
Theorems. These theorems will be demonstrated in the sequence (see page 70.)
It is time to state the notions of truth, validity and entailment.
Denition 3 (Truth)  is true with respect to g in M i 9h : hg; hi 2 [[]]
M
. 
Denition 4 (Validity)  is valid i 8M8g :  is true with respect to g in M. 
Denition 5 (Contradictoriness)  is a contradiction i 8M8g :  is false with
respect to g in M. 
In standard logic,  entails  if and only if whenever  is true,  is true as well.
In virtue of denition 3, it is possible to dene an analogue of this notion for dpl.
Denition 6 (s-entailment)  j=
s
 i 8M8g : if  is true with respect to g inM,
then  is true with respect to g in M. 
It is well known that in standard predicate logic, the notion of entailment coincides
16
Notice that 9xPx does not occur as a subformula in 9x(Px ^ Qx), and therefore does not
conform to the compositional criterium which has dominated logic (and semantics) since the days
of Frege.
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with the notion of meaning inclusion. As it would be expect, in virtue of dpl's
dynamic character, the same coincidence does not hold. As Groenendijk and Stokhof
themselves stated in page 66, \in dpl, meaning is a richer notion than in PL, where
interpretation and satisfaction coincide. Meaning inclusion implies s-entailment,
but not the other way around."
The problem with the notion of s-entailment is that it is not a truly dynamic
notion. To see why, let us point out the fact that this notion does not correspond
to implication. For example, although it holds that j=
s
9xPx ! Px, it does not
hold that 9xPx j=
s
Px. The notion of s-entailment does not account for binding
relations between premiss and conclusion that do happen to hold for implication,
where an existential quantier in the antecedent can bind variables in the consequent.
However, in natural language, such relations do occur. From A man walks in the
park wearing a hat, we may conclude he wears a hat, where the pronoun in the
conclusion is anaphorically linked to the indenite noun phrase in the premiss.
To nd another notion of entailment in tune with the dynamic philosophy pro-
posed, Groenendijk and Stokhof have taken the programming metaphor once more.
If we look at a sentence as a kind of program, a reasonably intuitive notion would
be:  entails  if every successful execution of  guarantees a successful execution
of  . In other words,  entails  i every assignment that is a possible output of 
is a possible input for  .
Denition 7 (Entailment)
 j=  i 8M; 8g; 8h : hg; hi 2 [[]]
M
) 9k : hh; ki 2 [[ ]]
M
: 
The notion of dynamic entailment just dened corresponds to the interpretation of
(dynamic) implication. This relationship can be set out as a Deduction Theorem
for dpl.
Deduction Theorem  j=  i j= !  .
Proof
17
17
The theorems (deduction and the two scope theorems) are from Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1991), but the proofs below are all mine.
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Suppose 1  j=  
1; entailment def 2 8M; 8g; 8h : hg; hi 2 [[]]
M
) 9k : hh; ki 2 [[ ]]
M
Suppose 3 g = h & 8k : hh; ki 2 [[]]
M
3;^ elim 4 8k : hh; ki 2 [[]]
M
4; 2;MP 5 9j : hk; ji 2 [[ ]]
M
3; 5; DMT 6 g = h & 8k : hh; ki 2 [[]]
M
) 9j : hk; ji 2 [[ ]]
M
6; [[!  ]] def; set theory 7 hg; hi 2 [[!  ]]
M
7; 9 intro 8 9h : hg; hi 2 [[!  ]]
M
8; truth def 9 !  is true with respect to g in M
9; 8 intro 10 8M; 8g : !  is true with respect to g in M
10; validity def 11 !  is valid; i:e:; j= !  
In Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) the reader will nd a delightful exploration
on the grounds of dynamic semantics; therefore, we refer the interested reader to
the full length article.
Before moving towards dpl's ospring, we would like to present some peculiar
results which do hold in dpl but not in standard logic. These results are related
to the notions of scope and binding, and provide us with the formal compositional
tools to analyse donkey sentences as the ones below.
(1) A man walks in the park. He whistles.
(2) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
(3) Every farmer who owns a donkey, beats it.
In standard logic, donkey sentences as (1), (2), and (3) get the right interpretation
if we let an existential quantier have wider scope over the sentential connective.
Doing so, we arrive at
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(1a) 9x[man(x) ^ walk in the park(x) ^ whistle(x)]
(2a) 8x8y[[farmer(x) ^ donkey(y) ^ own(x; y)]! beat(x; y)]
(3a) 8x8y[[farmer(x) ^ donkey(y) ^ own(x; y)]! beat(x; y)]
Notice that the translation of the rst sentence in (1), which would be 9x[man(x)^
walk in the park(x)], does not occur as a subformula in (1a). At rst sight, (1a)
can not be produced from (1) in a step-by-step procedure, i.e., in a compositional
way. In a compositional approach, we would rather translate (1) as (1b):
(1b) 9x[man(x) ^ walk in the park(x)] ^ whistle(x)
From the standard predicate logic point of view, (1b) is not a proper translation of
(1), since in (1b) the last occurrence of the variable x is not bound by the existential
quantier, and hence the anaphoric link in (1) is not accounted for. However, sup-
pose we could interpret (1b) in such a way that it is equivalent with (1). Evidently,
(1b) would be preferred to (1a) as a translation of (1), since it could be the result
of a compositional procedure. In dpl, this analysis is possible due to the theorem:
Scope Theorem 1 (9x) ^  i 9x( ^  )
Proof
[[(9x) ^  ]]
M
= fhg; hi j 9k : hg; ki 2 [[9x]]
M
& hk; hi 2 [[ ]]
M
g(1)
hg; ki 2 [[9x]]
M
i hg; ki 2 fhg; hi j 9k : k[x]g & hk; hi 2 [[]]
M
g i
9j : j[x]g & hj; ki 2 [[]]
M
(2)
Therefore, from (1) and (2), we get that
fhg; hi j 9k : 9j : j[x]g & hj; ki 2 [[]]
M
& hk; hi 2 [[ ]]
M
g =
fhg; hi j 9j : j[x]g & 9k : hj; ki 2 [[]]
M
& hk; hi 2 [[ ]]
M
g =
fhg; hi j 9j : j[x]g & hj; hi 2 [[ ^  ]]
M
g = [[9x( ^  )]]
M

Cases (2) and (3) are more dramatic than the previous one. Although (2) and
(3) contain indenite terms, which normally translate as existentially quantied
phrases, we need universal quantication to account for their meaning in these ex-
amples. Notice, moreover, that the corresponding universal quantiers 8x and 8y
have to be given wide scope over the whole formula, whereas the indenite noun
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phrases in (2) and (3) to which they correspond appear inside the antecedent of an
implication in the case of (2), and way inside the relative clause attached to the sub-
ject term every farmer in the case of (3). Again, if we use standard predicate logic
as our representation formalism, these kinds of examples prevent us from uniformly
translating indenite noun phrases as existentially quantied phrases. In dpl, this
analysis is possible due to the theorem:
Scope Theorem 2 (9x)!  i 8x(!  )
Proof
[[ !  ]]
M
= fha; bi j a = b & 8c : hb; ci 2 [[]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
g (by def).
Therefore hk; ji 2 [[!  ]]
M
i k = j & 8c : hj; ci 2 [[]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
i 8c : hk; ci 2 [[]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
[[8x( !  )]]
M
= fhg; hi j h = g & 8k : k[x]h ) 9j : hk; ji 2 [[ !  ]]
M
g =
fhg; hi j h = g & 8k : k[x]h) (9j : 8c : hk; ci 2 [[]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
)g =
fhg; hi j h = g & 8k : k[x]h) (8c : hk; ci 2 [[]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
)g =
fhg; hi j h = g & 8k : k[x]h & 8c : hk; ci 2 [[]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
g =
fhg; hi j h = g & 8k : 8c : k[x]h & hk; ci 2 [[]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
g =
fhg; hi j h = g & 8k : 8c : k[x]g & hk; ci 2 [[]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
g =
fhg; hi j h = g & 8k : 8c : hg; ci 2 [[9x]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
g =
fhg; hi j h = g & 8c : hg; ci 2 [[9x]]
M
) 9d : hc; di 2 [[ ]]
M
g =
[[(9x)!  ]]
M

The dynamics of dpl's implication and entailment, shown in the Deduction
Theorem, allows us to account for the dynamic relationship that occurs between
premises and conclusion in natural language reasoning. From An old lady came in
wearing a blue dress, one may conclude So, she wore a dress, where the pronoun she
occurring in the conclusion is anaphorically bound to the indenite noun phrase an
old lady in the premiss. This line of reasoning is justied not only by the Deduction
Theorem but also by the result below:
Theorem 9xPx j= Px
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Proof
Suppose 1 hg; hi 2 [[9xPx]]
M
1; def 2 hg; hi 2 fhg; hi j 9k : k[x]g & hk; hi 2 [[Px]]
M
g
2; set theory 3 9k : k[x]g & hk; hi 2 [[Px]]
M
3; def 4 9k : k[x]g & k = h & k(x) 2 F(P )
4 5 9h : h[x]g & hh; hi 2 [[Px]]
M
1; 5; DMT 6 hg; hi 2 [[9xPx]]
M
) 9k : hh; ki 2 [[Px]]
M
6; 8intro 7 8M; 8g; 8h : hg; hi 2 [[9xPx]]
M
) 9k : hh; ki 2 [[Px]]
M
7; entailment def 8 9xPx j= Px 
Finishing this section, we wish to call the reader's attention to the problem
posed to us by \natural language reasonings" in which pronouns are introduced in
intermediary steps. The following example, from Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990,
page 70), illustrates this point:
1. It is not the case that nobody walks and talks. ::9x[Px ^Qx]
2. So, somebody walks and talks. 9x[Px ^Qx]
3. So, he walks. Px
4. So, somebody walks. 9xPx
5. So, it is not the case that nobody walks. ::9xPx
Notice that the pronoun he occurring in 3 is bound by somebody in 2. In Groen-
endijk and Stokhof (1990, page 70) words, \although 1 implies 2, and 2 implies 3, 1
does not imply 3, precisely because 1 cannot, and should not, bind the pronoun in
3. But in the transition from 2 via 3 to 4, 3 can be omitted. And the same holds
for all other intermediate steps. So, in the end, 5 is a consequence of 1".
4.5.3.3 Summary
It is the power to push forward variable bindings from the left to the right conjunct
that allows for existential quantiers to bind variables yet to come. This means that
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variables outside the syntactic scope of existentials and pronouns anaphoric to ante-
cedent noun phrases mirror the same phenomenon. This explains how dpl achieves
its goal of developing a compositional logical framework dealing with intersentential,
as well as intrasentential, anaphoric relationships.
4.5.4 Dynamic Predicate Logic Varieties
In this section we sketch some systems developed on the grounds of Dynamic Predic-
ate Logic; in order to facilitate comparison, we discuss systems in a functional format
developed after the original presentation of dpl,
18
such as the ones in Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1990), Dekker (1993) and Dekker (1994).
All dynamic logic theories are based on dpl and therefore they all deal with a
compositional analysis of anaphoric intersentential as well as intrasentential relations
as shown in (16) below.
(16) a { A man walks in the park. He whistles.
b { Every farmer who owns a donkey, beats it.
For these sentences, ordinary translations would be as in (17).
(17) a { 9x(man(x)^ walk in the park(x))^ whistles(x)
b { 8x((farmer(x) ^ 9y(donkey(y)^ own(x; y)))! beat(x; y))
According to the static semantics of predicate logic, these formulas do not express
what sentences (16) mean. This is so because the pronoun-variables
19
are not bound
by the existential quantiers to which they refer to. The semantic relationship
between pronouns and their antecedents is established in a compositional way by
associating pronouns with variables, and dening the interpretation algorithm as a
function \updating" information about possible values of variables. Moreover, this
18
For the original relational formulation of DPL, which has been summarized in the previous
section, see Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991)
19
We can distinguish three main approaches dealing with the semantics of anaphoric relation-
ships. Firstly, there is what has been called the bound variable approach which can be subdivided
under the labels representational and compositional. dpl ts the last category while Kamp (1981)
fall under the representational (and non compositional, by the way) label. The third approach, on
the other hand, corresponds to the so-called E-type framework, Evans (1977), Heim (1990), Neale
(1990), Does (1993) which, roughly speaking, identies pronouns with descriptions.
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treatment of indenites binding free occurrences of the variables they quantify over
induces a semantical change on the other quantiers and connectives. All these facts
are put together, in an implicit form, in table 4.4 below and, in an explicit form, in
the Scope Theorems below.
s[[Pt
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: : : t
n
]] = s \ fg 2 G j hg(t
1
); : : : ; g(t
n
)i 2 F (p)g
s[[t
1
= t
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]] = s \ fg 2 G j g(t
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) = g(t
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)g
s[[:]] = s  # [[]]
s[[ ^  ]] = s[[]][[ ]]
s[[9x]] = s[x][[]]
Table 4.4: The functional characterization of dpl's semantics. G is the set of all
assignment functions, s[x] =
S
g2s
fh j g 
x
hg, g 
x
h are assignments that dier
at most with respect to the value they assign to x, and # [[]] = fi 2 G j fig[[]] 6= ;g.
Table 4.4 shows the functional characterization of dpl's semantics. Straightfor-
wardly, the essential dynamic feature of dpl is the dynamics of existential quantier
binding free occurrences beyond its syntactical scope. This fact is reected in the
Scope Theorems, which hold unconditionally for dpl (cf. stated by Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1991, p. 63, 65) and proofs on page 69 of the present work.)
Scope Theorems:
(a) (9x) ^  , 9x( ^  )
(b) (9x)!  , 8x(!  )
Proof
(a) The interpretation of 9x^ is the sequence of updates [[9x]][[ ]], and therefore
(s[x]  [[]])  [[ ]]. Since function composition is an associative operation, we get
s[x]  ([[]]  [[ ]]) and therefore the desired result.
(b) Before we can prove this item, we need to dene the following equivalences.
1) !  = :( ^ : )
2)  _  = :(: ^ : )
3) 8x = :9x: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Notice that
9x!  = :(9x ^ : ) by equivalence (1) above
:(9x ^ : ) = :(9x( ^ : )) by item (a)
:(9x( ^ : )) = 8x(:( ^ : )) by equivalence (3) above
8x(:( ^ : )) = 8x(!  ) by equivalence (1) above. 
The scope theorems allow us to prove the equivalence
20
shown in (18).
(18) (9x(farmer(x) ^ 9y(donkey(y) ^ owns(x; y))))! beats(x; y)
m
8x(farmer(x)! 8y((donkey(x) ^ owns(x; y))! beats(x; y)))
Notice that the scope theorem (item b) provides the so-called strong reading. For
donkey sentences, which have a universal import, the strong reading is a welcome
result. However, some sentences have a weak (existential) reading as shown in (19).
(19) If I have a dime in my pocket, I'll put it in the parking meter.
On its most natural reading (19) says that if I have one or more dimes in my pocket,
then I'll throw one in the meter. One is unlikely to interpret it as saying that I'll
throw all the dimes I have in my pocket in the meter.
It is possible to dene a notion of weak implication, along the lines that Pelletier
and Schubert (1988) argue for, assigning to conditional sentences the weak truth
20
The proof is as follows.
(1)   (9x(farmer(x) ^ 9y(donkey(y) ^ owns(x; y)))) ! beats(x; y)
from (1), using the donkey equivalence
(9x) !  , 8x( !  ) we get
(2)   8x((farmer(x) ^ 9y(donkey(y) ^ owns(x; y)))! beats(x; y))
from (2), using the classical equivalence
((a ^ b)! c), (a ! (b! c)) we get
(3)   8x(farmer(x) ! (9y(donkey(y) ^ owns(x; y)) ! beats(x; y)))
using the donkey equivalence (9x) !  , 8x( !  )
on the subformula (9y(donkey(y) ^ owns(x; y)) ! beats(x; y))
occurring in (3) we get
8y((donkey(y) ^ owns(x; y)) ! beats(x; y)). Therefore
(4)   8x(farmer(x) ! 8y((donkey(y) ^ owns(x; y)) ! beats(x; y)))
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conditions preserving however the internal dynamics of the implication.
21
Weak and strong readings apart, in dpl and edpl, Dekker's update revision of
dpl, the information carried over interpretation is information about the values of
variables achieved through the use of sets of assignments of individuals to variables;
such sets are called information states. For dpl, information states are sets of total
assignments whereas in edpl they are partial.
22
Such a \little" change allow us to account for two dierent aspects of informa-
tion growth. As Dekker (1993, page 12) pointed out \update of information consists
either in getting more information about the values of variables, by the elimination
of partial variable assignments, or in extending the domain of partial variable as-
signments
23
(or, of course, in a mixture of both)". This change also embraces the
existential quantier. In both systems, the existential quantier introduces arbit-
rary valuations of the bound variable. However, instead of dpl's re-instantiation
scheme,
24
domain extension is used by edpl. All in all, that change provides edpl
with an authentic update semantics, in the same sense stated in section 4.5.1.
Closely related to Dekker's edpl, Dekker's (1994) Predicate Logic with Ana-
phora, (pla), is built on the following ideas:
 There is independent motivation to keep pronouns apart from variables. For
instance:
{ Assigning pronouns to a new and specialized term category, entails that
bound and anaphoric pronouns and variables are kept apart from one an-
other at the syntactic level.
{ Pronouns and variables display a dierent semantic behaviour in the scope
of modal or epistemic operators (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1994)).
21
See, for instance, Chierchia (1992) for such an account. Dekker (1993) present us with a fully
developed argumentation about weak and strong readings of conditionals which he managed to t
in a general framework of universal adverbial quantication.
22
A function is called total when it is dened for all elements in its domain. Otherwise, it is
partial.
23
Roughly speaking, this means that one gets more informed when one knows more about some
specic thing or when one knows about more things.
24
Re-instantiation might be paraphrased as forget about any \old" values assigned to that variable
and assign new values to it.
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In the following denitions D is the domain of individuals, V the set of
variables used, S the set of all information states, and X any subset of
variables
dpl
S = P(D
V
)
edpl
S
X
= P(D
X
)
S =
S
XV
S
X
pla
S
n
= P(D
n
) is the set of information states about n subjects
S =
S
n2N
S
n
is the set of information states
Table 4.5: Information states for dpl, edpl, and pla.
{ The ordinary notions of scope and binding can be sustained without any
further modication.
 Information growth is achieved in the same way as stated for edpl.
 Subjects are partial, since their identity need not be absolutely determined.
Furthermore, subjects are interdependent, since the value of one subject may
depend on that of another (cf. Dekker (1994, p. 5)).
To achieve all the points listed above, pla's information states deal with in-
formation about values themselves, instead of sets of assignments of individuals to
variables, as is the case in dpl and edpl. These values are modelled by tuples of
individuals that are the values of variables. Table 4.5 shows the denitions for the
information state notion for the three systems. It also reveals the interrelationship
among the systems: edpl extends dpl in the sense that the former carries over
information about not only the values assigned to variables but also the variable
sets themselves.
25
On the other hand, pla pass on the values themselves. There-
fore, it might be the case that its semantics provides a \heuristics" for pronominal
anaphora resolution. This is indeed the case, since in the language a new set of
terms corresponding to anaphoric pronouns is dened as fp
i
j i 2 Ng. The index
i is to be understood as pointing to the i + 1 last introduced subject of the state s
and case e 2 s with respect to which it is evaluated.
25
As already pointed out, this makes possible to model the two ways of information gro
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All the points together conform to Karttunen's philosophy of indenites setting
up discourse referents which would be available for future (co-)reference.
26
The
interpretation of an existentially quantied formula 9x follows the traditional static
way, i.e., its interpretation with respect to some assignment g is stated in terms of the
interpretation of  with respect to any assignment g[x=d] which at most diers from
g in that it assigns an individual d to x. However, dierently from static theories,
d gets added to the cases considered possible after interpreting  with respect to
g[x=d].
By keeping pronouns apart from variables, pla diers from other dynamics set-
tings with respect to the scope theorem, which, obviously, does not hold in pla.
Moreover, they dier in some other aspects as, for example, the -conversion which
holds for pla but not for dpl or edpl.
27
In fact, Dekker (1994) proved that pla is
a proper extension, and not a modication, of ordinary predicate logic. In this re-
spect, \pla stands on a par with the so-called E-type pronoun approaches, claimed
advantage of which has always been that they keep as much as possible to classical
semantics" (Dekker (1994, p. 12)).
26
McCawley (1981) explains the Karttunenian approach using an axiomatic formulation of group
theory as a metaphor. Notice that for postulates (c) and (d) below, the role played by e is quite
dierent since in (c) e is an existentially bound variable while in (d) it is a constant. However, in
both postulates they are conceived as referring to the same entity.
A set G with a binary operation . is a group if and only if
a. (`Closure') (8x : x 2 G)(8y : y 2 G)(x:y 2 G)
b. (`Associativity') (8x : x 2 G)(8y : y 2 G)(8z : z 2 G)(x:(y:z) = (x:y):z)
c. (`Identity') (9e : e 2 G)(8x : x 2 G)(x:e = e:x = x)
d. (`Inverse') (8x : x 2 G)(9x
 1
: x
 1
2 G)(x:x
 1
= x
 1
:x = e)
To sum up, Karttunen notes that existential NP's have, in addition to the function of binding
a variable in forming existential propositions, as in the traditional static analysis, the function
of bringing into being constants (which Karttunen christens discourse referents) that may gure
in all or part of the subsequent discourse and which correspond to the entity that the existential
proposition asserts to exist.
27
Such substitution is not admissible in dpl because it changes the binding potential of the
quantied formula.
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4.6 Pronominal Anaphora revisited
In chapter 2 I have stated that pronominal anaphora could be accounted for from two
viewpoints, namely, the syntactic and semantic ones. The syntactic gb framework
was summarized but the semantic ones were postponed. It is time now to revisit
the topic using the semantic insights already provided by the previous sections.
In the literature, we nd a three-fold classication for pronouns, namely, deictic,
anaphoric and E-type. And since so much work has been done concerning them, let
us take a closer look at them.
4.6.1 Deictic
An expression is used deictically when its interpretation is determined in relation to
specic features of the speech-act; the identity of those participating as speaker(s)
and addressee(s) together with the time and place depends on the speech event.
(20) It is true Dear, that driver is looking at us.
28
It is clear that the referent of that driver is whoever is reading the advertisement
(21) I want to know why you are here.
For the classical sentence (21), I, you and here refer to whoever is uttering the
sentence, whoever is being addressed and wherever the sentence is being uttered.
(22) { I had a trunkful . . . they found out what he is good for.
{ I demand . . .
{ They made him a clown.
29
In the dialog (22), the reference for I changes according to the elephant speaker
while he, him refers to Dumbo and they to the circus' people.
Among the most obvious deictic elements are the personal and object pronouns,
and their possessive counterparts as well as demonstratives and locatives. Deictic
28
Bus advertisement that I have seen running by Leeds metropolitan area.
29
A summarized elephants' dialog from Disney's movie Dumbo.
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are also the inectional category of tense and a variety of temporal expressions such
as then, later, today, . . . including prepositional phrases (PPs) such as on Sunday,
adverbs like soon and phrases ending in ago. Finally, denite NPs with the, such
as the door, can also be used deictically as in (23.c) referring to the door where the
sentence is uttered.
As usual in natural language issues, there is no categoric division between classes
of deictic and non-deictic expression; the same lexical item might be used in both
senses depending on the context, as in (23).
(23) a { They'll arrive soon. (deictic)
b { They soon discovered their mistake. (non-deictic)
c { Please, close the door. (deictic)
d { When he nally reached her house, he found that the door was open. (non-
deictic)
e { Max came to Australia when he was ve, and has lived here ever since.
(both)
f { Sue's coming in today { we're having lunch together. (both)
In (23.e) here deictically refers to the place where the sentence has been uttered.
It also anaphorically refers to Australia; the mixed reading assigns somewhere in
Australia as the semantic interpretation for the expression.
Traditionally, deictic pronouns have been associated to free variables so that
their denotations depend on the assignment functions. The systems surveyed do
not pay attention to this category; instead, the bound and E-type varieties are the
centre of attention.
4.6.2 Bound Analysis
Bound analysis has been carried over to a syntactic and semantic fashion as ex-
emplied by gb, drt, and dpl (to cite but a few, where the rst falls under the
syntactic label and the others under the semantic label). Syntactic approaches have
80
as a major advantage the fact that the logical interpretation form associated to the
surface sentence assigns a bound variable to anaphoric pronouns as in (24.a). As
a consequence, the searching for antecedents is minimized. For (24.a), the logical
form would be (24.b).
(24) a { The boys like themselves.
b { 9x(boy(x) ^ like(x; x))
However, syntactic approaches do not cover most of pronominal anaphora, since
they are basically concerned with intrasentential anaphora.
30
So, research on the
topic shifted from syntax to semantics.
As we already seen, drt and dpl are semantic theories where quantication
and binding depart from usual. For them, anaphoric pronouns are syntactically
free but semantically bound variables. Instead of looking for syntactic methods
to bind pronouns under the scope of some quantier, these theories make use of
semantic tools such as unselective discourse binding operators (drt) and dynamic
binding (dpl). Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show, respectively, how drt and dpl
31
handle
the micro-discourse in (25).
(25) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
x y
farmer(x)
donkey(y)
x owns y
=)
u v
u = x
v = y
u beats v
Figure 4.1: drt representation for (25).
(9x(farmer(x) ^ 9y(donkey(y) ^ owns(x; y) ))) ! beats(x; y)
m
8x(farmer(x) ! 8y((donkey(y) ^ owns(x; y)) ! beats(x; y)))
Figure 4.2: dpl representations for (25).
30
Intersentential cases, that seems to be the most frequent anaphoric phenomenon in spontaneous
discourse events, do not belong to traditional approaches to syntax.
31
See footnote 20 on page 74 for the proof of this equivalence.
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pl dpl
(i) (( ^  ) ^ ), ( ^ ( ^ )) x x
(ii) (9x ^  ), 9x( ^  ) DPL's scope theorem x
(( ^  )! ) = :(( ^  ) ^ :)
(iii) m x x
:( ^ ( ^ :)) = (! ( ! ))
(9x!  ) = :(9x ^ : )
(iv) m DPL's universal reading x
:9x( ^ : ) = 8x(!  )
Table 4.6: pl and dpl equivalences for donkey anaphora resolution
The advantage of semantic methods is the broad modelling coverage allowed. The
basic drawback is that they all favour only one reading, the universal reading, for
certain kind of sentences known as donkey sentences. A contrast between universal
and existential readings is given in (26.b) and (27.b) below.
(26) a { Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
b { Every farmer who owns a donkey beats every donkey which he owns.
(27) a { Every man who owns a hat will wear it to the concert.
b { Every man who owns a hat will wear (exactly) one hat which he owns to
the concert.
Table 4.6 gives us a clear indication of how universal readings, item (iv), are
achieved in dpl. It also shows how existential scope gets extended over conjunction,
item (ii). Items (i) and (iii), that hold in pc and dpl, are displayed intending to
provide all the equivalences needed to, compositionally, transform the existential
clause into the universal one (of Fig. 4.2).
Because of the methodological failure to account for both readings in a unique
unied framework, new varieties of these theories (dpl and drt), using the so-called
E-type pronoun,
32
have been proposed.
32
The term E-type pronoun reects the type of analysis used.
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4.7 Dynamic theories II { the E-type perspective
As already pointed out, the category assigned to pronouns has a strong inuence
on how the problems with pronouns are analysed. Here, we can list two lines of
thought: rstly, there are schools of thought that map pronouns to terms, as seen
in sections 4.4 and 4.5. Secondly, there are the ones that map E-type pronouns
33
to
quantiers interpreted in context \going proxy" to denite descriptions; this line of
thought is known as E-type analysis.
This kind of analysis, started by Evans (1977), Cooper (1979) and Evans (1980)
and developed in recent years by Lappin and Francez (1994), Lappin (1989), Heim
(1990), and Neale (1990), assigns a denite description selecting the object, or set
of objects for plural, satisfying an open sentence obtained from the clause in which
the pronoun's antecedent occurs, as the interpretation of anaphoric pronouns.
According to the original E-type analysis of Cooper (1979) and Evans (1980),
(28.a) would be analyzed as (28.b).
(28) a { Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
b { Every man who owns a donkey beats the donkey he owns.
c { Every man who owns a donkey beats every donkey which he owns.
Recall that the preferred reading for (28.a) is (28.c); the problem with (28.b) is
that (28.a) does not seem to entail the existence of a unique donkey for each donkey
owner. The uniqueness problem has already been pointed out by Heim (1982); there,
(29) has been used to emphasize the uniqueness problem.
(29) Everyone who bought a sage plant here bought ve others along with it.
Due to the success achieved by rival line of thought in analyzing pronominal
anaphora, the E-type analysis was put aside for awhile. If drt and dpl give the
strong (universal) reading correctly assigned to donkey sentences, they do fail to
give the weak (existential) reading for a variety of donkey type as in (30).
(30) a { Every person who has a hat will wear it to the concert.
33
This term is due to Evans (1980) and is also referred to as pronouns of laziness.
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b { Every person who has a credit card pays his bill with it.
c { Every person who had a dime in his pocket put it into the meter.
Recent E-type proposals by Chierchia (1992), Does (1993), and Lappin and Francez
(1994), allow us to analyze strong and weak donkey sentences. The dierence
between them, is that the rst presents a non-unied framework relying on extra-
grammatical factors.
34
The latter developed a unied framework for both readings;
the correct reading is triggered by structural parametric values depending on prag-
matic factors. Finally, Does (1993) presents an E-type analysis in a dynamic setting
taking into account results from Kanazawa (1993). Also, the last two proposals are
general enough to take into account adverbs of quantication.
The dynamic proposal of Does (1993) combines several interesting aspects.
 Firstly, it tracks the footsteps of dpl.
 Secondly, it adheres to gqt philosophy. Using Kanazawa's (1993) insights on
the dynamics of gqt,
35
van der Does avoids the pronoun problem.
36
 Thirdly, he makes E-type pronouns quantiers sensitive to scope. This point is
indeed related to the question whether (or not) E-type pronouns refer. Evans
argues that they do; he argues that E-type pronouns as terms which have their
reference determined by description are scopeless rigid designators. In Phillips
(1985), Evans comments on scope with respect to psychological attitudes, neg-
ation, modalities, and time, gives support to the scopeless view. On the other
hand, Neale (1990, pp. 185-189) and Does (1993, sect. 6) show that the data
is more complex.
 Finally, he proposes and uses choice functions for solving the problems posed
by classical E-type analyzes of singular pronouns.
34
The same can be said for Heim (1990). Indeed, on page 169, she herself says \Not all existing
versions of the E-type analysis rely as heavily on pragmatics as Cooper's and mine."
35
Kanazawa's work gives formal support to the claim that in some cases the dynamic treatment
of dynamic generalized quantiers allows for a principled choice between the weak and strong
readings.
36
The pronoun problem is related to the Geachian truth conditional analysis of donkey sentences
within an E-type framework, which seems to give to such sentences always a strong (or always a
weak) reading.
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Such a combination of features seems to be enough to keep us in touch with this
E-type approach.
The Dynamic Quantier Logic, dql, proposed by Does (1993) incorporates the
previous ideas within a formal system. This system is dened in two stages which
might be thought of as a standard static logic to which a separate dynamic com-
ponent to handle the context generated by a text is added.
The language is a fairly standard version of pc with the addition of: (i) quan-
tier symbols `pro
sg
' and `pro
pl
' for singular and plural pronouns, respectively, (ii)
two place determiner signs `all', `some', `D', . . . , (iii) three implicational connectives,
!
c
, !
a
, !
k
, which allow to discern classical, anaphoric and kataphoric referring
expressions, (iv) formation rules dealing with (i), (ii) and (iii). The \dynamic mod-
ule" is the cornerstone of Does (1993) proposal since to interpret E-type pronouns as
quantiers contextually restricted (through the use of choice functions) it is crucial
that the part of the text in which they occur generates a context to supply their
restriction. For him, contexts are of a syntactical gure analyzed as partial functions
from variables to formulas. The author denes the context change potential of a
formula as :
Denition 1: Context Change
For each formula  assign a function ([]) from contexts to contexts. Using a postx
notation, we have
(i) c([Rx
1
: : : x
n
]) ' c
(ii) c([x = y]) ' c
(iii) c([:]) ' c([])
(iv) c([!  ]) ' c([])([ ])
(v) c([[c x]]) ' (c [ fhx; x = cig)([()
x
])
(vi) c([[Dx : ] ]) ' (c [ fhx; ()
x
^
a
( )
x
ig)([()
x
])([( )
x
])
(vii) c([[pro
sg
x]]) '

(c
 x
[ fhx; x = xc(x) ^
a
()
x
ig)([()
x
]) if c(x) #
c([()
x
]) if c(x) "
(viii) c([[pro
pl
x]]) '

(c
 x
[ fhx; c(x) ^
a
()
x
ig)([()
x
]) if c(x) #
c([()
x
]) if c(x) "

This denition conforms to the idea that processing a text, from left to right,
the context should register the information given by possible antecedents (which is
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relevant to the interpretation of E-type pronouns). Dierently from dpl, dql treats
contexts as structured objects which are created as we go along, reecting not only
the dynamic increasing of information, but also the partial character of contexts
while functions. Notice, also, that this denition makes clear that only quanti-
cational expressions aect context. Atomic sentences, negation and implications,
which do not aect context, play a role of adding and pushing ahead information
provided by their subformulas.
To interpret formulas in context, the author makes use of choice functions as the
formal device associated to singular pronouns. For the empty set Does (1993) opts
for assigning the null object `', which is disallowed for occurring in the extension
of relations. The model theory developed is fairly standard, except for the inclusion
of a special element, the null object. Denition 2 presents the interpretation in
context. Note that a model M = hD; i is a notational convention standing for a
triple M = hE;D; i where E = D [ fg, and  62 D and D 6= ;.
Denition 2: Interpretation in context
Let M = hD; i be a model, c a context, h a choice function for D, and a an
assignment forM. The truth of  inM with respect to [a,c,h] { notation: M j= 
[a,c,h] { is dened recursively.
a. M j= Rx
1
: : : x
n
[a,c,h] i ha(x
1
); : : : ; a(x
n
)i 2 R

b. M j= x = y [a,c,h] i a(x) = a(y)
c. M j= : [a,c,h] i M 6j=  [a,c,h]
d. M j= !
c
 [a,c,h] i M 6j=  [a,c,h] or M j=  [a,c,h]
e. M j= !
a
 [a,c,h] i M 6j=  [a,c,h] or M j=  [a,c([]),h]
f. M j= !
k
 [a,c,h] i M 6j=  [a,c([ ]),h] or M j=  [a,c([]),h]
g. M j= [c x] [a,c,h] i c

2 bx:[[()
x
]]
a;c;h
h. M j= [D x : ] [a,c,h] i D(bx[[()
x
]]
a;c([( )
x
]);h
; bx[[( )
x
]]
a;c([()
x
]);h
)
i. M j= [pro
sg
x] [a,c,h] i h([[c(x)]]
a;c;h
) 2 bx:[[()
x
]]
a;c;h
and c(x) #
M j= [pro
pl
x] [a,c,h] i pro(bx:[[c(x)]]
a;c;h
, bx:[[()
x
]]
a;c;h
) and c(x) #
M j= [pro x] [a,c,h] i M j= ()
x
[a,c,h] and c(x) "
Here, c

2 bx:[[()
x
]]
a;c;h
is the set fd 2 D j M j=  [a[d=x],c,h]g The assignment
a[d=x] is identical to a unless a(x) 6= d. When used, terms x are interpreted by
[[x]]
a;c;h
= h(bx:[[]]
a;c;h
). 
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Variables play a double role for systems like drt, dpl, and dql, since they func-
tion as indices for anaphoric links as well as place holders for binding \operations."
The articulation of both roles is achieved in dql through the ( )
x
operation which
erases all occurrences of [pro x] within the scope of any expression.
37
For deictic and E-type pronouns, which are interpreted as referring expressions
{ or contextually restricted quantiers { an inspection of def 1 shows that a context
is dened for a variable x if it has processed a sentence
38
with a proper name or
a determiner binding x. Therefore, due to the double role of variables, this means
that a possible antecedent for [pro x] has been found (cf. Does (1993, p. 22)). This
means that if a context c is dened
39
an unbound pronoun should be interpreted
as an E-type pronoun, which is a choice from the set bx:c(x), if [pro x] is singular,
and a quantier `pro' restricted by this set, otherwise. Notice, moreover, that for
undened contexts c(x), an unbound [pro x] functions deictically.
Now that the basic ideas have been stated, instead of presenting the formal
development leading to the characterization of entailment, and the like, it would be
worth presenting the theory in action.
Let us start with one sentence length \discourses" displaying anaphoric and
kataphoric situations.
For (31) below, the pronoun he is not within the scope of the proper name.
Sentence (31.a) is represented by (31.b) which generates the context set shown in
(31.c). This context is dened for x; therefore, def. 2.i makes (31.b) equivalent to
(31.d), which uses the eta-term x(x = j) to indicate a choice from the singleton set
bx:x = j (therefore, x(x = j) = j). Therefore, (31.d) is equivalent to (31.e).
(31) a { If John loves music he admires Mozart.
b { ([j x]L x) ! ([pro
sg
x][m y]Axy)
c { fhx; x = ji; hy; y = mig
37
In this way, the author provides an account for making a pronoun (occurring within the
scope of a quanticational expression binding x) a bound variable. Notice his use of this erasing
operation in the denitions of context change potential, def. 1, and the interpretation in context,
def. 2. Therefore, context does not aect such bound variables-pronouns; they are taken care of
by total assignments in the usual way.
38
As usual, processing is done on a left to right basis.
39
Recall the characterization of contexts as partial functions.
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d { Lj ! Ax(x = j)m
e { Lj ! Ajm
Example (32) below, shows how dependencies among choices are accounted for.
The context (32.c) results from the logical form (32.b) of (32.a).
(32) a { If a cardinal meets another cardinal, he blesses him.
b { [an x : Cx] [an y : Cy ^ x 6= y]Mxy ! [pro
sg
x][pro
sg
y]Bxy
c { fhx;Cx ^ [an y : Cy ^ x 6= y]Mxyi; hy;Cy ^ x 6= y ^Mxyig
d { Bxc(x)y(Cy ^ xc(x) 6= y ^ Mxc(x)y)
e { [every x : Cx][every y : Cy ^ x 6= y ^ Mxy]Bxy
The consequence of the conditional is represented by (32.d), which leaves the value
c(x) implicit. This means that if a cardinal meets another cardinal, the context will
pick a P from the cardinals meeting another cardinal and then a P
0
from the cardinals
dierent from but met by P. So, cardinal P blesses P
0
. This way, dql makes the
choice of `him' dependent upon a choice of `he.' This dependency complies with the
general phenomena that in these cases the scope relations of the pronouns should
coincide with that of their antecedents.
Related to this class of examples, Does (1993) observes on page 26 that (32.b)
\reports on a disposition of cardinals to bless the colleagues they meet. Therefore,
the choices involved should be rather arbitrary. Within an extensional framework
the closest one could get to this reading is perhaps the use of a conditional like:
M j= )
all
 [a,c,h] i
If M j= [a,c,h] then for all h
0
:M j=  [a,c([]),h
0
]
This conditional gives the consequent of (32.a) its strong reading, where it means
(32.e). Notice that by varying the italicized quantier in the denition of )
all
, one
seems to get a semantics for adverbs of quantication along the lines of Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1991, 81-82)."
MiG sentences are accounted for in dql as in (33) below. Note that the bound
pronoun [pro
sg
x] in (33.a) is not copied into the context.
40
For this reason the
semantics of dql produces (33.c). If (33.c) is true then there is a unique MiG that
40
This analysis follows up on Neale (1990, 196-197). Neale observes that [pro
sg
x] is bound while
[pro
sg
y] is E-type.
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chased and was hit by the shooting pilot. As a consequence, (33.c) turns out to be
equivalent to the subject wide scope reading.
41
(33) a { The pilot who shot at it hit the MiG that chased him.
b { [the x : Px ^ [pro
sg
y]Sxy][the y : My ^ [pro
sg
x]Cxy]Hxy
c { fhx,Px ^ [pro
sg
y]Sxy ^ [the y : My ^ Cxy]Hxyi,hy,My ^ Cxy ^ Hxyig
d { [the x : Px ^ Sxy(My ^ Cyx ^ Hxy)][the y : My ^ Cyx]Hxy
Complex discourses displaying intersentential anaphora are handled as in (34)
below. The logical form of (34.a) is (34.b), whose antecedent generates the context
c(x) 7! Mx ^ Wx. Recall that, for such cases, all intersentential pronouns must be
e-type since the notions of scope and binding are the standard ones for this kind of
analysis.
(34) a { Just one
1
man walks in the park. He
1
whistles.
b { [just one x : Mx]Wx. [pro
sg
x]WHx
c { [just one x : Mx]Wx. WHx(Mx ^ Wx).
In (34), the pronoun `he' is interpreted as a choice from the set bx:c(x), which, by
the antecedent sentence, is the singleton set bx:Mx ^ Wx.
This approach works for conservative as well as non-conservative determiners
such as `just one' and `only' respectively.
Closing this section, it would be worth to call attention for the fact that, ac-
cording to def. 1, pronouns update the formula associated with their variable. If
discourse (34) had been extended by sentence `He airs his dog' we might get the
following discourse
Just one
1
man walks in the park. He
2
1
whistles. He
2
airs his dog.
in which the rst pronoun is interpreted as a choice from the men who walk.
However, this pronoun changes the value of c(x) from Mx ^ Wx to x = x(Mx
^ Wx) ^ WHx. As a consequence, the second pronoun is interpreted in the new
context, i.e., as the previously chosen walking man, who is now required to whistle.
41
According to Karttunen, (33.a) has two non-equivalent readings depending on the relative
scope of the descriptions.
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4.8 Summary
In the present chapter we have presented a way of dealing with quantied expressions
in general and also with intra as well as inter-sentential anaphora.
The introduction of a more complex semantic category, the category of gener-
alized quantiers, allowed us to do a number of things. First, it provided us with
a compositional semantics for NPs, which appears to be impossible on a standard
rst-order approach. Second, it enabled us to state and hypothesize an explanation
for a substantive universal characteristic of natural language determiners. Third, it
might enable us to come up with a simple and precise classicatory criteria for NPs
allowing us to characterize the distribution of negative polarity items as well as the
behaviour of certain items in the presence of others, if we had discussed this issue
(for a concise discussion on these matters, see Keenan and Moss (1985), Keenan
(1995), Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990), but mainly Kanazawa (1994).)
The truth-conditional and model-theoretic approach to meaning developed into
the gqt format has a real empirical concern and a enormous relevance for linguistic
theory. Without it, some nontrivial properties of language would be lost. The gqt
kind of semantics, although limited in its scope, deeply contributes to the eort of
characterizing what a human language is.
The standard approach to model-theoretic semantics for natural language which
has been referred to as static semantics can be characterized as follows: the meaning
of a sentence is identied with its truth-conditional content. As a consequence, the
interpretation of a sentence with respect to some model M is given by a recursive
denition of the truth of a sentence with respect to M and some other parameters
specied inM (such as assignments of values to variables, possible worlds, points in
time, speaker, hearer, and so on (Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990)). Using the term
index to cover whatever parameters are in use, the meaning of a sentence inM can
be identied with the set of indices with respect to which it is true in M. Other
semantic notions are dened in terms of this one; entailment, for instance, could be
dened as meaning inclusion in all M. And the notion of updating an information
90
state with a sentence is dened as taking the conjunction of the information state
with the information content, i.e., the truth-conditional content, of the sentence.
The natural language dynamic interpretation framework, referred to as dynamic
semantics, is based on a completely dierent basic notion. It is the information
change potential of a sentence that is taken as constituting its meaning. Therefore,
the notion of the interpretation of a sentence with respect to a model M is given
by a recursive denition of the result of updating an information state with the
sentence. The meaning of a sentence with respect to M can then be identied
with the update function associated with the sentence in M. This already brings
out the fundamental dierence between a static and a dynamic semantical systems.
Whereas in the former the notion of information content is the basic recursive notion,
in the latter it is the notion of information change that plays this role. Finally, as
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990) point out, the dynamic notion of meaning brings
along new possibilities for dening entailment.
The several issues surveyed in this chapter cover dierent problems posed to, and
extensions on, traditional logic approaches to natural languages. In a progressive
development, we show a compositional approach to general quantifying (gqt) since
compositionality is not only central to logic but also to liguistics and philosophy of
language. Also, the development of gqt has come up with new results such as a
taxonomy for determiners classication which shed light onto the comprehension of
the constraints posed by them to anaphoric relations. Since gqt still sticks to the
pc conservative ontology, real discourses can not be addressed seriously in it. A step
forward is made by dynamic approaches, such as drt and dpl, for which, a richer
ontology is considered. As consequence, a more \complex" notion of discourse is
achieved and anaphoric relations can be solved. Then, several distinctive ospring
(of dpl) were presented intending to show how the notion of update can be improved
to deal with problematic aspects of the original formulation. But, the more evident
aspect of all approaches presented (and, to the best of my knowledge, all literature
concerning with this issue) is that no one has ever gone far enough to take discourses
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as structured entities as chapter 3, and references therein, claims. But this issue is
the target of chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
The problem being tackled
5.1 Initial Remarks
The development of dynamic semantic approaches, such as us, dpl, pla, and drt
among many others, showed that sentences could be used as devices for modeling the
dynamics of information changing (or information growth). From these traditional
dynamic semantic viewpoints, a discourse is a linear sequence of sentences whose
syntactic form resembles pc. However, the semantic counterpart is much more
sophisticated than pc in explaining how to keep track of all the information related
to each state. The theory explains the way to compute the next state given an input
sentence and a state. As a consequence of a discourse having a very simple structure,
it would be sequentially processed in a very similar way as regular languages are
recognized by nite automata.
What happens if we replace the input sentence by a set of sentences bearing
some built in structure? Literature in linguistics has shown that discourses are
a complex phenomena carrying information that is impossible to be attached to
single sentences. Figure 5.1 clearly displays a non-linear structure similar to block
structures found in Algol-like languages.
1
As such, the gure seems to be suggesting
the use of more powerful devices for processing \complex" discourse structures.
Imagine, for instance, that this very same interrupted discourse had been resumed
1
See also Chap. 3 for more examples and explanation.
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after Mr. Lewis managed to keep the pets under control (locking the pets in his
house library! (the very last place I'd let a pet (any pet) stroll away.)) Notice that in
this case a more powerful computational device is required, since we need to recover
the state where the conversation had been disrupted by the pouncing pets. There
remains the question of seeing how much computational power we need.
This is so because, in some sense, classical dynamic settings are one dimensional
and this explains why we can not represent and compute complex discourse relations
(or, if you prefer, discourse structures) in classical dynamic settings since complex
discourse structures are multidimensional. At rst glance, it seems to entail changes
to syntax as well as semantic. The language would distinguish among several notions
of scope such as, for instance, sentential scope (or classical scope, be it dynamic or
static) and block-segment scope. It is clear that dierent kinds of relationships
are in order for modeling inter-block or intra-block anaphoric links. (For instance,
pronouns can be used inside a discourse block instead of the noun phrase it replaces.
However, an anaphoric noun phrase must be used outside the block it was rst
mentioned.)
Using programming languages as a paradigm, us, dpl and ospring reminds me
of BASIC. I'd like to step forward to ALGOL!
5.2 Introduction
The literature in dynamic semantics is all focused on \one dimensional" discourses.
By one dimensional discourse I mean that the only underlying structure available
is a linear sequence of sentences. This is ne for dealing with simple anaphoric
pronouns. As we have showed in chapter 4, the one dimensional dynamic settings
provided us with the ability to extend the variable binding operation across sentence
boundaries.
Chapter 3 presented a \defense" of the need for introducing more structure into
theories dealing with discourse. Examples 3.5, 3.4, 3.6 and 3.7 display clearly such
claim. These examples make it evident that the dpl style dynamic binding is not
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\innitely" stretchable;
2
it is at least limited to discourse blocks which display a
nested structure a la Algol. This implies that dynamic binding operations and the
dynamics of anaphoric relationships, in general, should have a limited scope. And
the block structure is such a limit. However, as we will see, even the block structure
might be dynamically extended throughout discourse. Therefore, we might think
of two kinds of scope relations, namely: (i) the dpl dynamic intersentential one,
characterized by dpl scope theorems, and (ii) a new (inter/intra)block one. This
seems to suggest that discourses are, in some sense, multi-dimensional structures.
5.3 Towards a multidimensional dynamic logic
Cooper (1996) describes the following scenario in connection to the example presen-
ted in gure 5.1.
3
Imagine that, in their US household, the Lewises have not only a cat but
also a dog, both of whom have been dashing around the room, brushing
past your teacup and causing you some apprehension. Eventually, the
situation quiets down and David Lewis engages you in calming conversa-
tion. He starts to speak to you:
The dog is under the piano and the cat is in the carton.
The cat will never meet our other cat,
because our other cat lives in New Zealand.
Our New Zealand cat lives with the Cresswells and their dog.
And there he'll stay,
because the dog would be sad if the cat went away.
The cat's going to pounce on you.
And the dog's coming too.
Figure 5.1: The Lewises scenario I
Notice that signalizes a change in the focus of attention (cf. Grosz and Sidner
(1986) and Lewis (1979)) because it is no longer the conversationally salient New
2
Compare to Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991, page 65) where they state \. . . its binding power
extends indenitely to the right". The binding power they are referring to is generated by indenite
noun phrases which they take as existential quantiers.
3
Cooper's example is based on a similar example from Lewis (1979). Cooper himself acknow-
ledges it. Cooper's use of this example is due to the fact that his work is concerned with the role
of situations in a situation theoretic treatment of generalized quantiers.
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The dog is under the piano and the cat is in the carton.
The cat will never meet our other cat,
because our other cat lives in New Zealand.
Our New Zealand cat lives with the Cresswells and their dog.
And there he'll stay,
because the dog would be sad if the cat went away.
The cat's going to pounce on you.
And the dog's coming too.
Figure 5.2: An Algol-like block structure for the Lewises scenario I
Zealand cat which is being referred to but rather the approaching American one.
Also, for this scenario, it signalizes the end of the inner subordinate discourse block.
In order to make comparisons with other proposals and draw an analogy with
nested programming languages it is worth quoting Cooper, who on pages 76-77 says
On Lewis' account this corresponds to a change in focus from a more
salient cat to a less salient cat. For Barwise and Perry,
4
it represents a
change from a resource situation supporting infons about a cat and a dog
in New Zealand to one supporting infons about a dog and a cat in this
room. For Lewis, the reference back to the US dog could require just as
much accommodation as the reference back to the US cat, unless the US
and New Zealand animals are bundled up in dierent context sets. For
Barwise and Perry, the accommodation gives us back a whole previous
resource situation. Thus on the Barwise and Perry view you would not
expect a change to be signalled for the dog, provided you had divided up
the resource situations in an intuitive way. Similarly, if Lewis were to con-
tinue the conversation about the New Zealand dog, for example, replacing
the last sentence with It's amazing how much aection the dog shows for
other animals in the house, one has the feeling that the reference to the
cat pouncing would have to be clearly marked o as parenthetical in some
way. What is switching here is whole situations, not just individuals or
arbitrary sets of individuals determined independently from the situations
that are being talked about.
Although Barwise and Perry remark were concerned with situation theory,
5
their remark is akin in spirit to Grosz and Sidner's (1986, p. 175) theory.
6
4
The reference here is to Barwise and Perry (1983)
5
Barwise and Perry introduced the notion of resource situation to deal with denite descriptions.
Through resource situation they were able to preserve the intuition that denite descriptions have
a uniqueness requirement. However, they do not equate uniqueness to universal unicity. In other
words, a denite description such as the dog does not require that there is one and only one dog
in the whole universe of discourse.
6
See section 3.3.2 page 28 in this thesis for the relevant material.
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For the sake of simplicity, let us concentrate on discourses displaying a neatly
and properly embedded block structure such as the one being discussed thus far
(g. 5.2 shows the block structure for the Lewises' scenario I).
7
And, for the sake
of concreteness, let us take the Lewises' scenario as the paradigmatic example. Let
us assume yet that there are only two situations, or discourse blocks, on Lewises'
scenario I, namely: the US household and the New Zealand one. Once more, an
analogy with a programming language would be worth drawing.
The rst analogy I am proposing is regarding these discourse blocks as a kind of
subprogram; sometimes discourse blocks mimic the prototypical subroutine beha-
viour as shown in g. 5.2. But, sometimes their behaviour follows the coroutining
pattern as explicitly indicated by the double occurrence of in g. 5.3. The second
analogy is related to the programming language idea that identiers, in a general
sense, must be dened before use.
8
In this sense, the occurrences, in a bold em-
phasized tipeface, of denite descriptions correspond to the declaration statements
while the remaining occurrences correspond to executable statements, which could
be seen as the anaphoric use of noun phrases. The third analogy is related to Algol
visibility laws; based on such laws a variable, i.e., a pronoun, might be anaphoric on
values of noun phrases already present in the very same discourse frame (or, maybe,
in its immediate ancestor.) As a consequence, a noun phrase introduced into an
internal discourse frame would not be referred to by a pronoun occurring in any
external discourse frame.
9
Finally, the accommodation signalled by could be seen
as indicating coroutine resuming . This particular analogy is even more evident
if we look at the Lewises' scenario II in g. 5.3. The rst occurrence of signals
a parenthetical warning for the guest; therefore a resuming of the US household
coroutine is needed. And after the parenthetical warning has been closed, the NZ
household is resumed. Notice that none of the values of noun phrases have been lost
7
We are not taking into account any other possible topological relation between discourse blocks
even though a skillful linguist would possibly create examples where two discourse blocks overlap.
8
Therefore, constants and variables must be dened before their rst occurrence into a execut-
able statement.
9
See chap. 3, sect. 3.3.3, page 37 where reasons for such impossibility are given.
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The dog is under the piano and the cat is in the carton. coroutine USA
The cat will never meet our other cat, coroutine NZ
because our other cat lives in New Zealand.
Our New Zealand cat lives with the Cresswells and their dog.
And there he'll stay,
because the dog would be sad if the cat went away.
The cat's going to pounce on you.
It's amazing how much aection the dog shows for other
animals in the house.
Figure 5.3: An Algol-like block structure for the Lewises scenario II
in this coroutining shifting. And for the scenario I, the warning brings us back to
the US household; therefore, the cat and dog referred to in the sentences following
are the American ones. Notice how the coroutine analogy strengths the dynamic
scope of discourse blocks: sentences might be added to the ancestor block of a closed
sub-block of an unfolding discourse. Sentences might also be added to a block in a
\discontinuous sequence" as shown in scenario II (see gure 5.3).
Figure 5.3 suggests that it would be possible to characterize two types of scope
theorems in the same line of dpl. The dpl (intersentential) scope theorem might
be retained if we take the dynamic binding working inside individual blocks. But
the same idea could be followed for blocks; in this sense a block might be \sparsely"
distributed across a conversation without loosing its coherence. In this sense each
coroutine resuming would correspond to a block stretching.
5.4 The problem
The question one might ask is if a unied dynamic framework for dealing with
\complex" discourses displaying a coroutining behaviour and such that the discourse
blocks do not hold any interblock anaphoric relationship. This last property will
be termed the impenetrable hypothesis. The next section sketches the nature of
information states needed for modeling such kind of discourses. And a positive
answer is given in the next chapter.
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5.5 The dynamics of complex discourses
dpl departs from static logical approaches by regarding sentences as moving an agent
along information states. Since dpl only covers plain \unstructured" discourses {
in the sense discussed in the previous sections { its denition of information state,
as a set of assignment functions, suces. It is sucient since such discourses are
unidimensional and only one dimension is present in the information state denition.
As we are dealing with a kind of structured discourse, exhibiting a coroutining
behaviour, a multidimensional information state would be the kind of generalization
we are after. The basic idea is to allow a new dimension for every nested discourse
block present in the discourse. So, if D is a domain of individuals and V the set
of variables of some formal language (L), then any sequence s = s
1
; s
2
; s
3
; : : : where
every component s
i
, i > 0, is a set of assignment functions from V to D, i.e.,
s
i
 D
V
, is a multidimensional information state.
The multidimensional character of information states just proposed should al-
low us to keep track of information related to each dimension. In this way, when
we move from one block to another, we shift from one dimension to another. The
update of information conveyed into the new block will be processed in the new
dimension without losing of a single bit of information related to the other blocks.
Shifting from one block to another corresponds to the coroutining process described
early in this chapter. Notice that the information state model proposed prevents the
dynamic binding from crossing discourse block boundaries,
10
since a typical inform-
ation state would look like fg j g 2 D
V
g; fg j g 2 D
V
g; : : :, where dynamic binding
emanates from each dimensionally localized g (which are assignment functions on
one argument (which is the variable lying around in that very same block)).
For example, imagine a hypothetical logical discourse as depicted by
10
Boundary crossing ought to be done through re-introduction of full noun phrases. See chap. 3
for relevant material.
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9x(Dx ^ Cx)
Dx
9x(Cx ^ Pxy)
Qx
Hx
where formulas 9x(Dx^Cx) andHx occur, in this order, in the outermost block, and
formulasDx, Dx^9x(Cx^Pxy), andQx occur, in this order, in the innermost block.
Because of the block structure, the dynamic binding emanating from the existential
quantier occurring in the outermost block ought to be conned into the outermost
block. The same for the innermost (or any other block if present). Because of the
multidimensional character proposed for information states, the variable x in Hx,
in the outermost block is dynamically bound to the existential 9x(Dx ^ Cx). On
the other hand, the variable x in Dx, in the innermost block, does occur free while
x in Qx is dynamically bound to the existential 9x(Cx ^ Pxy).
Support for all the points presented here is present in the work of Grosz and
Sidner (1986). Notice the similarity between the analogy proposed and what Grosz
and Sidner (1986) call focusing. Related to focusing, Grosz and Sidner (1986, p.
180) claim that \The focusing structure is a stack. Information in lower spaces is
usually accessible from higher ones (but less so than the information in the higher
spaces)"; a few paragraphs ahead, still in the same page, they state \the stacking
of focus spaces reects the relative salience of the entities in each space during the
corresponding segment's portion of the discourse." Then, on page 191, they say \A
second role of the focusing structure is to constrain the OCP's search for possible
referents of denite noun phrases and pronouns". It is clear that Grosz and Sidner's
use of the stack concept departs from the stack concept as dened in abstract data
type theory.
It is worth remarking that we have so far only discussed semantic aspects of a
new dynamic logic; syntactic issues have not been addressed yet. Problems may be
expected related to this aspect, but such problems will be addressed in next chapter
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where we develop the logic system in full. And, as usual, we expect that the light
we are shedding onto the dynamics of discourse structure will bring us a new range
of problems; however, these problems will have to await future work.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we presented the problem target of this thesis and the methodology
we expect to solve it with. In order to provide the reader with a better comprehen-
sion of the issues involved, an analogy with a programming paradigm was drawn.
The conclusion drawn from the data presented here and the literature on dis-
course theories, is that a better information state model is needed if we want to
push discourse analysis further. It is clear that in order to represent structured dis-
course a new range of entities are needed. And this, naturally, argues for a improved
ontology.
It is also clear that some decisions ought to be made as exemplied by the
very nature of information states. We have assumed that information states are
sequences of sets of assignment functions in D
V
; therefore the same domain of
individuals is attached for all discourse blocks. If this assumption would make easier
the development of the rst \instance" of formal system coping with structured
discourses, it also would not seem natural from a linguistic point of view. It would
be more natural to assume dierent domains for every discourse block. But it should
be remarked that for every decision to be made, a new system would be proposed
as future work.
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Chapter 6
The formal system
6.1 Introduction
The system developed in this chapter builds on the seminal work of Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1991). However, Groenendijk and Stokhof's dpl, as well as rivaling
semantic theories dealing with discourses, suers from uni-dimensionality which
is reected directly from its characterization of information states. For dpl any
set of assignment functions is taken as an information state. Although not free
of problems, this conceptualization is ne as long as we take discourses as plain
sequences of sentences. As an immediate consequence, dpl's ontological top most
entity, the discourse, is modelled through formulas.
1
In chapter 3, we made a point of showing that discourses are not unidimen-
sional: discourses are indeed complex hierarchically structured entities. In spite of
this fact, it is still possible to undertake a semantic analysis of complex discourses
in the same philosophy started by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991). All that is
needed is to pass from unidimensional to multi-dimensional conceptualizations.
Multidimensional information states, for example, are envisaged as tuples of sets of
assignment functions. The multidimensional framework presents us with ontological
as well as philosophical questions.
1
Recall that dpl's syntax is the same as for pc. Hitherto, the word `formula' will be used in
this sense.
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From an ontological point of view, complex discourses cannot be represented
by formulas since the structure of the discourse has to be somehow accounted for.
Besides, formulas (sentences) have a relative place to \live," the discourse block they
occur at. This lead us to the need of characterizing a new class of entities (DBPL's
sequences and texts) and connectives (DBPL's ), operators and relations between
these new rst class citizens.
Since the new ontology poses us with new possibilities, some decisions ought
to be made. Questions such as \Do discourse blocks have dierent discourse do-
mains?", or \Should we grant cross-block interference?" As a rst step into the
multidimensional setting, we decided to keep the system as simple as possible; for
example, we decided not to grant multidimensional interference. We term this the
impenetrable hypothesis. And also, we decided to \distribute" the same domain to
all discourse blocks. Although simple, such a system is capable of dealing with many
sorts of natural language discourses.
We hope that the previous exposition has shown the similarities and dissimilar-
ities of the present system and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991).
This chapter is structured in the following way. The present section makes a short
explanation of what the reader should expect to nd in this chapter. Section 6.2
presents the syntax and semantics of DBPL and therefore it is the section dealing
with the characterization of DBPL's ontological entities. The way the denitions of
DBPL's formulas and texts are made, makes clear that all phenomena occurring at
any dimensional index get conned to the very same index. Section 6.3 introduces
the dynamic counterpart for notions such as truth and entailment. For the deni-
tion of DBPL's text entailment, we thought of a multidimensional Cartesian product
of dpl's entailment notion (which is related to implication.) Since implication is
internally (but not externally) dynamic, DBPL text entailment is a dynamic notion.
This approach allows us to model the idea that anaphoric pronouns occurring at a
conclusion text may refer back to indenites previously introduced by the premiss
without losing the dimensional niche the pronouns and indenites may occur at.
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Section 6.4 presents the properties the system has. Related to each individual di-
mension index, dpl's properties might be expected to hold. Related to the whole
text some properties are also expected to hold; for example, text commutativity
does not hold in DBPL (in the same way that we cannot commute pages in a book).
Section 6.5 presents some additional remarks and nally a summary of the issues
presented in the chapter is the issue of the last section.
6.2 Dynamic Blocked Predicate Logic
The vocabulary of DBPL is almost the same as the one for pc (and dpl). The
notable dierence is related to the introduction of a new unidimensional multisorted
sentential conjunctive connective () and a new multidimensional interblock dummy
functor (IJ) which, for all practical purposes will be handled as a new kind of
parenthesis.
Denition 1: Vocabulary of DBPL
 The non-logical vocabulary of DBPL consists of:
{ an innite stock of n-place predicative symbols, for every natural number
n.
{ an innite stock of symbols for individual constants.
{ an innite stock of symbols for variables.
2
{ a special set of delimiters and connectives, including only the following
symbols: (, ), I, J, and the full stop connective  (which is to be inter-
preted as sentential conjunction.)
 The logical vocabulary consists of negation :, conjunction ^, disjunction _, im-
plication!, the universal quantier 8, the existential quantier 9, and identity
=. 
We proceed to the denition of DBPL terms and formulas in a classical conservative
2
Henceforth, the set of variables will be denoted by V .
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rst-order fashion, except for the \absence" of functional symbols.
3
6.2.1 The syntax of DBPL
Denition 2: DBPL terms
The set of all DBPL terms is formed by the union of the set of all individual constant
symbols and the set V of variables. 
Denition 3: DBPL formulas
1. If t
1
; : : : ; t
n
are individual constants or variables and R is a n-place predicate,
then Rt
1
: : : t
n
is a formula.
2. If t
1
and t
2
are individual constants or variables, then t
1
= t
2
is a formula.
3. If  is a formula, then : is a formula.
4. If  and  are formulas, then ( ^  ) is a formula.
5. If  and  are formulas, then ( _  ) is a formula.
6. If  and  are formulas, then (!  ) is a formula.
7. If  is a formula and x a variable, then 9x is a formula.
8. If  is a formula and x a variable, then 8x is a formula.
9. Nothing is a formula except on the basis of 1{8 
So, the set of DBPL formulas is the same as the set of dpl formulas (which is the
same set of standard pc formulas.) For pc and dpl, formulas are rst class citizens
in the sense that there are no other objects dened upon them. In this sense, DBPL
formulas are only second class, since they play a role in the denition of DBPL rst
class citizens, namely, DBPL texts.
3
For rst-order theories in which equality is denable, function symbols can always be eliminated
in favour of predicate symbols. Instead of f
n
(x
1
: : : x
n
) we can write A
n+1
(y
1
: : : y
n
y
n+1
) for some
appropriate predicate letter for which the following is a theorem:
8y
1
: : :8y
n
8y
n+1
8y
0
n+1
(A
n+1
(y
1
: : : y
n
y
n+1
) ^ A
n+1
(y
1
: : : y
n
y
0
n+1
)) ! (y
n+1
= y
0
n+1
)
Where the notion of equality is available, we can always use functional predicate symbols (with
appropriate axioms) in the place of function symbols (cf. Hatcher (1968, p. 64)). More on this
subject will be discussed in section 6.5, page 149.
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Denition 4: DBPL pre-sequences, sequences and texts
Let  be a DBPL formula. Then
1.  is a DBPL pre-sequence (of length 1).
2. If  is a DBPL pre-sequence (of length n), then    is a DBPL pre-sequence (of
length n+ 1).
3. If  is a DBPL pre-sequence (of length n), then I  J is a DBPL plain text (of
depth 1 and length n).
4. All DBPL plain texts are DBPL texts (preserving the same length and depth
(depth = 1)).
5. If I  J is a DBPL text (of depth n + 1), then  is a DBPL sequence (of depth
n and length = length()).
6. If I  J is a DBPL text (of depth n and length m), then I  J is a DBPL
sequence (of depth n and length 1).
7. If , and  are DBPL sequences (of length m and 1, resp.), then    is a DBPL
sequence (of depth(  ) = max(depth(); depth()) and length m+ 1).
8. If  is a DBPL sequence, then I  J is a DBPL text (of depth n, where n =
depth() + 1 and length = length()).
9. Nothing is a dbpl pre-sequence, sequence, plain text, or text except on the
basis of 1{8. 
Texts are not only the topmost entities for DBPL but also, to the best of my
knowledge, new entities for semantic theories of discourse literature. The following
examples are given in order to make the reader acquainted with them.
Example 6.1 Some DBPL entities:
1. 9x(Px ^ Qx) is a DBPL formula such that both occurrences of x are bound to
the existential quantier. 9x(Px) ^ Qx is also a DBPL formula for which the
rst occurrence of x is clearly bound while the second one seems to be free. We
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will soon show that the second occurrence is, indeed, under the dynamic scope
of the existential quantier.
2. Since 9x(Px) ^ Qx and 9x(Px ^ Qx) are each DBPL formulas they are also
DBPL pre-sequences of length 1. On the other hand, 9x(Px^Qx)Rx is a DBPL
pre-sequence of length 2 since 9x(Px ^ Qx) is a DBPL pre-sequence of length
1 and Rx is a DBPL formula. A distinctive character of DBPL pre-sequences is
that the parenthetical IJ is not allowed to occur in them.
3. As already shown, 9x(Px ^Qx) Rx is a pre-sequence of length 2. Therefore,
I 9x(Px ^Qx)  Rx J is a DBPL plain text. This plain text might be seen as
the DBPL counterpart for the plain micro-discourse (6.1), below,
A man walks in the park. He whistles.(6.1)
where predicative letters P , R, and Q denote the predicates man, whistles,
and walks-in-the-park respectively. Notice that the anaphoric relationship
between the pronoun in the second sentence and the noun phrase in the rst
sentence is captured by the variable x in Rx which is under the dynamic scope
4
of the existential quantier in 9x(Px ^ Qx). Notice, moreover, that for this
particular DBPL plain text, a block structure picture would be given by gure 6.1.
9x(man x ^walks-in-the-park x)
whistlesx
Figure 6.1: Block structure for DBPL plain text (6.1)
4. By clause 4 of denition 4, which states that all DBPL plain texts are DBPL texts,
we get that I 9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx J is a DBPL text. The converse, however, is
not true. Therefore, not all DBPL texts are DBPL plain texts. The emphasis put
on the plain texts clause aims to reinforce the case of absence of block structure
4
Any variable other than x might be used; but then, the anaphoric link will be lost.
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in all other dynamic theories laying around.
5. To build up the double recursive notion of DBPL text an auxiliary notion has
been introduced. The trick is to allow DBPL texts be DBPL sequences and then
build up new and more complex DBPL texts upon these sequences. So, as we
have seen before, I 9x(Px^Qx)Rx J is a DBPL text (of depth 1). Therefore,
8
>
<
>
:
9x(Px ^Qx) Rx is a DBPL sequence of depth 0.
I 9x(Px ^Qx) Rx J is a DBPL sequence of depth 1.
Since I 9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx J is a DBPL sequence of depth 1, by clause 8 of
denition 4, II 9x(Px ^Qx) Rx JJ is a DBPL text of depth 2.
6. Since II 9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx JJ is a DBPL text of depth 2 it is also a DBPL
sequence of depth 2. On the other hand, 9x(Px ^Qx) Rx is a DBPL sequence
of depth 0. Therefore, by lemma 6.3 (page 119) II 9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx JJ
9x(Px^Qx)Rx is a DBPL sequence of depth 2 since max(2; 0) = 2 and length
3 (since length(II 9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx JJ) + length(9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx) =
1 + 2 = 3.)
7. Since II 9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx JJ 9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx is a DBPL sequence of
depth 2, III 9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx JJ 9x(Px ^ Qx)  Rx J is a DBPL text of
depth 3 for which the following block structure picture, i.e. gure 6.2, would be
assigned to. 
9x(Px ^Qx)
Rx
9x(Px ^Qx)
Rx
Figure 6.2: Block structure for III 9x(Px ^Qx) Rx JJ 9x(Px ^Qx) Rx J
The previous examples should help us to establish the correspondence between
embedded blocks and the proper occurrences of the parenthetical delimiters IJ.
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Moreover, they make clear that DBPL plain texts are DBPL texts \suering" from
the absence of any further discourse block structuring. So, in some sense, this case
(namely, the plain texts case) corresponds to a simple sequence of sentences of plain
unstructured discourses.
6.2.2 Semantics of DBPL
The semantics is dened with respect to a model M= hD;Fi consisting of a non
empty set of individuals D and an interpretation function F that assigns individuals
from D to constant symbols and sets of n-tuples of individuals from D to n-ary
relation expressions.
Dierently from static approaches, any dynamic semantic theory ought to mirror
the intuition that individual sentences operate on the information state one might
have before the sentences have been processed. This implies that sentences ought
to be seen as a kind of update function between information states. This approach
to semantics is not new; it is indeed the breakthrough provided by dpl for simple
sequences of sentences of any plain unstructured discourse. Moreover because of
this, dpl's notion of information states, which are thought of as sets of assignment
functions, lacks any kind of structure.
As we are dealing with structured discourses, i.e. discourses exhibiting a nested
block structure a la Algol,
5
a multidimensional information state would be the kind
of generalization we are after. The basic idea is to allow a new dimension for every
nested discourse block present in the discourse. Therefore, a DBPL information state
would be modelled by tuples of dpl information states, i.e., tuples of assignment
functions sets.
There is a clear correspondence amongst nested blocks and tuple components.
Figures 6.2, and 6.3 as well as the drawings already given throughout several chapters
of the present work, should help us to clarify the last point since they reect, more
5
See pages 33, 34, 107, and 109 for examples.
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naturally, the block structure for DBPL texts. Let us take
I 9x(Dx ^ Cx) I Dx  9x(Cx ^ Pxy) Qx J Hx J(6.2)
for instance; this text is composed of two nested blocks and therefore an n-tuple,
where n  2, would be the right structure to deal with information states for this
particular example. It is clear that for n = 1 any n-tuple of sets of assignment
functions couldn't deal with the example given due to the lack of dimensions. To
make sure we will not run into this problem we take tuples as innite sequences
of sets of assignment functions. Moreover, the multidimensional approach allows
us to keep some phenomena conned to the dimension they occur. For example,
the formulas 9x(Dx ^ Cx) and Hx occur, in this order, in the outermost block.
Therefore, the variable x occurring in Hx is dynamically bound by the existential
quantier occurring in 9x(Dx ^ Cx). Because of the multidimensional character
adopted for information states, the variable x in Dx, in the innermost block, does
occur free
6
(see gure 6.3, page 109.)
9x(Dx ^ Cx)
Dx
9x(Cx ^ Pxy)
Qx
Hx
Figure 6.3: Block structure diagram for (6.2), page 109.
Denition 5: Information States
1. a !-tuple is any sequence with innitely denumerable components.
2. Let D be a non-empty domain of individuals and V the set of DBPL variables.
A multi-dimensional information state is a !-tuple where every component
6
This assertion is made under the impenetrable assumption. By impenetrable I mean that each
dimensional component does not get aected by any phenomena occurring in any other dimensional
component. This hypothesis, if relaxed, might give rise to new families of logics.
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is a set of assignment functions in D
V
. To emphasize the multidimensional
character of any information state s, we will use the notation s
n
instead. Also,
s
n
i
and (i; s
n
) will be employed to refer to the i
th
element of s
n
. And s
0
will
be used to refer to the !-tuple s
n
such that for each natural number i, if i > 0
then s
n
i
= ;. 
Notice that the denition of multi-dimensional information states provides us
with innitely denumerable sequences of sets of assignment functions. If we had
taken nitary sequences of sets of assignment functions instead of the course taken,
we would run into trouble for cases such as s
n
[[]]
i
where n < depth() due to
insuciency of dimensional components.
Remark 6.1 Note that the denition of multi-dimensional information states is
based on the assumption that all dimensions \share" the same domain of individuals.
The possibility of having dierent domains for distinct dimensions has to await future
work. 
Remark 6.2 We will use the terms n-dimensional information state and multi-
dimensional information state interchangeably whenever this does not lead to confu-
sion. Also, as usual, reference to M will be omitted whenever this does not lead to
confusion. Therefore, we use s
n
[[]]
i
instead of s
n
[[]]
i
M
. 
Three kinds of information states are of special interest, namely, the absurd states,
the ignorance state and the maximal states. The absolute absurd state s
0
= ; =
h;; : : : ; ;; : : :i is reached when incoming material is in a contradiction relation with
previously introduced information in all dimensional levels. Relative absurd states
are states where for some, but not all, dimensional indices i, s
n
i
= ;. The interesting
point here is related to the nitary character of real life discourses. As nitary
entities, discourses have a nite depth and therefore a relative absurd state might
be considered \absolute" (relative to some discourse) whenever all components of s
n
,
from 1 to the depth of the discourse, are empty. The ignorance state, on the other
hand, models the absence of knowledge; it should be taken as the initial state for
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any semantic valuation since all possibilities are open. Therefore the ignorance state
corresponds to the minimal information one might have and the set of all assignment
functions seems to be the ideal candidate for it. Maximal information, on the other
hand, is represented by singleton sets of assignment functions. Therefore, variables
have their value determined; this means that no other options are possible for every
variable occurring in the discourse.
Recall that the denition for DBPL formulas characterizes the same set of pc
formulas and therefore dpl. So, it comes as no surprise that the semantics for DBPL
formulas conate to dpl if we disregard the multidimensional nature of information
states employed by DBPL (or, equivalently, if we consider dpl's information states
notion as a particular case of the DBPL one where n = 1.) Moreover, due to the
multidimensional nature of information states adopted, DBPL formulas ought to be
interpreted according to the dimension index reecting the embedding level the
formulas occur in a DBPL text. The relativity of such interpretation, which might
seem odd at rst sight, is what allows us to use the \same" denite noun phrase to
represent the two dierent cats talked about in the Lewises' scenario on page 95.
For it, the American cat is the one who inhabits the outermost block while the New
Zealand one inhabits the innermost block. These noun phrases could be represented
as a conjunction of two predicates, cat and lives-in , standing respectively for cat
and lives-in. So, 9!x(cat x)^ lives-in x; USA should be present in, and would aect
only, the outermost block. Contrastingly, formula 9!x(cat x)^ lives-in x; NZ should
be present in the other block. Notice now that for each block, i.e. dimension,
the existential quantier \sets up" all possible discourse referents for x, which will
be \rened" afterwards by formulas cat , lives-in , and whatever will get x as an
argument. Figure 6.4 not only neatly synthesizes these points but mainly shows how
the Russellian analysis of denite descriptions, based upon the uniqueness condition,
could be sustained into the multidimensional approach.
As already pointed out, DBPL formulas might be seen as update functions on mul-
tidimensional information states. The update produced by DBPL formulas conforms
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9!x(cat x) ^ lives-in x; USA
9!y(dog y)
.
.
.
is-under-the-piano y : the dog is under the piano
is-in-the-carton x : the cat is in the carton
9!x(cat x) ^ lives-in x; NZ
9!y(dog y)
.
.
.
loves y; x : the dog loves the cat
is-going-to-pounce-on-you x : the cat is going to pounce on you
.
.
.
Figure 6.4: A DBPL variant for Lewises scenario on page 95.
to the many dierent ways logical constants behave when anaphoric relationships
are taken into account. Conjunction, for instance, is not only internally dynamic,
(which means that an antecedent in its rst argument could bind an anaphor in its
second argument), but also externally dynamic since it also passes on bindings to
sentences to come. The question one might ask at this point about the other logical
constants is whether they are externally or internally dynamic (or both). Answers
to this question are found elsewhere in the literature, but Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1991) provide us with a concise one. But the basics are all present in gure 6.4.
Notice that:
 existentials and conjunctions are internally as well as externally dynamic.
Existentials pose us with some choices for the reference system to be developed.
Take Dx ^ 9xPx for example. The existential might (or not) take care of the
variable quantied on. The position we are going to adopt is to take existentials
as downdates, because whatever the value x has been assigned to will be lost and
new references will be established. Moreover, the dynamic binding originating
from existentials are passed on by both conjunctions.
 atomic formulas do not have dynamic eects of their own although they
function as eliminative updates since they test whether an input assignment
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satises the condition it embodies. If so, the input assignment is passed on as
output, if not it is rejected. So, the output is a subset of the input set.
Except for existentials and conjunction, all other logical constants are externally
static. This means that bindings are not passed on by negation, implication, dis-
junction or even universals. It is time now for intuitions to give place to their formal
counterparts.
Denition 6: Semantics of DBPL formulas
Let s
n
and r
n
be any n-dimensional information states. Suppose, also, that s
n
j
= r
n
j
for every index dimension j other than i. Then
1. s
n
[[Rx
1
: : : x
m
]]
i
= r
n
where r
n
i
= fk 2 s
n
i
j hk(x
1
); : : : ; k(x
m
)i 2 F(R)g
2. s
n
[[x = y]]
i
= r
n
where r
n
i
= fk 2 s
n
i
j k(x) = k(y)g
3. s
n
[[:]]
i
= r
n
where r
n
i
= fg 2 s
n
i
j fgg[[]] = ;g
4. s
n
[[ ^  ]]
i
= s
n
[[]]
i
[[ ]]
i
5. s
n
[[9x]]
i
= s
n
[x]
i
[[]]
i
where s
n
[x]
i
= r
n
such that r
n
i
= fk[x=d] j k 2 s
n
i
& d 2 Dg. As usual, k[x=d] is
the assignment g such that g agrees with k on the values of all the variables except,
possibly, x and such that k(x) = d. 
Denition 7: Classical closure of DBPL formulas
Let  be any DBPL formula and M an arbitrary model. Then
# [[]]
M
= fg 2 D
V
j fgg[[]]
M
6= ;g: 
Remark 6.3 Note that due to the shared domain assumption stated in remark 6.1,
# [[]] does not change among dimensional indices. Therefore, for every natural
number i > 0, # [[]]
i
= fk 2 D
V
j fkg [[]] 6= ;g 
Remark 6.4 The notation used in denition 6 is, indeed, an abbreviation for
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1. s
n
[[Rx
1
: : : x
m
]]
i
= hs
n
1
; : : : ; s
n
i
[[Rx
1
: : : x
m
]]; : : : ; s
n
n
; : : :i
= hs
n
1
; : : : ; fk 2 s
n
i
j hk(x
1
); : : : ; k(x
m
)i 2 F(R)g; : : : ; s
n
n
; : : :i
2. s
n
[[x = y]]
i
= hs
n
1
; : : : ; fk 2 s
n
i
j k(x) = k(y)g; : : : ; s
n
n
; : : :i
3. s
n
[[:]]
i
= hs
n
1
; : : : ; fg 2 s
n
i
j fgg[[]] = ;g; : : : ; s
n
n
; : : :i
4. s
n
[[ ^  ]]
i
= hs
n
1
; : : : ; s
n
i
[[]][[ ]]; : : : ; s
n
n
; : : :i
5. s
n
[[9x]]
i
= hs
n
1
; : : : ; s
n
i
[x][[]]; : : : ; s
n
n
; : : :i
The only advantage of this \verbose" notation is to make it easy to see the evaluation
of each dimensional block under the government of the impenetrable assumption. 
Denition 6 is given in a format intending to show not only the set of primitive
logical constants for DBPL but also how dynamic binding is accomplished. For in-
stance, note that conjunction, which is interpreted as function composition, allows
pushing forward any possible binding that might occur during the semantic evalu-
ation of previous formulas (giving by the assignments already present in the state
s
n
or \freshly" bindings risen from the rst conjunct). In some sense, conjunction
works like a passive transducer since the real source of dynamic binding is the ex-
istential quantier. In this case, the existentially quantied variable behaves like
an active booking system keeping track of values in the dynamic scope of the exist-
ential quantier. Notice, also, how items 4 and 5 manage to keep the dynamics of
conjunction and existential quantication conned to only one dimension by using
the same superscript index i. These points are better presented in examples 6.2 and
6.3 below, where we disregard all indices other than a certain i.
7
Example 6.2 Let V = fx; y; : : :g be the set of variables, and suppose also, that
D = f1; 2; 3; 4g is the domain of discourse and F() = f3; 4g for a predicate .
Assume that
7
Therefore, if we take i = n = 1, these examples would be valid for dpl too.
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i
1
= f(x; 1); (y; 1); : : :g i
5
= f(x; 2); (y; 1); : : :g i
9
= f(x; 3); (y; 1); : : :g
i
2
= f(x; 1); (y; 2); : : :g i
6
= f(x; 2); (y; 2); : : :g i
10
= f(x; 3); (y; 2); : : :g
i
3
= f(x; 1); (y; 3); : : :g i
7
= f(x; 2); (y; 3); : : :g i
11
= f(x; 3); (y; 3); : : :g
i
4
= f(x; 1); (y; 4); : : :g i
8
= f(x; 2); (y; 4); : : :g i
12
= f(x; 3); (y; 4); : : :g
i
13
= f(x; 4); (y; 1); : : :g i
14
= f(x; 4); (y; 2); : : :g i
15
= f(x; 4); (y; 3); : : :g
i
16
= f(x; 4); (y; 4); : : :g
and let s
n
i
= h: : : ; fi
2
; i
4
g; : : :i.
By denition, s
n
[[9xx]]
i
= s
n
[x]
i
[[x]]
i
. But s
n
[x]
i
is the information state obtained
from s
n
by \forgetting" all information s
n
might have about x, in the dimension
index i, i.e., downdating s
n
i
with respect to x. So,
s
n
[x]
i
= h: : : ; fi
2
; i
6
; i
10
; i
14
; i
4
; i
8
; i
12
; i
16
g; : : :i. Therefore
s
n
[x]
i
[[x]]
i
= h: : : ; fi 2 s
n
[x]
i
j i(x) 2 F()g; : : :i = h: : : ; fi
10
; i
12
; i
14
; i
16
g; : : :i 
Example 6.3 As example 6.2 except that  = (9x x) ^ x, F( ) = f3; 4g and
F() = f4g. By denition s
n
[[(9x x) ^ x]]
i
= s
n
[[(9x x)]]
i
[[x]]
i
= s
n
[x]
i
[[ x]]
i
[[x]]
i
.
By example 6.2, we already know that s
n
[x]
i
[[ x]]
i
= h: : : ; fi
10
; i
12
; i
14
; i
16
g; : : :i.
Therefore s
n
[x]
i
[[ ]]
i
[[x]]
i
= h: : : ; fi
10
; i
12
; i
14
; i
16
g; : : :i[[x]]
i
= h: : : ; fi
14
; i
16
g; : : :i.

Example 6.2 clearly shows how the formula 9xx sets up values { the possible
discourse referents { for x. The updated state h: : : ; fi
10
; i
12
; i
14
; i
16
g; : : :i keeps track
of such information. Notice, also, that i
10
; i
14
and i
12
; i
16
agree with i
2
and i
4
, resp.,
on all other values for variables. The values the input state could have for variables
other than x are preserved by assignments on the output state.
Example 6.3, on the other hand, shows how to extend the scope of existentially
quantied variables beyond the syntactic border. Note that the occurrence of x in
x is syntactically free. However, the kinematics projected into denition 6 brings
it back to the scope of the quantier which, by the way, occurs in the rst conjunct
of a conjunction.
A closer look at negation shows that it is also a bit \tricky". Negation is indeed
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a set dierence operation,
8
which ultimately removes from the input state all as-
signments that classically validate any formula . Therefore, any existentials which
might occur as part of any negated formula  will have their dynamic binding power
blocked by negation. Let us take (:9xx) ^  x for example. In this case, x in  x
occurs free. The dynamic power originating from 9xx gets blocked inside negation
because of the set dierence operation; the set dierence operation removes from
the input state s any assignments originating from the existential 9xx. In other
words, s[[(:9xx) ^  x]] = s[[:9xx]][[ x]] = (s  # [[9xx]])[[ x]]).
Examples 6.2 and 6.3, as well as the comment about negation, provide us with
evidence to take negation, conjunction and existential quantication as primitive
logical constants for DBPL. The remaining logical constants can be dened in terms
of the primitive set
9
by
!  w :[ ^ : ]
 _  w :[: ^ : ]
8x w :9x:
and therefore their semantic interpretation can be given by
s[[!  ]] = s  # [[ ^ : ]]
s[[ _  ]] = s  # [[: ^ : ]]
s[[8x]] = s  # [[9x:]]
The interesting bit here is related to implication: implication is internally dynamic.
The internal dynamic eect is achieved by the use of conjunction in its denition.
So, free variables occurring in the consequent might be bound to some existential
into the antecedent. This is more easily seen if we take s[[ !  ]] as fg 2 s j
fgg[[]] = ; _ fgg[[]][[ ]] 6= ;g which is equivalent to s  # [[ ^ : ]].
8
It is a trivial set theory exercise to show that fg 2 s
n
i
j fgg[[]] = ;g = s
n
i
  # [[]]: The proof
goes thus:
i 2 (s
n
i
  # [[]]) i i 2 s
n
i
& i 62# [[]]. But i 62# [[]] i i 62 fg 2 D
V
j fgg[[]] 6= ;g i fig[[]] = ;.
Therefore, i 2 s
n
i
& fig[[]] = ;, i.e., i 2 fg 2 s
n
i
j fgg[[]] = ;g.
9
There is a reason for using w instead of the usual \full equivalence" symbol . For the reasons
why we could not take universal quantier and disjunction, nor universal quantier and implication,
and therefore, having the usual \full equivalence", we refer the reader to Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1991, page 61).
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Contrasting to pc, which allows a broader range of primitives and therefore a
broader interdenability of logical constants, DBPL and dpl are more restricted in
this aspect. But pc is a static theory where binding and scope collapse into the same
concept. DBPL on the other hand, is a dynamic theory in which these aspects do not
collapse. Recall that existential formulas have the power of binding variables outside
their syntactic scope and conjunction allows to propagate dynamic binding through
the function composition mechanism. Therefore, the set of primitives presented
conforms to the dynamics we are after. Moreover, no other set of primitives does
work for DBPL. The reason for this, together with some other logical properties of
the system, will be discussed later in this chapter.
If we restrict ourselves to formulas, the DBPL system will collapse to dpl. But
DBPL diers from dpl by its multidimensional aspect, which is syntactically charac-
terized in denition 4 as texts. And, since denition 4 is built up on the auxiliary
notions of pre-sequence and sequence, the semantic interpretation for these concepts
conforms to the following intuitive ideas:
? For DBPL sequences, the dynamic interpretation is almost self-suggesting: the 
connective is mapped to the function composition operator. Therefore, as each
sentence updates the previous information state, such updated states will be
used as the input state for the next \sentence" in the sequence.
? For DBPL sub-texts,
10
the dynamic interpretation is also self-suggesting: the IJ
parenthesis take us from the dimension in which we are evaluating the sub-text
to a higher one, where we ought to evaluate the sequence dening the sub-text.
This process, naturally, reects the level of embedding the sub-text might be
occurring at inside a text. And since the embedding process might be done
ad innitum, the corresponding dimensional shifting should reect this inertial
point of view.
Notice that the combination of both ideas preserves the compositionality criteria.
Denition 8: Semantics of DBPL pre-sequences, sequences and texts
10
A sub-text could be seen as a text occurring in the sequence that denes the broader text.
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Let  be a DBPL formula and s
n
a multidimensional information state. Suppose,
also, that i is a natural number such that i > 0. Then
1. If  is a DBPL pre-sequence of length 1 and  is the formula that equals , then
s
n
[[]]
i
= s
n
[[]]
i
. (* it reduces to the formula's interpretation *)
2. If  is a DBPL pre-sequence of length m > 1, then s
n
[[  ]]
i
= s
n
[[]]
i
[[]]
i
.
3. If  is a DBPL sequence such that  is I  J for some DBPL sequence , then
s
n
[[]]
i
= s
n
[[ I  J ]]
i
= s
n
[[]]
i+ 1
. (* shift from the ongoing working
dimension to the next one *)
4. If ;  are sequences (of length n and 1 resp.), then s
n
[[  ]]
i
= s
n
[[]]
i
[[]]
i
. (*
index distributivity *)
5. If I  J is a text, then s
n
[ I  J ] = s
n
[ I  J ]
i = 0

Denition 8 is stated in such a way that evaluation of pre-sequences, item 2, and
sequences, item 4, is made in a right-to-left basis. This evaluation splits the whole
(pre-)sequence into two \halves", where the rst half is of length n   1 and the
second one is of length 1. However, we could state this in a stronger form saying
that
If  and  are sequences of arbitrary length, then s
n
[[  ]]
i
= s
n
[[]]
i
[[]]
i
(6.3)
A natural consequence of this theorem is that the right-to-left order does not play a
real role; we might have based denition 8 on a left-to-right basis without changing
the desired eect.
11
But, to state (6.3) we need rst to develop some auxiliary lemmas, which will
be used in the theorem's proof. At some point of its proof it will be necessary to
answer the following question: Which DBPL entities are of length 1? The answer
quite naturally would be: pre-sequences of length 1 and sequences of length 1. In
11
What is really at stake here is function composition. Recalling that phrases and texts are
update functions on information states we should note that s
n
[[]]
i
[[]]
i
denotes the function com-
position in a postx format. So, s
n
[[]]
i
[[]]
i
might be read, in a more set theoretic fashion, as
[[]]
i
([[]]
i
(s
n
)).
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fact, pre-sequences are also sequences, even though this fact has not been explicitly
granted in denition 4.
Lemma 6.1
All DBPL pre-sequences are DBPL sequences.
Proof
supp 1.  is a pre-sequence of length m;m  1
1, denition 4.3 2. I  J is a plain text of depth 1 and length m
2, denition 4.4 3. I  J is a text of depth 1 and length m
3, denition 4.5 4.  is a sequence of depth 0 and length m 
Lemma 6.2 sequence decomposition (weak form)
Let  be any DBPL sequence of length m;m  1. Then, there exist m DBPL sequences
of length 1 such that  = 
1
 
2
 : : :  
m
Proof
The proof is made by induction on the complexity of .
Base step: for any sequence  of length 1. Trivial, since the only DBPL sequences
of length 1 are either:
(1) DBPL pre-sequences of length 1 (lemma 6.1) or
(2) DBPL sequences of type I  J, for some DBPL sequence . By denition 4.6,
I  J is a DBPL sequence of length 1.
Inductive step: for any sequence  of length m,  = 
1
 
2
 : : :  
m
The only way of making bigger sequences is given by denition 4.7. So, if 
0
is any
DBPL sequence of length m+1 then there exist two DBPL sequences  and  of length
m and 1 resp. such that 
0
=   . Applying the inductive hypothesis on  we get
the desired result. 
Lemma 6.3 sequence addition
If  and  are DBPL sequences of length m and n resp., then  is a DBPL sequence
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of length m+ n.
Proof
By lemma 6.2, for any DBPL sequence  of length n there exist n DBPL sequences
of length 1 such that  = 
1
 
2
 : : :  
n
. By straightforward n applications of
denition 4.7 we get that   
1
 : : :  
n
, i.e.,    is a DBPL sequence of length
m+ n. 
Lemma 6.4 sequence decomposition (strong form)
Let  be a sequence of length m, m > 1. Then
there exist, at least, two sequences 
1
and 
2
such that  = 
1
 
2
Proof
The proof is made by cases.
(1) suppose length() = 2. Then by lemma 6.2, there exists 2 DBPL sequences 
1
and 
2
of length 1 such that  = 
1
 
2
.
(2) suppose length() > 2. By lemma 6.2, there exist m DBPL sequences 
1
; : : : ; 
m
of length 1 such that  = 
1
 : : :  
m
. Let i be any number 1  i < m. Two cases
are still possible. (i) If i = 1, then 
i
is a sequence of length 1. By m  i successive
applications of denition 4.7 we get the sequence 
i+1
 : : :
m
of length m  i. Call
them 
1
and 
2
resp. By lemma 6.3 we get the desired result. (ii) If i > 1, then by i
successive applications of denition 4.7 we get the sequence 
1
 : : :  
i
of length i.
By similar argumentation, we get another sequence, namely, 
i+1
 : : :
m
of length
m  i. Call them 
1
and 
2
resp. Again, by lemma 6.3 we get the desired result. 
Lemma 6.5 Index distributivity over sequence formation operator 
Let  be a DBPL sequence of length m, i.e.  = 
1
 
2
: : :  
m
, where for all
i; 1  i  m;
i
is a DBPL sequence of length 1. Then
s
n
[[]]
i
= s
n
[[
1
 
2
: : :  
m
]]
i
= s
n
[[
1
]]
i
[[
2
]]
i
: : : [[
m
]]
i
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Proof
The theorem is a trivial consequence of denition 8, clause 4, and its proof is made
by induction on the length of .
The inductive step: for all j  m; s
n
[[
1
 
2
: : :  
j
]]
i
= s
n
[[
1
]]
i
[[
2
]]
i
: : : [[
j
]]
i
Then for any DBPL sequences 
0
of length m and  of length 1
s
n
[[
0
 ]]
i
= s
n
[[
0
]]
i
[[]]
i
by denition 8.4. It follows from the inductive step that
s
n
[[
0
]]
i
[[]]
i
= s
n
[[
1
]]
i
[[
2
]]
i
: : : [[
m
]]
i
[[]]
i

In some sense, this sequence splitting is weak since it allows for distributing the
dimensional index throughout all \atomic" sequence components. A stronger version
would say that the dimensional index could be distributed in a prex-sux basis,
for all pairs of prexes-suxes that might compose the sequence.
12
Lemma 6.6 sequence distributivity theorem (strong form)
If  and  are sequences of arbitrary length, then
s
n
[[  ]]
i
= s
n
[[]]
i
[[]]
i
Proof
Suppose  is a sequence of length m, m  1. Then, by lemma 6.2 there exist
m sequences of length 1 such that  = 
1
 : : :  
m
. Therefore, s
n
[[  ]]
i
can
be rewritten as s
n
[[  
1
 : : :  
m
]]
i
. By m applications of denition 8.4 we get
s
n
[[]]
i
[[
1
]]
i
: : : [[
m
]]
i
. Now, by function associativity we get s
n
[[]]
i
([[
1
]]
i
: : : [[
m
]]
i
) i.e.
s
n
[[]]
i
[[]]
i
. Therefore, s
n
[[  ]]
i
= s
n
[[]]
i
[[]]
i

Theorem 6.1 sequence splitting theorem (strong form)
Let  be any sequence of length > 1. For any two sequences 
1
, 
2
such that
 = 
1
 
2
it holds that
s
n
[[]]
i
= s
n
[[
1
 
2
]]
i
= s
n
[[
1
]]
i
[[
2
]]
i
12
For example, if  is a sequence of length 3 then the possible prex-sux pairs might be:
(
1
; 
2
 
3
), and (
1
 
2
; 
3
).
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Proof
Follows from lemmas 6.4 and 6.6. 
From now on, whenever this does not lead to confusion, theorem 6.1 will be used
interchangeably with denition 8.4.
Items 2 and 4 of denition 8 still deserve a comment. Both items deal with distri-
bution of the dimensional index through pre-sequences and sequences components.
Since item 2 deals with pre-sequences, which necessarily are only made of formulas,
this entails that all components of a pre-sequence will be evaluated at the same di-
mensional index. Item 4, as well as theorem 6.6, deals with general sequences, which
might be made of any DBPL entities. Although item 4 distributes the dimensional
index through the sequence components, this does not mean that all sequence
components will be evaluated at the same dimensional index, since, by item
3, the internal sequence structure does matter. Therefore, it is wrong to assume that
s
n
[[  ]]
i
= hs
n
1
; : : : ; s
n
i
[[]][[]]; : : : ; s
n
n
; : : :i holds unconditionally. This is especially
clear when  and  are sequences of dierent depths. It is clear that the facts just
explained together with items 4 and 5 of denition 6 conform to the intuitive ideas
underlying the impenetrable hypothesis.
As might be seen, denition 8 deals with DBPL sequences in such a way that the
shifting among dimensions does not move us from the information state reached (for
each individual dimension) as the discourse unfolds. The following example shows
how the dimensional shiftings are performed.
Example 6.4 Suppose that V = fx; y; : : :g is the set of variables, and also, that
D = f1; 2; 3; 4g is the domain of discourse and F(P ) = f(3; 1); (4; 2); (4; 4)g, F(Q) =
f2; 4g for predicates P , and Q. Assume that
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i
1
= f(x; 1); (y; 1); : : :g i
5
= f(x; 2); (y; 1); : : :g i
9
= f(x; 3); (y; 1); : : :g
i
2
= f(x; 1); (y; 2); : : :g i
6
= f(x; 2); (y; 2); : : :g i
10
= f(x; 3); (y; 2); : : :g
i
3
= f(x; 1); (y; 3); : : :g i
7
= f(x; 2); (y; 3); : : :g i
11
= f(x; 3); (y; 3); : : :g
i
4
= f(x; 1); (y; 4); : : :g i
8
= f(x; 2); (y; 4); : : :g i
12
= f(x; 3); (y; 4); : : :g
i
13
= f(x; 4); (y; 1); : : :g i
14
= f(x; 4); (y; 2); : : :g i
15
= f(x; 4); (y; 3); : : :g
i
16
= f(x; 4); (y; 4); : : :g
and let s
n
= hfi
1
; i
2
g; fi
16
g; : : :i.
Finally, let the DBPL text be I 9xPxy Qy I 9yQy  Pxy JJ.
The update of s
n
with I 9xPxy Qy I 9yQy  Pxy JJ determines
hfi
14
g; fi
14
; i
16
g; : : :i for output, i.e.,
hfi
1
; i
2
g; fi
16
g; : : :i[[ I 9xPxy Qy I 9yQy  Pxy JJ ]] = hfi
14
g; fi
14
; i
16
g; : : :i
The computation of the output state is as follows.
s
n
[[ I 9xPxy Qy I 9yQy  Pxy JJ ]] =
s
n
[[9xPxy Qy I 9yQy  Pxy J ]]
1
=
s
n
[[9xPxy]]
1
[[Qy I 9yQy  Pxy J ]]
1
=
s[x]
1
[[Pxy]]
1
[[Qy I 9yQy  Pxy J ]]
1
=
hfi
1
; ; i
2
g[x]; fi
16
g; : : :i[[Pxy]]
1
[[Qy I 9yQy  Pxy J ]]
1
=
hfi
1
; i
5
; i
9
; i
13
; i
2
; i
6
; i
10
; i
14
g; fi
16
g; : : :i[[Pxy]]
1
[[Qy I 9yQy  Pxy J ]]
1
=
hfi
9
; i
14
g; fi
16
g; : : :i[[Qy I 9yQy  Pxy J ]]
1
=
hfi
9
; i
14
g; fi
16
g; : : :i[[Qy]]
1
[[ I 9yQy  Pxy J ]]
1
=
hfi
14
g; fi
16
g; : : :i[[ I 9yQy  Pxy J ]]
1
=
hfi
14
g; fi
16
g; : : :i[[9yQy  Pxy]]
2
=
hfi
14
g; fi
16
g; : : :i[[9yQy]]
2
[[Pxy]]
2
=
hfi
14
g; fi
16
g; : : :i[y]
2
[[Qy]]
2
[[Pxy]]
2
=
hfi
14
g; fi
13
; i
14
; i
15
; i
16
g; : : :i[[Qy]]
2
[[Pxy]]
2
=
hfi
14
g; fi
14
; i
16
g; : : :i[[Pxy]]
2
=
hfi
14
g; fi
14
; i
16
g; : : :i 
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Notice that the semantics for DBPL texts meets the constraints we are looking
for: rstly, each dimension corresponds to discourse blocks, i.e. DBPL sub-texts,
depending only on the depth the sub-texts occur at. Admitting that
I  I  J  I  JJ(6.4)
is a text such that , ,  and  are DBPL formulas (as shown in gure 6.5), and
that s
n
is a multidimensional information state, the update of s
n
with (6.4) follows
the steps shown in gure 6.6, page 124.
9x(Dx ^ Cx) : 
Dx ^ 9x(Cx ^ Pxy) : 
Hx : 
Hx : 
Figure 6.5: Block structure picture for (6.4)
1. s
n
[[ I  I  J  I  JJ ]] =
= s
n
[[ I  I  J  I  JJ ]]
0
by def. 8.5
2. = s
n
[[ I  J  I  J ]]
1
from 1 by def. 8.3
3. = s
n
[[]]
1
[[ I  J  I  J ]]
1
from 2 by def. 8.4
4. = s
n
[[]]
1
[[ I  J ]]
1
[[ I  J ]]
1
from 3 by def. 8.4
5. = s
n
[[]]
1
[[ I  J ]]
1
[[]]
1
[[ I  J ]]
1
from 4 by def. 8.4
6. = s
n
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
[[]]
1
[[ I  J ]]
1
from 5 by def. 8.3
7. = s
n
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
from 6 by def. 8.3
8. hs
n
1
[[]]; s
n
2
; : : :i[[]]
2
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
from 7 since  is a formula
9. hs
n
1
[[]]; s
n
2
[[]]; : : :i[[]]
1
[[]]
2
from 8 since  is a formula
10. hs
n
1
[[]][[]]; s
n
2
[[]]; : : :i[[]]
2
from 9 since  is a formula
11. hs
n
1
[[]][[]]; s
n
2
[[]][[]]; : : :i from 10 since  is a formula
12. hs
n
1
[[  ]]; s
n
2
[[  ]]; : : :i
Figure 6.6: Information states computation for (6.4) when , ,  and  are DBPL
formulas (for example, the ones shown in gure 6.5.)
Step 7 is general enough to show us how to compute the nal multidimensional
information state. Since by hypothesis , , , and  are all DBPL formulas, the nal
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result is as shown in step 12. Suppose now that  is II 9xPx JJ and , , and
 are DBPL formulas as depicted in gure 6.7. The information states computation
should now follow the steps shown in gure 6.8, page 125.
9xPx : 
Dx ^ 9x(Cx ^ Pxy) : 
Hx : 
Hx : 
Figure 6.7: Block structure picture for (6.4) when  is II 9xPx JJ
7. = s
n
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
from 6 by def. 8.3
8. = s
n
[[ II 9xPx JJ ]]
1
[[]]
2
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
from 7 and equality
9. = s
n
[[ I 9xPx J ]]
2
[[]]
2
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
from 8 by def. 8.3
10. = s
n
[[9xPx]]
3
[[]]
2
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
from 9 by def. 8.3
11. hs
n
1
; s
n
2
; s
n
3
[[9xPx]]; : : :i[[]]
2
[[]]
1
[[]]
2
from 10 and denition 6
12. hs
n
1
; s
n
2
[[]]; s
n
3
[[9xPx]]; : : :i[[]]
1
[[]]
2
from 11 since  is a formula
13. hs
n
1
[[]]; s
n
2
[[]]; s
n
3
[[9xPx]]; : : :i[[]]
2
from 12 since  is a formula
14. hs
n
1
[[]]; s
n
2
[[]][[]]; s
n
3
[[9xPx]]; : : :i from 13 since  is a formula
15. hs
n
1
[[]]; s
n
2
[[  ]]; s
n
3
[[9xPx]]; : : :i
16. hs
n
1
[[]]; s
n
2
[[  ]]; s
n
3
[x][[Px]]; : : :i from 15, denition 6.5
Figure 6.8: Information state computation for (6.4) when ,  and  are DBPL
formulas and  is II 9xPx JJ.
For all cases, the aected dimensions are the ones displayed as superscripts (step 7
for the rst case and step 10 for the second.) This is necessarily the case in virtue
of the recursive construal of denition 8.
Secondly, the characteristic dynamic binding of dpl is still available. Notice
that DBPL dynamic binding is restricted to each particular dimension. For
I 9x(Dx ^ Cx) I Dx ^ 9x(Cx ^ Pxy) J Hx J,
we can see that in the inner text, i.e. I Dx^ 9x(Cx^ Pxy) J, the rst occurrence
of x in Dx is statically and dynamically free; the combined eect of the existential
quantier and sentential connective occurring in the outer text, i.e. the underlined
text in I 9x(Dx ^ Cx) I Dx ^ 9x(Cx ^ Pxy) J Hx J, dynamically binds the
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\free" occurrence of x in Hx. So, the multidimensional model for information states
allows us to conne the kinematics of binding to each particular dimension. This
connement is even more easily seen from the two formal derivations shown in
gures 6.6 and 6.8 (pages 124 and 125, resp.) and from the informal pictorial
representation of the same DBPL texts as shown in gures 6.5 and 6.7 (pages 124 and
125, resp.).
Thirdly, the proposed model retains the information state, for each dimension,
during the interpretation of sub-texts occurring at the same level independently of
possibly intervening material occurring at dierent levels. This is convenient for
situations such as the one described in Lewises scenario II, in gure 5.3, page 97.
This discourse has two blocks occurring at the same level corresponding to the
resuming of the topic being talked about just before the interruption. It is clear that
no piece of information has been lost.
13
In fact, the conversation follows based on
the assumption that the other participants retained the information already given.
This phenomenon is what I have called co-routining in the previous chapter. So,
denition 8 models this co-routining behaviour.
Fourthly, the multidimensional character of information state adopted allows
us to use denite descriptions in a Russellian way. For pc (and dpl as well),
which might be seen as a kind of unidimensional DBPL-like system, unicity and
uniqueness collapse into one another. However, for multidimensional cases, where
the uniqueness condition would not aect any dimension but the one where the
description occurs at, uniqueness does not mean unicity. Unicity is therefore a
much stronger concept meaning that for all possible dimensions there exist one and
only one object satisfying some condition. For the Lewises' scenario, the denite
noun phrase the cat, for instance, is used in two dierent blocks referring to dierent
cats. Since only one cat \inhabits" each block, the uniqueness condition is satised.
Finally, by not conating sequence conjunction and formula conjunction it is
possible to keep a better recording of the \internal" structure of DBPL texts (without
13
See, for instance, gure 6.6, step 12, and gure 6.8, step 16, for details of how this is accom-
plished.
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loosing any of the above cited characteristics.) This better structuring would help
us, for example, to discover better splitting points for text segmentation (or the
other way around).
14
It is easily seen that if  and  are DBPL sequences, then  
is a DBPL sequence which might be broken in some reasonable place.
15
This is what
the theorem below states.
Theorem 6.2 DBPL text splitting (strong form)
Let  and  be any DBPL sequences of any length and s
n
any information state. Then
s
n
[[ I    J ]] = s
n
[[ I  J ]][[ I  J ]]
Proof
s
n
[[ I    J ]] = s
n
[[ I    J ]]
0
(def. 7.5)
= s
n
[[  ]]
1
(def. 7.3)
= s
n
[[]]
1
[[]]
1
(lemma 6.6, page 121)
= s
n
[[ I  J ]]
0
[[]]
1
= s
n
[[ I  J ]][[ I  J ]]
0
= s
n
[[ I  J ]][[ I  J ]] 
Before stating the multidimensional notions related to meaning, truth and equi-
valence, we ought to develop extra machinery in order to cope with most of DBPL's
text results. In fact, most of the results to be presented, will be stated in a two-fold
approach. Firstly, we will employ a reduction strategy in order to prove theorems for
DBPL entities that can be \reduced" to dpl's \equivalent" ones. This is the case for
DBPL's formulas and DBPL's pre-sequences. That DBPL's formulas are dpl formulas is
not dicult to see since for both systems the denition for formulas follow the same
pattern. Although DBPL sequences do not have a dpl counter-part, pre-sequences
might be seen as dpl formulas if we replace the  conjunction by the more tradi-
14
These facts could be rephrased as stating that the text composed by juxtaposing sequences 
and , i.e. I    J, induces the same output as the juxtaposition of the texts made up upon 
and , i.e. I  JI  J . Notice that this \equivalence" preserves the dynamic character we are
after.
15
A DBPL sequence can be broken in two (or more) DBPL sequences only if each of these sequences
are balanced with respect to IJ. Notice that IJ do not occur in DBPL pre-sequences, therefore
any occurrence of  in a DBPL pre-sequence would be used as a reasonable splitting point.
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tional ^.
16
Doing so, the result for formulas would be immediately transposed for
pre-sequences.
Secondly, we will employ a \synchronization" strategy in order to prove most of
the results for DBPL rst class citizens, i.e., DBPL texts (which cannot be reduced,
in any way, to any dpl entities in virtue of their multidimensionality). The syn-
chronization strategy, which is related to the impenetrable assumption, will take
every individual unidimensional information state, for every dimensional index i,
of any multidimensional information state s
n
, to compute the result of updating
s
n
with a DBPL text. But, to undertake this computation we need to know which
objects inhabit every dimensional niche. Therefore, some extra concepts, notation
and auxiliary results ought to be developed before we proceed to the next section.
As we have said before, we need to develop some extra technical tools in order
to prove DBPL theorems related to texts. One of these tools is a projection function,
Proj, which is a binary function taking as input a natural number i and a DBPL
text I 	 J and giving as output a DBPL pre-sequence containing all DBPL formulas
occurring at the specied level i in their natural order of occurrence. So, for example,
if 
1
and 
2
are DBPL pre-sequences, then Proj(1;I 
1
 I  J 
2
J) = 
1
^
2
,
17
independently of the internal structure of . However, such a function poses us with
technical problems exemplied by Proj(1;II  JJ) for which case the output is
null. Since DBPL did not make provision for entities such as the null sequence and
the null text we ought to make some provisos for dealing with cases like Proj(1;II
 JJ), and, also, the subsequent problems related to the introduction of such
null entities into the framework. One of these problems is related to the following
question: what does it mean to update a multidimensional state with a null text.
These points will be handled in sequel.
Denition 9: Null sequence and null text
The null text is a \text" of depth 0 and length 0. The null sequence is a \sequence"
16
For pre-sequences, the \multi-sorted" connective \" will be applied to, and only to, DBPL
formulas. In this case, the bullet operator \might be seen" as equivalent to the traditional ^.
17
Notice that Proj maps  to ^.
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of length 0. The null text and the null sequence will be denoted by . 
Notice that denition 9 does not grant the null entities a special place among DBPL's
entities. Indeed, neither the null text nor the null sequence are DBPL entities. The
introduction of such exotic objects is due to the total character assumed for the
Proj function, which must always produce a value.
18
Denition 10: null sequence update
If  is the null sequence then s
n
[[]]
i
= s
n
i
for all multidimensional states s
n
and
dimensional indices i. 
Denition 11: null text update
If  is the null text then s
n
[[]] = s
n
for all multidimensional states s
n
. 
It seems reasonable to interpret the null entities in two ways: rstly, as producing
an absurd state. After all, it is not natural to be presented with an empty page or
any other empty object without running into a contradictory feeling. On the other
hand, we might stay in the same information state as before since the null text does
18
Trading once more on the programming language paradigm, I would point out the striking
similarity between DBPL texts and lisp lists. Although I do not intend to develop here the necessary
repertoire of functions needed in order to characterize Proj, I would like to give a Common Lisp
version of Proj. This is accomplished by the following functions.
(defun proj (n list of lists)
(cond
((null list of lists) nil)
((equal n 1) (remove-if #'null (mapcar #'atom proj list of lists)))
(t
(proj (1- n) (ze append (remove-if #'null (mapcar #'list proj list of lists)))))))
(defun atom proj (simbolo)
(cond ((atom simbolo) simbolo)
(t nil)))
(defun list proj (arg)
(cond ((listp arg) arg)
(t nil)))
(defun ze append (lista)
(cond ((null lista) nil)
(t (append (car lista) (ze append (cdr lista))))))
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not provide us with any information. For technical reasons, we choose the latter
option since it will make the proof of the next theorems easier.
As a straightforward consequence of denition 10, it holds that
Theorem 6.3 Let  be the null sequence and M an arbitrary model. Then
# [[]]
M
= D
V
Proof
By denition 7, # [[]]
M
= fg 2 D
V
j fgg[[]]
M
6= ;g. By denition 10, fgg[[]]
M
=
fgg. Therefore # [[]]
M
= D
V
. 
It is clear that there exist a closer connection between DBPL's text evaluation and
Proj. This relationship is as follows.
s
n
[[ I 	 J ]] = hs
n
1
[[Proj(1;I 	 J)]]; : : : ; s
n
i
[[Proj(i;I 	 J)]]; s
n
i+1
; s
n
i+2
; : : :i
where i is the depth of I 	 J.
Having developed the necessary tools, we can now proceed to the next section.
6.3 Meaning, Truth and Equivalence
Static semantic systems were primarily devised as devices to model the world. As
a consequence, their underlying languages should reect the relationship between
language and the world they model. Therefore, truth and falsity were in the very
kernel of such a relationship. Contrastingly, in dynamic settings, it is information
about the world, and not the world itself, that language is related to. If the notions
of truth and falsity occupy a central position in standard static semantics, their
places are expected to be lled by more appropriate information oriented notions
which are usually referred to in the literature by names such as consistency, support,
satisfaction and the like (cf. Groenendijk, Stokhof and Veltman (1994, p.123)).
Denition 12: Support (or compatibility) in
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Let  be a DBPL formula, I  J a DBPL text, s
n
a multidimensional information
state, and M a model. Then,
Formulas: s
n
supports  with respect to M and a dimensional index i > 0 i
(i; s
n
) # [[]]
M
Notation: s
n
j=
i
M

Texts: s
n
supports I  J with respect to M i for all i, 1  i  depth(I  J)
& Proj(i;I  J) 6= ) (i; s
n
) # [[Proj(i;I  J)]]
M
.
Notation: s
n
j=
M
I  J 
Remark 6.5 Recalling denition 7, denition 12 might have been stated in an equival-
ent form as displayed below.
Formulas: s
n
supports  with respect to M and a dimensional index i > 0 i
for all g, (g 2 (i; s
n
)) fgg[[]]
M
6= ;)
Texts: s
n
supports I  J with respect to M i for all assignments g and natural
numbers i, (1  i  depth(I  J) & Proj(i;I  J) 6=  & g 2 (i; s
n
) )
fgg[[Proj(i;I  J)]]
M
6= ;) 
The equivalence between denition 12 and remark 6.5 is granted by the following
theorem.
Theorem 6.4 s
n
i
# [[]]
M
i for all g, (g 2 s
n
i
) fgg[[]]
M
6= ;).
The proof is trivial since by denition of # [[]]
M
, # [[]]
M
= fg 2 D
V
j fgg[[]]
M
6= ;g.
Therefore, s
n
i
# [[]]
M
i for all g, g 2 s
n
i
) fgg[[]]
M
6= ;. 
The support denition equivalent form stated in remark 6.5 helps us to more
easily understand that an information state s
n
supports a DBPL text (or put the
other way around, a DBPL text is compatible with s
n
, the information state one
might have reached thus far) i the update of s
n
with the text takes one to a
relative non-absurd information state.
19
Being \local entities", DBPL formulas could
19
Recall that for any DBPL text I 	 J, a relative multidimensional absurd state is any multidi-
mensional information state such that for each dimensional index ranging from one to the depth
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only aect the dimensional \niche" they occupy in a DBPL text. This means that
a DBPL formula should be compatible (or incompatible) with the dimensional index
of a multidimensional information state. It does mean also that dierent instances
of a formula, occurring into dierent dimensional indices, might produce dierent
answers: in one index the update produced by the formula might be compatible to
the \local (uni)dimensional information state" while just the opposite for the other
index.
Having dened the notion of support we can now characterize the notion of
entailment and validity in terms of it. Before doing this, we will characterize the
notion of multidimensional agreement which plays an important role in the concepts
to be dened.
Denition 13: Multidimensional agreement in DBPL (weak form)
Let I 
1
J; : : : ;I 
n
J be DBPL texts. Then
I 
1
J; : : : ;I 
n 1
J multidimensionally agree with I 
n
J i depth(I 
n
J) =
depth(I 
1
: : :
n 1
J) and for all i, 1  i  depth(I 
n
J)) (Proj(i;I 
n
J) 6=
) Proj(i;I 
1
 : : : 
n 1
J) 6= ). 
Notice that the kind of multidimensional agreement stated in denition 13 is in some
sense a weak form since it does not state that all texts in the sequence must agree
among themselves; if this is the case (let us call it strong multidimensional agree-
ment), then the sequence I 
1
J, : : : ;I 
n 1
J multidimensionally agrees with
I 
n
J. For strong multidimensional agreement we can, indeed, permute I 
n
J
with any other text in the sequence and the multidimensional agreement still holds.
However, for weak agreement, permutation should not preserve, in general, the
multidimensional agreement as exemplied by I 
1
J;II 
2
JJ which multidi-
mensionally agree with II 
3
J 
4
J. Note that if we permute II 
3
J 
4
J
with I 
1
J, then the weak agreement is destroyed.
of the text I 	 J for which Proj(i;I 	 J) 6= , the unidimensional information states for such
indices are all the empty set. In other words, independently of the \irrelevant" dimensions { the
dimensions not present in the text I 	 J { the relative absurd multidimensional information state
will not support I 	 J.
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Notice that multidimensional agreement allows us to dene multidimensional
connectives induced from the unidimensional ones. So, we can dene
m
^,
m
), and
m
:
,
for instance, as
? I  J
m
^ I 	 J is a DBPL text I  J i I  J multidimensionally agree
with I 	 J and I 	 J multidimensionally agree with I  J and for all i,
1  i  depth(I 	 J) & Proj(i;I 	 J) 6=  ) Proj(i;I  J) ^ Proj(i;I
	 J) = Proj(i;I  J)
? I  J
m
) I 	 J is a DBPL text I  J i I  J multidimensionally agree
with I 	 J and I 	 J multidimensionally agree with I  J and for all i,
1  i  depth(I 	 J) & Proj(i;I 	 J) 6= ) Proj(i;I  J) ! Proj(i;I
	 J) = Proj(i;I  J)
?
m
:
I  J is a DBPL text I  J i I  J multidimensionally agree with I  J
and for all i, 1  i  depth(I  J) & Proj(i;I  J) 6=  ) :(Proj(i;I
 J)) = Proj(i;I  J)
According to the denitions given above, I  I  JJ
m
) I  I  JJ is the
DBPL text I !  I  !  JJ.
We can now start discussing entailment in DBPL.
Text entailment might be dened as
I 
1
J; : : : ;I 
n
J j= I 	 J
i for all models M and information states s
n
,
s
n
[[ I 
1
J ]]
M
: : : [[ I 
n
J ]]
M
j=
M
I 	 J.
Looking at the premiss and conclusion texts we can think of three relationships
holding among them. For the rst case, let us assume that there are no restrictions
on them, i.e., the premises and conclusion can be any texts. For the second case,
let us assume that the premises weakly multidimensionally agree with the conclu-
sion, i.e., I 
1
 : : : 
n
J multidimensionally agree with I 	 J. As this weak
multidimensional agreement does not imply that all texts multidimensionally agree
among themselves, this would be the point for the third relationship. Let us denote
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these entailments by (1)j=, (2)j= and (3)j=, respectively. As a consequence of these
proposed \denitions" (each denition would include the respective restriction), the
following results hold.
Theorem 6.5 for any DBPL formula , I  J;II  JJ (1)j= I  J.
Proof
Let M and s
n
be any model and multidimensional information state, resp.
Since  is a formula we get that depth(I  J) = 1. So, Proj(1;I  J) =  6= 
and (1; s
n
[[ I  J ]][[ II  JJ ]]) = s
n
1
[[]]. We know also that
# [[Proj(1;I  J)]] =# [[]] = fg 2 D
V
j fgg[[]] 6= ;g (*)
However, s
n
1
[[]] = fg 2 s
n
1
j fgg[[]] 6= ;g (**)
Therefore, from (*), (**) and set theory (**)  (*). By denition of support,
s
n
[[ I  J ]][[ II  JJ ]] (1) j= I  J. And since M and s
n
are arbitrary, by
denition of (1)entailment we get I  J;II  JJ (1)j= I  J 
Theorem 6.6 for any DBPL formula , I  J;II  JJ (2 j 3)6j=I  J.
Proof
Trivial, since by denition the texts do not multidimensionally agree. 
Theorem 6.7 for all DBPL formula , I  J (1 j 2 j 3) 6j= II  JJ.
Proof
 (1)j=
Suppose by contradiction that I  J (1)j= II  JJ. Then, by denition of
(1)entailment, for all models M and multidimensional information states s
n
,
s
n
[[ I  J ]]
M
(1)j=
M
II  JJ. Let us take a multidimensional information
state r
n
such that one and only one component (the rst component) does
indeed support  and all other dimensional components support :. It is clear
that such r
n
when updated by I  J will produce an information state that
does not support II  JJ (since (2; r
n
) 6# [[Proj(2;II  JJ)]]
M
, because
(2; r
n
)\ # [[]]
M
= ;), which is an absurd.
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 (2 j 3)j=
Trivial, since by denition the texts do not multidimensionally agree. 
By similar argumentation, the converse of theorem 6.7, theorem 6.8 below, does
hold.
Theorem 6.8 for all DBPL formula , II  JJ (1 j 2 j 3) 6j= I  J. 
The problem with (1) j= is that it does not allow us to follow a uniform pro-
cedure when deduction is accounted for. The basic problem is exemplied by
I  J;II  JJ (1)j= I  I  JJ. If we want to preserve the usual deduction
style, we should expect that I  J (1)j= II  JJ
m
) I  I  JJ holds. But
what does
m
) mean in such dimensionally mismatched texts? Also, any multidimen-
sional information state supporting the premissI  J when updated by I  Jmust
support the conclusion II  JJ
m
)I  I  JJ. To solve the
m
) mismatching,
two possibilities are open:
1. \relaxing"
m
) making it to denote a text where the mismatched dimensions are
kept and for all other dimensions we get that !  where  comes from the
premiss and  from the conclusion. So,I  J (1) j= II  JJ
m
) I  I  JJ
becomes I  J (1) j= I  I !  JJ and therefore
(1) j= I !  I !  JJ
which would be the intended result. But now, let us consider the follow-
ing case. II  JJ;I  J (1) j= I  J i II  JJ (1) j= I  J
m
)I  J i.e.
II  JJ (1) j= I !  J i (1) j= II  JJ
m
)I !  J
i (1) j= II  J !  J. But this is obviously absurd since there would be
multidimensional states where the second component would support : instead
of .
2. As we have seen in the previous item, keeping mismatched dimensions in the
resulting text leads us to inconsistency. So, we can think of throwing mis-
matched dimensions away. But this also leads us to problems as exemplied
by I  J;II  JJ (1) j= I  I  JJ. For this case, we get that
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I  J (1) j= II  JJ
m
)I  I  JJ. But II  JJ and I  I  JJ do
not dimensionally agree and therefore we should throw some components of
one of them away. Which text should be thrown away? It seems quite obvious
to discard the \useless" hypothesis, but which one is (are) the useless one(s)?
The problem is related to the global/simultaneously binding work emanating
from all relevant dimensions
20
as stated in denition 12 which cannot be split when
we walk back through the premises sequence in order to pass on the last premiss
to the conclusion. This can only be done when no dimensional splitting occurs.
And since (1)j= does not fulll this criteria it must be rejected as a candidate for
characterizing the entailment relation. Notice, however, that (2)j= and (3)j= respect
the \simultaneous global binding" criteria. Moreover, the pre-denitions given for
(2)j= and (3)j= show that these concepts are empirically equivalent with respect to
entailment. They both take care of the dimensional interplay between premises and
conclusion; all relevant dimensions are there, no more no less. So, we feel justied
to adopt (2)j= for dening entailment.
Denition 14: Entailment in DBPL
Let 
1
; : : : ; 
n
and  be DBPL formulas. Let, also, I 
1
J; : : : ;I 
n
J and I 	 J
be any DBPL texts such that I 
1
 : : :
n
J multidimensionally agree with I 	 J.
Then
Formulas: 
1
; : : : ; 
n
j=  i for all models M and information states s
n
, and
natural numbers i > 0, s
n
[[
1
]]
i
M
: : : [[
n
]]
i
M
j=
M
 
Texts: I 
1
J; : : : ;I 
n
J j= I 	 J i for all models M and information states
s
n
, s
n
[[ I 
1
J ]]
M
: : : [[ I 
n
J ]]
M
j=
M
I 	 J. 
Denition 15: Validity in DBPL
Let  be a DBPL text and  a DBPL formula. Then
20
The relevant dimensions we are referring to here are the ones for which the Proj(i;) 6=  for
any arbitrary DBPL text  and natural number i, 1  i  depth().
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Formulas: j=  i for all models M, multidimensional information states s
n
, and
natural numbers i > 0, s
n
i
j=
M

Texts: j=  i for all models M and multidimensional information states s
n
,
s
n
j=
M
 
The following theorems show how the impenetrable hypothesis underlies the entail-
ment relation. Also, they emphasize the point that premiss texts and the conclusion
text must agree in all relevant dimensional indices. Obviously, the most trivial
agreement one could get for any DBPL text is given by the following result.
Theorem 6.9 for any DBPL text ,  j= 
Proof
The proof is trivial since for all i, 1  i  depth() such that Proj(i;) 6= ,
Proj(i;) is a dpl formula. Since for any dpl formula ,  j=
dpl
, we get the
desired result. 
The next theorem shows how dynamic binding is preserved under entailment.
Theorem 6.10 I 9xPx J j= I Px J
Proof
Let M be an arbitrary model and s
n
an arbitrary multidimensional information
state. Then s
n
[[ I 9xPx J ]]
M
= s
n
[[9xPx]]
1
by definition 7:5
= hs
n
1
[[9xPx]]; s
n
2
; : : :i by remark 6:4
= hs
n
1
[x][[Px]]; s
n
2
; : : :i by definition 6:5
Two cases are required:
(i) s
n
1
= ;.
For this case s
n
1
[x] = ; and therefore ;[[Px]]
M
= fg 2 ; j g(x) 2 F(P )g = ; i.e.
s
n
[x][[Px]]
M
= ; i.e. s
n
[[9xPx]]
1
M
= ;
On the other hand, # [[Proj(1;I Px J)]]
M
=# [[Px]]
M
= fi 2 D
V
j fig[[Px]]
M
6= ;g =
fi 2 D
V
j fg 2 fig j i(x) 2 F(P )g 6= ;g but since g 2 fig ) g = i then we get that
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fi 2 D
V
j fg 2 fig j i(x) 2 F(P )g 6= ;g = fi 2 D
V
j i(x) 2 F(P )g. Since ;  X
for all sets X then we get that
s
n
1
[[9xPx]]
M
# [[Proj(1;I Px J)]]
M
and since depth(I Px J) = 1 we get that
for all i, 1  i  depth(I Px J) ) s
n
i
# [[Proj(1;I Px J)]]
M
. Therefore, by
denition 8, s
n
[[ I 9xPx J ]]
M
supports I Px J with respect to M. Since M and
s
n
are arbitrary, then by denition 9, we get the expected result.
(ii) s
n
1
6= ;.
Suppose now that i 2 s
n
1
[[9xPx]]
M
. Then i 2 s
n
1
[x][[Px]]
M
. By denition 6,
i 2 fk 2 s
n
1
[x] j k(x) 2 F(P )g ) i(x) 2 F(P ). On the other hand
# [[Proj(1;I Px J)]]
M
=# [[Px]]
M
= fi 2 D
V
j fig[[Px]]
M
6= ;g =
= fi 2 D
V
j fg 2 fig j g(x) 2 F(P )g 6= ;g = fi 2 D
V
j i(x) 2 F(P )g.
Therefore i 2# [[Proj(1;I Px J)]]
M
and by set theory
s
n
1
[[9xPx]]
M
# [[Proj(1;I Px J)]]
M
By denition 8, s
n
[[ I 9xPx J ]]
M
supports I Px J with respect to M. Since M
and s
n
are general, by denition 9 we get that I 9xPx J j= I Px J. 
Indeed, theorem 6.10 holds for 9xPx as premiss and Px as conclusion provided that
both formulas occur at the same dimensional index,
21
i.e., I
n
9xPx J
n
j= I
n
Px J
n
since both texts multidimensionally agree and the same argumentation presented in
the proof of theorem 6.10 can be used.
The next theorem deals with a case where premises and conclusion show a \di-
mensional gap". Note that the rst premiss is a text of depth 1 while the second
premiss a text of depth 3 where the rst and second dimensional projection are
null, i.e., Proj(1;III  JJJ) =  = Proj(2;III  JJJ) . The conclu-
sion is a text of depth 3 where the second dimensional projection is null, i.e.,
Proj(2;I   II  JJJ) = .
Theorem 6.11 for any DBPL formula , I  J;III  JJJ j= I   II  JJJ
Proof
21
The superscript n in I
n
stands for the sequence of I repeated n times (n  1). Analogously
for J
n
.
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First of all, the premises and conclusion multidimensionally agree. So, for all models
M and information states s
n
, for
s
n
[[ I  J ]]
M
[[ III  JJJ ]]
M
j=
M
I   II  JJJ
to hold it must be the case that for all i, 1  i  depth(I   II  JJJ) )
(i; s
n
[[ I  J ]]
M
[[ III  JJJ ]]
M
) # [[Proj(i;I   II  JJJ)]]
M
. Therefore
For i = 1, we get that (1; s
n
[[ I  J ]]
M
[[ III  JJJ ]]
M
) = s
n
1
[[]]
M
= fg 2 s
n
1
j fgg[[]] 6= ;g (1)
# [[Proj(1;I   II  JJJ)]]
M
= # [[]]
M
= fg 2 D
V
j fgg[[]] 6= ;g (2)
Therefore, (1)  (2)
For i = 2, (2; s
n
[[ I  J ]]
M
[[ III  JJJ ]]
M
) = s
n
2
[[]] = s
n
2
(1
0
)
# [[Proj(2;I   II  JJJ)]]
M
= # [[]]
M
= fg 2 D
V
j fgg[[]] 6= ;g
= fg j g 2 D
V
g (2
0
)
(1
0
)  (2
0
)
For i = 3, analogous to case where i = 1
Therefore, the result holds. 
Theorem 6.11 shows that if dimensional \holes" are present in the premises then
the same dimensional holes ought to be present in the conclusion text (if entailment
holds).
What is at stake is the fact that DBPL's text entailment takes care of all di-
mensions of premises and conclusion (DBPL) texts. Unmatched dimensions among
premises and conclusion ruin the unidimensional entailment ow throughout such
unmatched dimensions. In other words, entailment denition says that all dimen-
sions present in the conclusion text must be somewhere present in the premises
(though not necessarily vice versa) and the premises must give support for all di-
mensions in the conclusion.
Notice that DBPL's notion of entailment is \doubly" dynamic.
22
Firstly, DBPL's
22
Pursuing the programming languages paradigm even further, the double character referred
to by the word double might be easily explained if we \compile" a DBPL text as a set of
hhlevel,oset i; formulai instructions. The level{oset pairs indicate in a bidimensional picture
the position each formula instruction occurs at in the text. Entailment ought to mirror the local-
global dichotomy of DBPL entities: DBPL formulas induce local eects while DBPL texts induce
global eects provided that the impenetrable assumption be accepted as is indeed the case.
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formula entailment corresponds, in the usual way, to the interpretation of implic-
ation. It means, also, that pronouns in the conclusion may refer back to subjects
introduced in the local premises, as easily seen from 9xFx j= Fx. As Dekker (1993,
p. 10) pointed out, this corresponds to the following reasoning:
If a man comes from Rhodes, he likes pineapple juice. A man I met yesterday comes
from Rhodes. So, he likes pineapple juice.
9x(Mx ^ Rx)! Lx; 9x(Mx ^ Rx) j= Lx
Secondly, DBPL's text entailment corresponds, as might be expected, to the inter-
pretation of multidimensional implication. Since unidimensional implication is a
dynamic notion so is multidimensional implication and therefore entailment. Put
in other way, multidimensional implication might be seen as the Cartesian product
of unidimensional implication. We can also think of premises and conclusion as
pages in a sequence since pronouns in a concluding page may refer back to subjects
introduced in previous pages. If we think of previous pages as premises then the
entailment relation, as dened above, captures these ideas which are then reected
in its plenitude throughout the Deduction Theorem.
Thirdly, notice that, in a certain sense, dynamic entailment is not monotonic. Recall
that the order of binding is relevant for DBPL and therefore the premises' order may
interfere with the conclusion. For example, it holds that I 9xPx J j= I Px J but
I 9xPx J; I 9xQx J 6j= I Px J since the premiss
I 9xQx J interferes with the anaphoric pronoun x in the conclusion \text page";
the pronoun x could not any longer be referring back to the rst premiss.
23
DBPL, also licenses deduction theorems reecting its multidynamic character as
already explained.
Theorem 6.12 (Deduction Theorem)
Let I 
1
J,. . . ,I 
n
J be any DBPL texts which multidimensionally agree with the
23
To see why, imagine for example, that the intersection of F(P ) with F(Q) is empty; in this
case the conclusion does not hold since it depends on the value assigned to x. As already pointed
out, existentials behave like downdates discarding previous information one might have about the
variable. As the second premiss terminates the dynamic binding emanating from the rst one, the
conclusion does not hold. Recall that the denition of support \takes care" of all dimensions and
therefore any \troublemaker" block will ruin the dynamics of the whole discourse.
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DBPL text I 	 J. Then
Formulas: 
1
; : : : ; 
n
j=  i 
1
; : : : ; 
n 1
j= 
n
!  
Texts: I 
1
J; : : : ;I 
n
J j= I 	 J i j= I 
1
 : : : 
n
J
m
) I 	 J
Proof
Formulas: The proof is made by reduction to dpl's deduction theorem, since the
set of DBPL and dpl formulas are exactly the same and each dimensional index of a
multidimensional information state is a dpl information state.
Texts: The proof is made by reduction to dpl's deduction theorem, which will be
applied to every dimensional index i, 1  i  depth(I 	 J), in the following way.
Suppose I 
1
 : : : 
n
J and I 	 J multidimensionally agree. Suppose also that
I 
1
J; : : : ;I 
n
J j= I 	 J
Then by denition of entailment, for all modelsM and multidimensional information
state s
n
,
s
n
[[ I 
1
J ]]
M
: : : [[ I 
n
J ]]
M
j= I 	 J
By theorem 6.2
s
n
[[ I 
1
J ]]
M
: : : [[ I 
n
J ]]
M
= s
n
[[ I 
1
 : : : 
n
J ]]
M
and therefore
s
n
[[ I 
1
 : : : 
n
J ]]
M
j= I 	 J
By denition of support, this means that for all i, 1  i  depth(I 	 J) &
Proj(i;I 	 J) 6=  ) (i; s
n
[[ I 
1
 : : :  
n
J ]]
M
) # [[Proj(i;	)]]
M
So, let us
take such an i. Then
(i; s
n
[[ I 
1
 : : : 
n
J ]]
M
) = s
n
i
[[Proj(i;I 
1
J) ^ : : : ^ Proj(i;I 
n
J)]]
M
and s
n
i
[[Proj(i;I 
1
J) ^ : : : ^ Proj(i;I 
n
J)]]
M
 # [[Proj(i;I 	 J)]]
M
. So,
s
n
i
[[Proj(i;I 
1
J) ^ : : : ^ Proj(i;I 
n
J)]]
M
j=
M
Proj(i;I 	 J)
Therefore, by dpl's deduction theorem we get
j=
M
Proj(i;I 
1
J) ^ : : : ^ Proj(i;I 
n
J)! Proj(i;I 	 J).
Since it holds for any i, by
m
) denition we get that
j= I 
1
 : : : 
n
J
m
) I 	 J

142
6.4 What properties does the system have?
All properties of DBPL are related to the dynamics of the binding mechanism used in
it. Traditionally, the binding process is stated in a way saying that bound variables
are the ones under the syntactic scope of a quantied formula while free variables
are the ones outside the syntactic scope of a quantied formula.
To characterize the dynamic version we need to change the traditional charac-
terization of bound variables. The intuitive idea is that any existential formula not
only binds the variable quantied over but also makes it somehow active. Moreover,
previously activated variables are not free even they are not syntactically bound in
the formulas they occur at. This dynamic binding mechanism is formally character-
ized in denition 16 through the notions of binding pairs, active quantier occurrence
and free variable conforming to the following notational convention.
Remark 6.6 Let 	 be a DBPL text of depth m. Then
bp (	) is a m-tuple of sets of binding pairs in 	.
aq (	) is a m-tuple of sets of active quantier occurrences in 	.
fv (	) is a m-tuple of sets of free occurrences of variables in 	.
We will also use bp
i
, aq
i
and fv
i
to indicate the dimensional index the binding pair,
active quantier occurrence and free variable sets are concerned with. 
Recall that the depth of a text reects the dimensional embedding of discourse
blocks occurring at it. So, the notions of bp, aq and fv are multidimensional and
the previous remark makes sure that there is a way to keep track of these notions
for every discourse block. Alternatively, we might have dened an m-tuple of triples
where the rst component (of the triple) was the binding pairs set, the second
component was the active quantier occurrence set and the third the free variable
set. The only advantage of the formulation presented in the remark 6.6 is to keep
notation as simple as possible.
Denition 16: Scope and Binding
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For all DBPL texts of depth n and dimensional index i, 1  i  n and DBPL formulas
, 
1
, and 
2
, and DBPL text I  J,
1. bp
i
(Rx
1
; : : : ; x
m
) = ;
aq
i
(Rx
1
; : : : ; x
m
) = ;
fv
i
(Rx
1
; : : : ; x
m
) = fx
i
j x
i
is a variable occurring at Rx
1
; : : : ; x
m
g
2. bp
i
(:) = bp
i
()
aq
i
(:) = ;
fv
i
(:) = fv
i
()
3. bp
i
(
1
^ 
2
) = bp
i
(
1
) [ bp
i
(
2
) [ fh9x; xi j 9x 2 aq
i
(
1
) & x 2 fv
i
(
2
)g
aq
i
(
1
^ 
2
) = aq
i
(
2
) [ f9x 2 aq
i
; (
1
) j 9x 62 aq
i
(
2
)g
fv
i
(
1
^ 
2
) = fv
i
(
1
) [ fx 2 fv
i
(
2
) j 9x 62 aq
i
(
1
)g
4. bp
i
(
1
 
2
) = bp
i
(
1
) [ bp
i
(
2
) [ fh9x; xi j 9x 2 aq
i
(
1
) & x 2 fv
i
(
2
)g
aq
i
(
1
 
2
) = aq
i
(
2
) [ f9x 2 aq
i
; (
1
) j 9x 62 aq
i
(
2
)g
fv
i
(
1
 
2
) = fv
i
(
1
) [ fx 2 fv
i
(
2
) j 9x 62 aq
i
(
1
)g
5. bp
i
( I  J) = hbp
1
; : : : ; bp
i
(); bp
i+1
( ); : : :i
aq
i
( I  J) = haq
1
; : : : ; aq
i
(); aq
i+1
( ); : : :i
fv
i
( I  J) = hfv
1
; : : : ; fv
i
(); fv
i+1
( ); : : :i
6. bp
i
(9x) = bp
i
() [ fh9x; xi j x 2 fv
i
()g
aq
i
(9x) =
8
>
<
>
:
aq
i
() [ f9xg if 9x 62 aq
i
()
aq
i
() otherwise
fv
i
(9x) = fv
i
() minus the occurrences of x 2 

Notice how clause 6 displays the dynamic binding power emanating from exist-
entials and how clauses 3 and 4 manage to pass on such a binding. For formulas,
 is just like its \cousin," ^, since sequences of DBPL formulas inhabit the same
block. However, it is possible for a DBPL sequence to be formed by a DBPL formula
and a DBPL text, as for example, in Px I 9xQx J. For such cases, and due to
the impenetrable assumption, the second conjunct ought to be taken as \invisible"
(for the rst conjunct) since it corresponds to a whole new discourse block. This
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situation is accounted for by item 5 which reects a form of synchronization between
the consecutive dimensional indices: the rst conjunct will pass on the bindings it
knows about while the second does the same.
Having stated a formal characterization of dynamic binding, we can undertake
now a discussion on the properties of the system.
Trading on the \page" and \subpage" analogy,
24
some properties such as asso-
ciativity, for example, would be expected to hold even in a dynamic setting where
active bindings might get blocked by new occurrences of existentials. Since we follow
the left to right convention for writing, new occurrences would, necessarily, appear on
the right (or subsequent pages) of previous ones and therefore pronouns
25
anaphoric
on these existentials will be under the scope of the right-most one; so, the binding
potential is preserved by both DBPL conjunctions, i.e. ^, DBPL's formula conjunc-
tion and , DBPL's sentential conjunction, which are interpreted through function
composition.
26
Therefore, associativity holds at any DBPL level, be it \global" or
\local".
Theorem 6.13 DBPL sequence associativity
Let ; , and  be any DBPL sequences. Then
s
n
[[]]
i
[[  ]]
i
= s
n
[[  ]]
i
[[]]
i
Proof
This result is a immediate consequence of lemma 6.5, page 120, and function asso-
ciativity. 
24
The page analogy is based on text splitting theorem (theorem 6.2, page 127), and text deduction
theorem (theorem 6.12, page 140). The rst says that we can always split up a text (at any adequate
point) and the second allows us to move the split part(s) from the premiss to the conclusion.
25
Recall that pronouns are being conated to variables.
26
Recalling that DBPL texts are update functions on multidimensional information states,
we might have characterized update functions f
n
as
Q
-functions, i.e., n-tuples of functions
f
n
= hf
1
; : : : ; f
n
i such that f
n
(x
n
) = hf
1
(x
1
); : : : ; f
n
(x
n
)i. If f
n
and g
n
are
Q
-functions,
then f
n
 g
n
(x
n
) = f
n
(g
n
(x
n
)) = f
n
(hg
1
(x
1
); : : : ; g
n
(x
n
)i) = hf
1
(g
1
(x
1
)); : : : ; f
n
(g
n
(x
n
))i =
hf
1
 g
1
(x
1
); : : : ; f
n
 g
n
(x
n
)i. So, the global composition f
n
 g
n
induces the local f
i
 g
i
ones. It
is a trivial exercise to show that
Q
-composition is associative. These facts play a very important
role in the forthcoming material, i.e., in the proofs of next results.
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Theorem 6.14 DBPL text associativity
s
n
([[ I  J ]][[ I  J ]])[[ I  J ]] = s
n
[[ I  J ]]([[ I  J ]][[ I  J ]])
Proof
This result is a consequence of splitting theorem 6.2, page 127, and function associ-
ativity. 
Since DBPL is a multidimensional generalization of dpl, as far as formulas are
concerned, dpl properties are expected to hold in DBPL.
27
Indeed, dpl properties
do hold in every DBPL dimensional index by virtue of the construal in denition 6.
Therefore, the so-called \donkey equivalences,"
28
as well as conjunction(s) asso-
ciativity does hold in DBPL while conjunction(s) commutativity, reexivity, idem-
potency does not, in general, hold. These results, which are fully explained in the
relevant dpl literature (and chapter 4 of this thesis), induce similar versions for
DBPL texts. The dierence between formula results and text equivalents relies on
the multiplicity character introduced by the multidimensional information state ad-
opted. This means that to show that some dpl property holds for a DBPL text we
need to assure the property for all dimensions. For the converse, all that is needed
is to nd out a single \badly behaving block" where the property does not hold. In
virtue of these facts, it is easy, now, to understand why
1. DBPL conjunctions are not, in general, commutative. The page analogy would
be helpful here: we cannot (in general) commute pages on a book without chan-
ging the information conveyed. Imagine a discourse where pronouns occurring
at any dimensional index i, under the rule of an active quantier occurring
previously at the same dimensional index, makes perfect sense. If we commute
the \pages" we would loose the original anaphoric relationships; new anaphoric
27
Trading on an analogy to vectorial spaces, we can think of scalar product as the generalization
tool moving us from dpl to DBPL as far as formulas are concerned. So, dpl properties play the
scalar role while the multidimensional state plays the vector role. A proviso: this analogy only
works by virtue of the impenetrable assumption which keeps things conned to each dimension
they happen to occur in.
28
See table 4.6, page 81.
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relationships might be established and the discourse as a whole might lose its
coherence.
Anaphoric relationships, for example, would be lost or even get distorted by
attaching pronouns to the wrong existentials. This is what happens for the
DBPL text below
I : : : I 9x(Wx^WKx)WHx9x(Mx^WKx)ADx  : : : J : : : J (where
predicatesW ,WK,WH,M , AD stand for woman, walks in the park, whistles,
man, and airs his dog resp.), when we commuteWHx9x(Mx^WKx) getting
I : : : I 9x(Wx ^WKx)  9x(Mx ^WKx) WHx  ADx  : : : J : : : J. The
original discourse has an inner block where one was talking about a woman and
a man walking in the same park. Moreover, one has stated that the woman was
whistling while the man was airing his dog. After commuting the sequence, we
get a dierent discourse where the only information about the woman is that
she was walking in the park while the walking man was not only airing his dog
but also whistling.
Co-routining discourses would provide us with another source of counter-ex-
amples; for these cases the second block is the one where some topic under
previous discussion is being resumed. If we reverse the blocks we will get a
resuming block occurring at a point before the interrupted one. Compare, for
example, the discourse in gure 6.9 with the one in page 97.
A natural conclusion from the previous examples is that for DBPL the way a
text is built up does matter. It matters for a `microscopic level' since formula
elements' order mirror the natural order in which anaphoric relationship are
established. But, it also matters for `macroscopic level' since sequence elements'
order mirror the natural order in which structured discourses are built up. And
since order does matter commutativity can not be expected to hold anymore.
2. DBPL conjunctions are not, in general, idempotent. That DBPL  is not idem-
potent is exemplied by I : : : I Px^9xQx J : : : J and I : : : I Px^9xQx 
Px ^ 9xQx J : : : J. For the second DBPL text, the second occurrence of Px is
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The dog is under the piano and the cat is in the carton. coroutine USA
The cat's going to pounce on you.
It's amazing how much aection the dog shows for other
animals in the house.
The cat will never meet our other cat, coroutine NZ
because our other cat lives in New Zealand.
Our New Zealand cat lives with the Cresswells and their dog.
And there he'll stay,
because the dog would be sad if the cat went away.
Figure 6.9: Commuting blocks for Lewises scenario II.
under the active scope of the quantier 9xQx. As a consequence, Px ^ 9xQx
and Px ^ 9xQx  Px ^ 9xQx are not equivalent since s
n
[[Px ^ 9xQx]]
i
and
s
n
[[Px ^ 9xQx  Px ^ 9xQx]]
i
should not be equivalent, independently of the
dimensional index i, the multidimensional information state s
n
and the model
M considered.
3. DBPL entailment relations are not, in general, reexive. I Px  9xQx J j= I
Px  9xQx J is a counter-example. The reason is that in the occurrence of
this text as conclusion, the variable x in the rst conjunct gets bound by the
quantier in the occurrence of the text as a premiss, whereas in the occurrence
of the text as a premiss it is free. On the other hand, if the active quantier
variables (AQV) of a text I 	 J do not intersect the free variables (FV) of
I 	 J, then I 	 J j= I 	 J
4. DBPL entailment relations are not, in general, transitive. The cases that pose
problems to transitivity can be characterized as follows. Suppose I  J j= I
	 J and I 	 J j= I ? J. If we want to conclude from this that I 	 J j=
I ? J, then problems may arise if x 2 FV (?) and x 2 AQV (	). Consider
I ::9xPx J j= I 9xPx J I 9xPx J j= I Px J. It is clear that the rst
entails the second and the second entails the third, without the rst entailing
the third. On the other hand, consider I 9xPx J, I 9xPx J and I Px J.
This is a case where nothing goes wrong. So, not all cases where I ? J contains
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a free occurrence of x, and I 	 J contains an active occurrence of 9x ought
to be excluded. Evidently, what also matters is what I  J \says" about x,
in the dynamic sense of what constraint it puts on whatever free occurrence of
x that are still to come. Roughly speaking, what I  J says about variables
which occur freely in I ? J and which are bound in I 	 J, should be at least
as strong as what I 	 J says about them.
One property, however, deserves a special treatment. This property is the point-
wise character of dpl update which is stated, in dpl, as s[[]] =
S
i2s
fig[[]].
29
This
property is pointwise because in order to compute the output state we only need
to know each individual component on the input state. What this really means
is that (
S
i2s
fig)[[]] =
S
i2s
(fig[[]]).
30
The straightforward transposition of dis-
tributivity, from the unidimensional setting of dpl to the multidimensional setting
of DBPL, related to any DBPL text , would be accomplished by s
n
[[Proj(i;)]]
i
=
S
k2s
n
i
fkg[[Proj(i;)]], for all dimensional index i between 1 and depth().
Theorem 6.15 (DBPL text distributivity)
Let M, s
n
and  be an arbitrary model, multidimensional information state and
DBPL text, resp. Then for all i, 1  i  depth(),
(i; s
n
[[]]
M
) =
[
r2s
n
i
frg[[Proj(i;)]]
i
M
Proof
The proof is trivialized by resorting to dpl's distributivity theorem. Notice that for
all i, 1  i  depth(), Proj(i;) is a dpl formula. Therefore,
s
n
i
[[Proj(i;)]]
M
=
S
r2s
n
i
frg[[Proj(i;)]]
M
by dpl distributivity theorem. Since
s
n
[[]]
M
= hs
n
1
[[Proj(1;)]]; s
n
2
[[Proj(2;)]]; s
n
3
[[Proj(3;)]]; : : : ;
s
n
depth()
[[Proj(depth();)]]; s
n
depth()+1
; s
n
depth()+2
; : : :i
29
Recall that for dpl any information state s is a set of assignment functions.
30
Recall from set theory that for any set X , X =
S
i2X
fig. So, what the dpl theorem really
says is that s[[]] = (
S
i2s
fig)[[]] =
S
i2s
(fig[[]]), what justies its name.
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we get the desired result. 
Notice how distributivity is carried out in parallel throughout all dimensions
of a DBPL text. The kind of \synchronization" required was provided by function
Proj which produced a presequence of all elements belonging to the same dimension
index. This means, as might be expected, that distributivity is done in parallel for
every dimensional index i for every multidimensional state s
n
. And this is so by
virtue of the impenetrable assumption. If we had adopted a dierent position with
respect to the impenetrable hypothesis, for example, having made it weaker, we
might have developed a completely dierent semantical system where distributivity,
among many other results, would not be expected to hold. Carrying on properties
from one dimension to another might remove the local nature of distributivity. But
this is not the aim of the present work and this kind of logic must await future work.
6.5 Additional Remark
The literature on anaphoric pronouns all rests on identifying pronouns with vari-
ables (the polemic is about what kind of variables they are, i.e., if they are free
or bound variables). So, if we allow our rst-order language to include functional
symbols then we run into a new problem, since, now, the class of \variable terms"
includes not only \plain variables" but also \functional variables". Functional
variables might be seen as a kind of \anonymous variable" which depend only on
the input argument variable used. Therefore, all future references to such an in-
directly determined element must be done through the use of its anonymous name,
i.e., its functional term. Now, note that functions are likely to take us away from
the anaphoric source of reference, as showed below:
Example 6.5 A farmer's son owns a donkey. He got it for free.
a. 9x(f(x) ^ 9y(d(y) ^ o(son(x); y))): g (he; y):
b. 9x(f(x) ^ 9y(d(y) ^ o(son(x); y))): g (son(x); y):
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c. 9x(f(x) ^ 9w(son of(w; x) ^ 9y(d(y) ^ o(w; y)))): g (w; y):
Example 6.5.a makes clear that the place holder marked as *he* can not be iden-
tied to any variable: the pronoun clearly refers back to the son of a farmer (where
a farmer has been associated to x). Two solutions are almost self-evident: (i) we
might use the same functional term and therefore allowing pronouns to be identied
to a broader class of terms, as in 6.5.b, or (ii) we might stick to the \conservative"
hypothesis, as in 6.5.c, page 149 since, after all, it is theoretically possible to regard
functional terms as special cases of relational predicative symbols (if the theory
admits equality, what is always the case for logic systems dealing with anaphoric
pronouns).
6.6 Summary
The semantic framework presented in this chapter was built up under the assumption
that discourses are structured multidimensional objects, which could be analyzed in
a extended dynamic semantic framework in tune with the one rstly developed by
Groenendijk and Stokhof. The cornerstone of the Groenendijk and Stokhof theory is
that sentences in a discourses behave like update functions over information states.
Basic for Groenendijk and Stokhof's theory is: (i) their keeping to the meaning
compositionality principle, (ii) their characterization of discourse as a sequence of
sentences, and (iii) their characterization of information states as a set of assignment
functions.
By keeping to the compositionality principle, Groenendijk and Stokhof's discus-
sion strongly supported the view that meaning is a richer concept that should not
be conated to the traditional truth conditional semantics, since truth conditions
are one, but only one, important aspect for characterizing meaning. In this sense,
we agree that dpl was a rst step on the right direction.
Independently of accepting (or not) the principle of compositionality, no frame-
work (be it on the representationalist grounds of Kamps' drt, be it on the grounds
151
of Groenendijk and Stokhof semantics) attempted to go beyond the unidimensional
character assigned to discourses. However, the discussion presented in chapter 3
gives support for the existence of multidimensional kinds of discourses.
In this research we made a step towards multidimensional discourse semantics
analysis taking a closer look at hierarchically structured discourses dealing with
interruption phenomena. We focused on interruptions exhibiting a co-routining
behaviour. But to deal with such complex entities we had to make some decisions.
So, we assumed that
1. all dimensions share the same domain of individuals,
2. the multidimensional information states are impenetrable,
3. the assignment functions are total.
As should be expected, the decisions made would aect the framework in many
dierent ways. For example, the assumption that all dimensions share the same
domain of individuals made easier the development of a formal system. The same-
ness domain is particularly emphasized in the conceptualization of multidimensional
information state. Since we are now acquainted with the multidimensional informa-
tion state concept, it seems natural to think of a more `realistic' characterization for
it. Abolishing the sameness domain assumption, we might have attached a specic
domain of individuals for every discourse block (or, in our terminology, for every
dimensional index) occurring at any discourse. So, the multidimensional inform-
ation state might have been any tuple of sets of assignment functions from each
set of variables in use in each dimensional index to the domains of each dimension.
It would look like this s
n
= hfg j g 2 D
V
1
1
g; : : : ; fg j g 2 D
V
n
n
g; : : :i. This new
multidimensional information state denition would not pose any new problems for
the framework developed except, maybe, some more philosophical questions such
as cross-block identication (.i.e, which elements are shared between two discourse
blocks and how could they be recognized as such).
In fact, assumptions 1 and 3 above do not change the main aspects and properties
of the framework developed in this chapter; as we already said before, they only made
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easier the development of the framework. The same could not be said with respect to
assumption 2. It is the impenetrability character assumed, that avoids phenomena
occurring at one dimensional level being propagated to another dimension. Keeping
dimensions independent of each other allowed us to preserve the pointwise character
of updates. If we abolish the impenetrable assumption, then the local character for
update computation would be lost since its computation would depend on entities, or
even properties, inherited from ancestor blocks. It is true that inheritance patterns
reect a more realistic discourse modeling than the one presented in this chapter.
But it is true, also, that they need a more sophisticated framework to cope with
them (a suggestion of how we could develop such a multidimensional framework,
without the impenetrable assumption rule, will be presented in chapter 8). And so,
the framework developed in this chapter, under the impenetrable assumption rule,
deserves a special place among the dynamic systems for being the rst landmark
into the multidimensional discourse space.
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Chapter 7
Example of Application
7.1 Lewises' scenario II revisited
Chapter 5 presented us with examples of \sophisticated" discourses exhibiting a co-
routining like interruption structure (which we have coined the Lewises' scenario I
and II pages 95 and 97 resp.). In this short chapter we will show how an admittedly
over-simplied version of the Lewises' scenario II would be handled in DBPL. Scen-
ario II was chosen because it displays more clearly than scenario I the co-routining
resuming character discussed in chapter 5.
Notice that there is a mismatch between the boxes drawn and the indented
discourse blocks shown in the same picture on page 97 (repeated in gure 7.1 for
convenience). The boxes were drawn in the attempt of characterizing the two dis-
tinctive situations, namely, the American household from the New Zealand one,
in order to more clearly show the \leaving" and \resuming" of the NZ coroutine.
However, the real NZ coroutine is the one displayed at the third level of indentation
(as emphasized on gure 7.2). The mismatch is, of course, located at the second
level of indentation. Indeed, the second level is a mediating discourse block between
the USA and NZ situations. This block works in dierent ways: one of its roles is
to (prepare to) introduce a new discourse block along with a new discourse referent,
namely, the New Zealand cat. So, to be realistic, this example does not support the
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impenetrability hypothesis assumed in this research proposal. However, we did not
claim that real discourses would always conform to the \impenetrability law." The
proposal developed in chapter 5 is indeed the rst step into the multidimensional
\landscape" of structured discourses; a more elaborated step, abolishing the impen-
etrable assumption, has been already envisaged as indicated in chapter 8, section 8.4,
page 164.
The dog is under the piano and the cat is in the carton.
The cat will never meet our other cat,
because our other cat lives in New Zealand.
Our New Zealand cat lives with the Cresswells and their dog.
And there he'll stay,
because the dog would be sad if the cat went away.
The cat's going to pounce on you.
And the dog is coming too.
It's amazing how much aection the dog shows for other
animals in the house.
Figure 7.1: Lewises scenario II
The dog is under the piano and the cat is in the carton.
The cat will never meet our other cat,
because our other cat lives in New Zealand.
Our New Zealand cat lives with the Cresswells and their dog.
And there he'll stay,
because the dog would be sad if the cat went away.
The cat's going to pounce on you.
And the dog is coming too.
It's amazing how much aection the dog shows for other
animals in the house.
Figure 7.2: NZ coroutine for Lewises scenario II
Taking these points into consideration, we feel justied to undertake further sim-
plications on the Lewises' scenario II as shown in example 7.1. Therefore, the
over-simplied example below has the sole purpose of showing how DBPL copes with
such kind of discourses.
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Example 7.1 Let us work on a slightly modied but heavily shrunken version of
Lewises scenario II as displayed below.
The dog is under the piano and the cat is in the carton.
I've got a cat that lives in New Zealand with the Cresswells and their
dog.
And there she will stay because the dog would be sad if the cat went
away
The cat went out for his all night walk.
It's amazing how much aection the dog shows for other animals in
the house.
.
.
.
.
.
.
This discourse could be translated to a DBPL-like discourse as shown below.
is under(y; z) ^ is in the carton(x)
9x(cat(x) ^ lives in with(x;NZ;Cresswells) ^ is owned by(x;David))
9y(dog(y)^ lives in with(y;NZ;Cresswells) ^ is owned by(y; Cresswells))
will stay in(x;NZ)
went away(x)! would be sad(y)
went out for his all night walk(x)
8z(animal(z) ^ lives in with(z;NZ;Creswells)! shows affection for(y; z))
.
.
.
.
.
.
To make shorter the notational representation above, let us assume that the predicate
letters 
1
through 
12
stand for the following natural language predicates:
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1
is for cat 
2
is dog

3
is for is under 
4
is for is in the carton

5
is for for lives in with 
6
is for is owned by

7
is for will stay in 
8
is for went out for its all night walk

9
is for animal 
10
is for shows aection for

11
is for went away 
12
is for would be sad
and that the constant letters a and b stand for David Lewis and the Cresswells
respectively. Due to DBPL's entailment denition and DBPL's text deduction theorem
(theorem 6.12, page 140), we would accept that in a previous \page" of this scenario
discourse referents for the American cat (x), dog (y), and the piano (z) have been
introduced by existential formulas. Suppose also that s
n
is the information state
reached after processing the discourse with the \initial" pages and that the DBPL text
 corresponds to the following scenario's page.
 = I 
3
(y; z)^
4
(x) I 9x(
1
(x)^
5
(x;NZ; b)^
6
(x; a))9y(
2
(y)^
5
(y;NZ; b)^

6
(y; b))  
7
(x;NZ)  
11
(x) ! 
12
(y) J 
8
(x) I 8z(
9
(z) ^ 
5
(z;NZ; b) !

10
(y; z)) JJ
And since  above is not easily readable, for convenience, a more visually readable
version is presented below.
 = I 
3
(y; z) ^ 
4
(x)
I
9x(
1
(x) ^ 
5
(x;NZ; b) ^ 
6
(x; a))
9y(
2
(y) ^ 
5
(y;NZ; b) ^ 
6
(y; b))

7
(x;NZ)

11
(x)! 
12
(y)
J

8
(x)
I
8z(
9
(z) ^ 
5
(z;NZ; b)! 
10
(y; z))
J
J
We are now ready to compute the update of s
n
operated by the DBPL text . The
update is calculated as follows.
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s
n
[[]] = h s
n
1
[[
3
(y; z) ^ 
4
(x)  
8
(x)]], s
n
2
[[9x(
1
(x) ^ 
5
(x;NZ; b) ^ 
6
(x; a)) 
9y(
2
(y)^
5
(y;NZ; b)^
6
(y; b))
7
(x;NZ)
11
(x)! 
12
(y)8z(
9
(z)^
5
(z;NZ; b)!

10
(y; z))]],. . . i
Focusing now on s
n
2
we get
s
n
2
[[9x(
1
(x)^
5
(x;NZ; b)^
6
(x; a))9y(
2
(y)^
5
(y;NZ; b)^
6
(y; b))
7
(x;NZ)

11
(x)! 
12
(y)  8z(
9
(z) ^ 
5
(z;NZ; b)! 
10
(y; z))]] =
s
n
2
[[9x(
1
(x)^
5
(x;NZ; b)^
6
(x; a))]][[9y(
2
(y)^
5
(y;NZ; b)^
6
(y; b))]][[
7
(x;NZ)]]
[[
11
(x)! 
12
(y)]][[8z(
9
(z) ^ 
5
(z;NZ; b)! 
10
(y; z))]] =
s
n
2
[x][[
1
(x)^
5
(x;NZ; b)^
6
(x; a)]][[9y(
2
(y)^
5
(y;NZ; b)^
6
(y; b))]][[
7
(x;NZ)]]
[[
11
(x)! 
12
(y)]][[8z(
9
(z) ^ 
5
(z;NZ; b)! 
10
(y; z))]] =
s
n
2
[x][[
1
(x) ^ 
5
(x;NZ; b) ^ 
6
(x; a)]][y][[
2
(y) ^ 
5
(y;NZ; b) ^ 
6
(y; b)]][[
7
(x;NZ)]]
[[
11
(x)! 
12
(y)]][[8z(
9
(z) ^ 
5
(z;NZ; b)! 
10
(y; z))]] =
So, to the USA dimension s
n
1
, the update s
n
1
[[
3
(y; z)^ 
4
(x)  
8
(x)]], says that only
assignments in s
n
1
which assign a cat to x which is required to be, rstly, in the carton
and afterwards away, are preserved in the updated state. For the NZ dimension s
n
2
,
the update of s
n
2
with I 9x(
1
(x)^
5
(x;NZ; b)^
6
(x; a))9y(
2
(y)^
5
(y;NZ; b)^

6
(y; b)) 
7
(x;NZ) 
11
(x)! 
12
(y)  8z(
9
(z)^
5
(z;NZ; b)! 
10
(y; z)) J says
that only the assignments in s
n
2
which assign a cat to x and a dog to y such that
the cat and the dog live in New Zealand with the Cresswells would survive in the
updated state. And since anaphoric relationships are conned to their dimensional
niches the information state s
n
tells us that there are two dierent cats satisfying
the conditions established in each dimensional index corresponding to the discourse
blocks occurring at the scenario.
Finishing this section, notice that we did not take into account tense and mood
since the framework developed does not deal with such points.
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7.2 Summary
In this chapter we showed how the framework developed in this thesis deals with
\real" discourses tting the impenetrable hypothesis. Recalling that the framework
is only the rst step into the realm of complex, structured discourses, we would not
have expected to nd here a very sophisticated example. We expect to present better
examples of application when the development of more sophisticated frameworks,
such as the ones drafted in chapter 8, come in to existence.
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Chapter 8
Discussion and Outlook
The aim of this chapter is to draw attention to the contributions and advantages
of the new theory over the old ones. A critical discussion of the weak points are
presented as well as an outlook on future research.
8.1 Last Comments on Dynamic Semantics
A great deal of work in formal semantics over the last two and a half decades has
been dedicated to the analysis of particular constructions and semantic phenomena
in natural language. This analysis, which has frequently been referred to as dynamic
semantics, is based on the view that the meaning of a sentence does lie in the way
it changes (the representation of) the information of the interpreter (Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1991)). And naturally, the shift from traditional approaches based on
truth conditions (since then, referred to as static semantics) to dynamic approaches
has often involved the collaboration of linguists with logicians, philosophers, and
mathematicians.
The roots of the dynamic view on meaning can be traced back to the works
of Stalnaker (Stalnaker (1974)), Kamp (Kamp (1981)), and Heim (Heim (1982)).
Kamp (1981), and Heim (1982) oer solutions to certain problems involving indef-
inite noun phrases and anaphora in multisentence discourses and in the so called
donkey sentences of Geach (1962). In their systems, indenite and denite noun
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phrases are interpreted as variables and conditions, i.e., open sentences, instead of
quantier phrases. In this unselective binding philosophy the puzzle about why an
indenite noun phrase seems to be interpreted as existential in simple sentences but
universal in the antecedents of conditionals is no longer localized on the noun phrase
itself. As Partee (1995, p. 30) points out \its apparently varying interpretations are
explained in terms of the larger properties of the structures in which it occurs, which
contributes explicit or implicit unselective binders which bind everything they nd
free within their scope."
Kamp's and Heim's work has led to a great deal of further research, applying
it to other phenomena, extending and rening it in various directions, and even,
challenging it. And, among several proposals, including the revival of a modied
version of Evans (1980) E-type analysis (Neale (1990) and Heim (1990)), there is
Dynamic Predicate Logic of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991), developed in part in
connection with a claim that Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory is not fully
compositional.
8.2 The Multi-Dynamic Semantics
In almost all compositional approaches to anaphora, pronouns are reduced to vari-
ables. The underlying idea is that pronouns are syntactically free variables, although,
somehow, semantically bound variables. By dening the interpretation process as a
function updating information about possible values of these variables, the value of
antecedents will be available for further occurrences of coindexed pronouns. This is
achieved by dpl and its ospring by equating information states to sets of assign-
ment functions. Nevertheless to say, this was (and it still is) an insightful break-
through.
Together with drt, dpl is a landmark in the dynamic semantics (or, informa-
tion states semantics) paradigm. Both have been targeted by research programmes
aiming to reduce or eliminate their idiosyncrasies. But no programme, to the best
of my knowledge, has made or suggested the step toward embracing the analysis of
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hierarchically structured discourses. Not up to now!
The rst step into this eld was made by this research work. That means that
the analysis of hierarchically structured discourses are the target. And information
states the weapons directed to the target. It is clear that some kind of change in
the information state character is needed since sets do not have any internal
interesting structure. To grasp the multi-dimensionality character present in the
recursive \denition" of discourse we have to search for more powerful weaponry;
n-tuples provide an almost self-suggestive answer.
The new information state model is an n-tuple of sets of assignment functions.
This model allows us to keep discourse components and the referential system rep-
resented by a set of assignment functions on a one to one basis. As a natural
consequence, we could capture a new scope dimension responsible for important
linguistic phenomenon such as for example preventing anaphoric reference between
entities that do not belong to the same block. This connement is trivially done in
our work by adopting a strong assumption we coined the impenetrable hypothesis.
But it also might have been softened in order to deal with a greater number of
linguistic phenomena. For instance, one segment might have been paving the way
for a subsequent \non-ambiguous" double sense discourse block. The intended sense
might be a joke while the conveyed \main sense" would be a normal unsuspicious
situation. So, intentions (or yet rhetorical relations) would \migrate" among dis-
course blocks and therefore the impenetrability of the impenetrable hypothesis is not
so impenetrable after all. Or we might have expanded the information state model
in order to cope with multi-agent discourses. Or . . . Some of these points are, of
course, left for future work (see future work below).
With the multi-dimensional approach a new dynamic has been superimposed to
the dynamic semantics.
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8.2.1 Pros and Cons over Other Approaches
dpl (and its ospring) and drt are empirically equivalent. They are equivalent
in the sense that both address the same phenomena and both theories achieve the
same results, even though through dierent methodological approaches. While the
rst sticks to the compositionality criteria, the other does not so much (although
several \xes" have been developed addressing this particular drt issue).
dpl and drt come up with an impressive answer for the intra and inter-sentential
anaphoric reference as well as the apparently varying behaviour of indenite noun
phrases. However, this is achieved only for simple discourses, discourses made of
sentences. From an ontological point of view both theories are shallow.
Data presented in chapter 3 give support for a much richer ontology, since dis-
courses are hierarchically structured entities. A clear recursive pattern might be in-
ferred from the underlying overall structure. Discourses are made of sub-discourses
which are in turn discourses. And only in the last instance they are made of sen-
tences. And this is one of the building blocks of this research and one of its main
contributions. For the rst time, complex discourses have been tackled from the
dynamic perspective. The answer provided sheds light onto the ontological nature
of information states (as well as discourse ontology) and paves the way for new
varieties of dynamic logics.
A criticism one can make of the approach presented in this research is its appar-
ently parasitic character on dpl. So, one might expect to nd here the same weak
points emanating from dplmultiplied by all dimensions. I could have listed the criti-
cisms of dpl found in the literature, but I won't. Indeed, a great deal of work on the
dpl's weak points is being undertaken in Europe, and particularly in Amsterdam.
Improved versions, that I have been calling dpl ospring, have been published in
important journals and conferences; also the DIANA project has provided the com-
munity with electronic Internet sites in Europe where work on dynamic semantics
can be found (the biggest repository sites for DIANA project as well as literature
on dynamic semantics, be it seen from the drt or dpl perspective, are located in
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Edinburgh and Amsterdam, respectively. The http electronic addresses are provided
in the references). But, if I am a parasite then all good \xes" and improvements
made on dpl will ow naturally into the one presented here. Therefore, the weak
points are not so weak after all. But a word of warning is needed here. This is not
a parasitic work, it is, indeed, a symbiotic one. After all no one has undertake the
course I did and the results provided here are not only empirically important for
strengthening Groenendijk and Stokhof's view on semantics but also to push it even
further as the future research work, below, points to.
Of course that the work presented here is not free of problems. One particularly
odd problem is directly related to the impenetrable assumption made which allows
us to conne any phenomena to the dimensional index they occur. The oddity is
that this allows the discourse to be restructured in unnatural ways. For example,
I 
1
 
2
 I 
1
 
2
J 
3
J, I 
1
 
2
 
3
 I 
1
 
2
JJ, and II 
1
 
2
J

1
 
2
 
3
J will lead one to the same multidimensional states pattern although,
as interruption cases make clear, not all are natural. Interruptions clearly show that
the block-dimension shift is anchored to the point they occur. A x for this problem
is enrolled under the cover name \anchoring x" in the future research work.
8.3 Contributions
The main contribution of this research work is to show that it is possible to undertake
linguistically based discourse frameworks under the dynamic semantic paradigm. As
we have showed in chapter 3, concepts which originated from computer programming
were largely used to explain the linguistic phenomenon under analysis. And a stack
processing was the prevalent model. Changing from stack based discourse processing
to list (general list) processing wasn't an easy step. Having done it, it seems very
useful and one would wonder if the multidimensional processing couldn't be pushed
even further. An expressive armative answer to this question is given in the future
research section. And this is at least as expressive as the contribution emanating
from the research work presented here.
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The future work is expressive because it proposes not only conservative \patch
extensions" for dealing with the weak points of the present work but mainly new
extensions coping with a new range of linguistic phenomena. Patch extensions are
conservative since their goal is to correct \minor errors." So, in a sense, they are
not important as an evaluation measure of the contributions made by any work.
Under this category I would put any extension making an update a real update
(s
n
[[]]  s
n
), even knowing that this is not an easy task.
Another important contribution of this research work was to expand (and im-
prove our knowledge of) the ontology underlying discourses. This research presents
us with a simple one (yet more complex than any other presented in the dynamic
semantics literature); we did not take into account any intention as a phenomenon
attached to discourse blocks (as in Grosz and Sidner (1986)). If we did so, we would
need to extend the ontology. An intentional system would provide the answer in a
format of lambda abstraction along the line suggested in 8.4.3 (see future work sec-
tion). This makes clear that IJ is indeed a functor instead of a simple parenthetical
notational device. And this is an important contribution to our understanding of
the dynamics of semantic interpretation for natural languages.
Finally, this research may lead to the development of a metatheoretic study
focusing all dynamics multidimensional settings already developed in this thesis and
others (not yet in existence, but already envisaged by this author in the section
below).
8.4 Future Research
The \multidimensional paradigm" introduced in this research work was developed
in a way that allows the following \patches":
Update x The update x should try to make an updated information state more
specic than its parent, i.e., make it eliminative. Eliminative updates show
more clearly the real ow of information growth. In other words, the update
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x ought to remove downdates from this system without losing its dynamics.
This is not an easy task since we will be dealing with a combination of elimin-
ative and distributive modalities of updates in a multidimensional setting. If
not done carefully, the result will be a classical update which means that the
semantic system will be equivalent to a static one (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1990), Dekker (1993)). But this kind of \patch" is being accounted for by the
research task force located mainly in Amsterdam. The ongoing research work
on this topic is exemplied by Vermeulen (1993), and Dyana deliverables such
as Dekker (1993), Dekker (1994), Does (1993), Groenendijk et al. (1994), Dek-
ker (1995a), Dekker (1995b), and Groenendijk, Stokhof and Veltman (1995)
(to cite a few). Therefore, this extension should not worry us since the results
achieved by that task force might be incorporated into our framework. The
really important x that should concern us, since it is specic to the proposal
developed in this work, is the issue of next item.
Anchoring x The anchoring x should try to remove the odd character emanat-
ing from the impenetrable hypothesis. As stated, the impenetrable hypothesis
imposes a higher degree of parallelism (or independence) between dimensions
than would pertain in a real situation.
Some possibilities for more creative future research are:
Multi-Agent Discourses The multidimensional paradigm developed in this re-
search work could be used to model multi-agent discourse: discourses where
more than one agent take part on it.
Adding Intentionality The multidimensionalmodel presented in the present work
might be extended in a way that it would be possible to account for the `in-
tensional' component of Grosz and Sidner (1986) system (the present one deals
only with the attentional component). Analogously, rhetorical relations might
be accounted for.
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8.4.1 The Anchoring Fix
The anchoring x is concerned with the problem imposed on DBPL by the impen-
etrable hypothesis. The DBPL version developed in this thesis allows us to take as
\equivalent" DBPL texts such as
I 
1
 
2
 I 
1
 
2
J 
3
J
I 
1
 
2
 
3
 I 
1
 
2
JJ
II 
1
 
2
J 
1
 
2
 
3
J
These DBPL texts might be thought as corresponding to the following natural lan-
guage abstract discourse frames.

1

2

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

1

2

1

2

3
However, it does not seem natural to think of these discourses as equivalent (in the
sense they lead us to the same output state when presented to the same input).
The point the inner blocks occur at seems to have a role to play and therefore this
role should be accounted for into the theory. Two possibilities could be attempted
here: the rst one would try to keep the impenetrable assumption as strong as
stated in the present work. The second one would try to overcome the impenetrable
assumption.
For the rst case pointed out, a new class of anchor operators 
a
i
would be
envisaged along with a new type of information state where a new component would
be present. The new multidimensional information state would look like a n-tuple
of 2-tuples from D
V
 N (for every dimensional component). As usual, D
V
would
be the set of assignments from the set of variables to the domain D while N would
be the set of natural numbers; in this way, any update would have to handle the
set of assignments as well as the anchor set N . The second component, could be
thought as a kind of anchor register, a register where the position of an anchored
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block is occurring at is recorded. Updates should then take care of these aspects and
in this way the resulting state for all situations as the ones depicted above should be
dierent. This seems to be specially relevant for coroutining blocks since the points
of leaving a block and resuming \the same block" are relevant. But, of course, these
are only rough ideas that need to be further investigated.
For the second case, the attachment point is thought of as indicating an underly-
ing intention. If this is the case, then the impenetrable hypothesis should be some-
how relaxed and a new intentional system along the lines proposed in section 8.4.3
would be an adequate tool to deal with this situation.
8.4.2 Multi-agent Discourses
Imagine, for example, a two person dialogue. An n-tuple of 2-tuples might suit
this case. For each dimensional block, we might have distinctive updates for each
participant, i.e., each sentence updates (possibly in dierent ways) each participant's
information state. A typical information state would look like the one below.
s
n
= hhsa
n
1
; sb
n
1
i; : : : ; hsa
n
n
; sb
n
n
ii(8.1)
The update of s
n
with an atomic formula Px
1
: : : x
m
in a dimensional index i would
be characterized as
hhsa
n
1
; sb
n
1
i; : : : ; hsa
n
n
; sb
n
n
ii[[Px
1
: : : x
m
]]
i
= h: : : ; hsa
n
i
[[Px
1
: : : x
m
]]; sb
n
i
[[Px
1
: : : x
m
]]i; : : :i
Analogously, we might straightforwardly transfer the results from DBPL to here. And,
of course, the number of participants does not pose further concerns. All we have
got to do is to extend the size of each tuple component of the multidimensional
information state getting something looking like (8.2) below.
s
n
= hhs
1
a
n
1
; : : : ; s
m
a
n
1
i; : : : ; hs
1
a
n
n
; : : : ; s
m
a
n
n
ii(8.2)
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The multi-agent multidimensional information state proposed in (8.2) would be
used to formalize the common ground concept. The common ground would be the
intersection set of each hs
1
a
n
i
; : : : ; s
m
a
n
i
i (where 1  i  n). The initial common
ground conguration should correspond to hs
1
a
n
1
; : : : ; s
m
a
n
1
i. As we proceed evaluat-
ing the discourse, new congurations for the common ground will appear as updates
of the previous congurations. Under this conception, every sentence would update
(or, maybe, downdate) the common ground. And, maybe, some type of metric could
be used to verify how big (or small) the disagreement becomes. Such a metric might
trigger a recovery procedure in the hope of putting the discourse back in a \right
direction." If, by some magic spell (or the like), all participants share the same
initial 100% perfect matching common ground, then the model presented in (8.2)
collapses to DBPL as the initial state would be the same and the semantic updates
would follow the same pattern for all participants.
These conjectures pose us with interesting new possibilities and problems. I
wonder what kind of system we might obtain by dropping: (1) the sameness do-
main hypothesis: the domain might be dierent not only for every discourse block
component but also for every discourse participant. (2) the impenetrable assump-
tion: what happens if we allow a cross-fertilization among blocks or even among
participants?
The answers have to wait for the right time come.
8.4.3 Adding Intentionality
The multidimensional model of information states might be generalized in a way
to deal with the intentional component of Grosz and Sidner (1986); similarly, rhet-
orical relations could be accounted for. The idea is that rhetorical relations (and
intentions) would be update functions between dimensions. (So, the impenetrable
hypothesis would not be valid any longer.) This move implies a further research de-
velopment into the ontological nature of discourse components. But it seems clear
that a new range of parenthetical IJ functors would be necessarily one of the pillars
169
for the theory to be developed.
At rst glance, it seems that an intentional system would provide the answer
to the points presented in previous paragraph. Lambda abstraction might work
alongside the new class of IJ functors (lambda abstraction would be the other
pillar). Through lambda abstraction (seen as rhetorical relations) we would, for
example, establish anaphoric links between pronouns and anaphoric constructions,
occurring at an inner block, and their antecedent noun phrases, occurring at the
outer parent block (see gure 5.2, page 95). For this example, the anaphoric the
cat in \The cat will never meet our other cat" refers back to the American cat
that inhabits the outer block. The link would be made through the application of
x:x[[Cat]] to the initial conguration of the information state attached to the inner
block. Lambda abstraction would therefore produce the intentional \transferring"
process along the lines below.
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Admitting that 
n
has introduced 9xCatx, the existential formula for the American
cat, into the outer block, we have for granted that all subsequent uses of x, in
the outer block, will be referring to the same unique cat. If we take x:xP
j
, the
rhetorical parameter for the second block, as x:x[[Cat]] then (x:xP
j
)s
n
2
[[
1
: : :
m
]]
will become (x:x[[Cat]]:s
n
2
)[[
1
: : :
m
]] = (s
n
2
[[Cat]])[[
1
: : :
m
]]. Therefore, before
we start processing the inner block, a new referent is already present in it. And, we
would certainly deal with more complex phenomena along the same lines as the one
just presented.
Note that x:xP
i
:s
n
1
= s
n
1
P
i
where s
n
1
P
i
is the update of s
n
1
made by P
i
(in a
postx notation). This formulation suggests that the intentional function P
i
would
work an update out only once and the updated state would serve as input state
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for the subsequent sentences in the block. Another possibility is to distribute the
update throughout all subsequent sentences. This would look like
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This latter formulation insists in keeping all updates processed so far re-updated by
the intentional relations holding among discourse blocks. This is exemplied by the
following close-up computation on the rst component displayed on the penultimate
line of the example above.
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This would, for example, account for eliminate downdates that would eventually be
produced previously. But these are only rough initial conjectures.
Once more, the dynamics of the multidimensional approach shows its powerful
face.
8.5 A Final Word
dpl was the spaceship which took us to the new DBPL multi-dimensional world. The
rst steps into this world have been done in this thesis. To establish the geography
of the new world is the task to be embraced by future generations.
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